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SUMMARY OF THESIS 
The aim of the thesis is to consider the position of phenomenology in 
contemporary thought in order to argue that only on its terms can a political 
ontology of difference be thought. To inaugurate this project I begin by 
questioning Heidegger's relation to phenomenology. I take issue with the 
way that Heidegger privileges time over space in "Being and Time". In 
this way, the task of the thesis is clarified as the need to elaborate a spatio- 
temporal phenomenology. After re-situating Heidegger's failure in this 
respect within a Kantian background, I suggest that the phenomenological 
grounding of difference must work through the body. I contend that the 
body is the ontological site of both the subject and the object. I use 
Whitehead and Merleau-Ponty to explore the ramifications of this thesis. I 
suggest first of all that architecture should be grounded ontologically in the 
body, and as such avoids being a 'master discourse'. Secondly, by 
theorising the body and world as reciprocally transformative, my reading of 
Merleau-Ponty emphasises the ways in which his thinking opens up a 
phenomenology of embodied difference. 
It is on the basis of these themes that I develop this thinking in the direction 
of race, exploring the dialectics of visibility and invisibility in the work of 
Frantz Fanon and James Baldwin. I argue that, embodied difference attests 
to variations in the agent's freedom to act in the world. If fteedom is 
understood through Merleau-Ponty as being the embodied ground of 
historicity, we must ask after unfreedom. I suggest that the " flesh" 
ontology of a pre-thetic community should be rethought as a regulative 
ideal, the ideal of a justice that can never be given. In this light, 
phenomenology becomes a politics as much as a poetics. Beyond being 
thought of as conservative, phenomenology henceforth unleashes the 
possibility of thinking a transformative embodied agency. 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
In the main, I agree more with the artists than with any 
philosopher hitherto: they have not lost the scent of life, they 
have loved the things of "this world" - they have loved their 
senses. To strive for " desensualisation": that seems to me a 
misunderstanding or an illness of a cure, where it is not merely 
hypocrisy or self-deception. I desire for myself and for all who 
live, may live, without being tormented by a puritanical 
conscience, an ever greater spiritualization and multiplication 
of the senses; indeed, we should be grateful to the senses for 
their subtlety, plenitude, and power and offer them in return the 
best we have in the way of spirit. What are priestly and 
metaphysical calumnies against the sense to us! We no longer 
need these calumnies: it is a sign that one has turned out well 
when, like Goethe, one clings with ever-greater pleasure and 
warmth to the "things of this world": - for in this way he holds 
firmly to the great conception of man, that man becomes the 
transfigurer of existence when he learns to transfigure himself. 
Nietzsche, 1885. 
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It is a suggestive contention to say that the most important issue in 
philosophy today is that of the body. In the history of Western philosophy, 
thought's treatment of the body has tended to follow one of two paths. 
Either the body has become increasingly absent (such that one can progress 
quickly to the core of what is problematic in Kant's critical philosophy by 
asking after 'the body' III his thinking), or increasingly universalised. An 
example of the universalisation of the body in philosophy would seem to be 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's treatment of it 'in the " Phenomenology of 
Perception", whereby an account of the 'normally functioning' body is 
derived from a protracted theoretical examination of one of its pathological 
and damaged instantiations. 
In terms of contemporary thought, I contend in this thesis that in response to 
the hegemony of the universalised body, poststructuralist thought has failed 
to articulate the experience of difference. ' As such, it has failed to return 
'The gross injustice of collating a massive multiplicity of thinking under the banner of Toststructuralism' 
is evident to the author himself. However, in order to proceed, a simplification and a periodisation was 
required. Sometimes, for the sake of maximalising an articulation of one's own intellectual position with 
regard to the broadest context, such devices as 'polemical prefaces' are necessary. Poststructuralism, as a 
theoretical complex that emerged within late-capital academic institutions in many way spans the dynamic 
between the abstract and the concrete introduced in the first paragraph. However, to the extent that the 
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thinking to the concrete. It has at the most thought the difference proper to 
language itself This failure has its origins in the nature of the 
poststructuralist project as a whole. There is an unbridgeable gap between 
the thesis that difference occupies the core of the production of meaning and 
the reality of the experience of difference. This wave of theory has 
elaborated, in the most technically accomplished manner, the lack of 
presence 'meaning' has to itself But it remains caught within a conception 
of signification that cannot respond to the conditions of existence from 
which it takes its cue. As one writer puts it, referring in particular to 
Derrida's 'notion' of differance, 'it responds to a world to which it cannot 
allow itself to refer. ' 2 The proponents of poststructuralism locate its value in 
eschewing ego-centrism and 'presence' in thought. This mode of avoidance 
itself is open to question however. In a sense, it is possible to say that 
poststructuralism. substitutes a privilege accorded to the immanence of the 
sign for a privilege accorded to the immanence of the subject. 
Poststructuralist thought traps itself within linguistic immanence. It reduces 
diverse discourses of poststructuralist thought are obsessed with language is the extent to which that project 
bears the mark of an exaggeration, and ultimately, a failure. 
'M. C. Dillon, 'Merleau-Ponty and Postmodemism', pxxii, the preface to the collection " MERLEAU- 
PONTY VIVANT". 
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every mode of expression to a form of signification or textuality. In these 
terms, poststructuralist thought is once more caught by the philosophical 
seduction of privile ging immanence over transcendence. To spell it out, 
the immanence of signification is the reductive frame into which the 
transcendence of experience is slotted. The gain for such a manotuvre is a 
grand theory appearing a modest guise. Its cost is that real difference gets 
dissimulated by a theoretical impostor. As such, I would argue that the 
articulation of the desire to return to the concrecity of difference through the 
theoretical frameworks of poststructuralism must end in oblique textuality, 
frustration and failure. 
That being stated, no-one would want to deny the power of the name, its 
violence, violations and reductions of multiplicity. It would be 
oversimplistic and reactive to damn wholesale the trends of the last two 
decades of thinking. The valuable legacy of poststructuralist thought will be 
its powerful articulation of the risk involved in treating the sign as neutral. 
Signification in the text has been shown to operate always on the basis of 
exclusion and supplementarity. In an alternative register, codification 
always involves a dynan-uc of territorialisation and de-temtonalisation. 
Henceforth, the rational, the male, white-ness,, order, 'and so on', have been 
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shown to be installed within an unstable economy of privilege. Or again, a 
4perverse' or minor language always threatens to break up the apparently 
calm surface of molar identity. Beneath the apparent neutrality of the sign, a 
limited economy of power coerces language's users to repeat its values 
without question. Poststructuralist thought has therefore donated a vital new 
level of critique: of power in language itself Through the diverse styles of 
its leading lights, language has come to be seen as a prime sight of 
contestation. As such, language, as the instrument of power, has been 
revealed as one of the deepest modes of conditioning. This novel and 
positive form of critique has unfortunately not always met with a positive 
response. In recent times, what might be called an 'apolitical critique' of the 
political in language has arisen. That hackneyed term of abuse, 'political 
correctness', reveals the reactionary backlash against the exposure to 
juridical and general critical attention of one of the most entrenched totems 
of privilege - language itself. We will therefore continue to require 
something like what poststructuralism opened up in order to be viligant 
against the reactive forces of privilege at work in the world. 
In the same gesture, no-one would want to lessen the insights into an 'ethics 
of speech' by the 'great' thinkers of our time. In response to the limited 
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economy of the coercive sign, an awareness of the potentiality of speech 
opening itself up to a dialogue with the different has been made available. 
To begin claiming an ethics of speech involves the contention that speaking 
to the other involves a relation between the finite and the infinite. The other 
to whom one speaks can be touched, but not grasped, to use a distinction 
from Descartes which shall be explored later on in the text. To try to grasp 
always involves the potentiality of violation, of reducing the other to one's 
own horizon of comprehension. Henceforth, the ethical conversation one 
can adopt with the other becomes that of Ventretien infini. 3 In an ideal world 
without violation, one could never be done with realising the difference of 
the other in speech. ' 
Without neutrality, within the regulative ideal of an ethics of speech and an 
ethics of writing, poststructuralist thought has also importantly suspended 
and problematised a distinction between the 'literal' and the 
'Here of course I referring to the original french title of Maurice Blanchot's book, translated as " The 
Infinite Conversation". 
'And as an author, one can never be done with realising the difference of the audience assumed within the 
text. I have to ask myself who I am writing for: is it a white male readership adopting the privileged guise 
of the universal (again)? This entry-point into an ethics of writing, be it academic or otherwise, is therefore 
at the same time a politics of writing. 
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4 metaphorical'. ' The non-neutrality of the sign entails that there Is no literal 
given. But then the sign is not merely a 'metaphor', as if the literal has been 
merely deferred and not rejected. Rather, words and names exist within their 
significational context. These contexts, as the saying goes, can never be 
saturated. 'The significance of this work in one direction lies in ramifying 
the discussion of an ethics of speech. Beyond an ethics of speech being at 
the same time an ethics of writing, it is also an ethics of all relations of 
signification between any form of author and any modality of reader. There 
are no merely 'metaphorical' or 'simply literal and factual' interpretations 
of any form of signification available. Therefore, an ethics of speech implies 
a vigilance that is vigilant at every level of signification, in every context. 
However, having acknowledged all this, it is clear to me that the conditions 
of existence and experience cannot simply be reduced to forms of language 
or textuality. Or rather, if we take 'language' and the 'sign' to have a more 
general extension than the usual, such that they refer beyond the structures 
of linguistics, even in this case a reduction would be said to have occurred. 
5Tbe most important essay on this topic is Jacques Derrida's "White Mythology" in "Margins". 
'The notion that 'meaning depends on context, but contexts can never be saturated', originally comes from 
Jonathan Culler's book " On Deconstruction". 
II 
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Not all existence and not all experience conform to or can be articulated 
within the structure or post-structure of the sign. Conversely, the 
problematisation of the categories of 'experience' and 'perception' by 
poststructuralist thinkers must be contested, for the salvation of any utility 
to theory. ' After the poststructuralist turn, a desire has arisen to figure 
existence and experience once again, as embedded within difference. 
But how can one legitimate this desire? On what basis can it be grounded? 
Do we turn to the body in despair, in the face of theory's recent 
inadequacies to speak of our experience and to articulate our places in the 
world? Or is the body itself an exigency that demands recognition of its 
place? That is, is the body there by default, as that which remains after a 
necessary exaggeration of the limits of language, or does the body issue in 
an ontological primordiality of its own accord? 
The following questions therefore arise: how do we think the return to the 
body philosophically? What method do we use? And how do we figure this 
return in terms of the differences at work in the world that can no longer be 
'In " Speech and Phenomena", Derrida writes, 'There never was any 'perception'; and 'presentation' is a 
representation of the representation that yearns for itself therein as for its own birth or its death. ' Demda, 
1973 p 103. 
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kept silent in theoretical discourses? These are the questions of this thesis. I 
propose that the beginnings of an answer must be thought in terms of 
ontology. Only in relation to ontological difference can the body be 
affirmed philosophically, as a positive conception. The body, as the site of 
return, is no longer taken to be merely just another entity in the world. 
Rather, the body is taken as playing a crucial role in that world's 
construction. The body is therefore much more thanjust another sign in the 
horizontal and shifting economy of differance. The body is both the site of 
an unstable shifting of its very meaning and that upon which history, pain, 
privilege and abjection are inscribed. The body is both just another sign and 
so much more than that. And by claiming that the body must be thought in 
terms of ontological difference this 'so much more' is allowed an initial 
opening towards expression. 
But how can this ontological difference ascribed to the body be thought? 
How do we allow the body to become more than just another sign? I will 
argue that there is a twofold answer to these questions, firstly in terms of the 
form of critique demanded, and secondly in terms of an alternative 
methodology that must be formulated. In terms of critique, the suggestion of 
this thesis is that the body can be thought ontologically only through a 
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critique of transcendentalism. As the foremost transcendental thinker, Kant, 
was himself a 'critical' thinker, what is being suggested is something like a 
C critique of critique'. Our experience of embodiment is not, as a 
tTanscendental argument would claim, fixed within apriori conditions. The 
Kantian apriori forms of space and time are abstractions from a more 
fundamental experience of corporeality. In these more fundamental terms, 
the body is seen as a form of work, or put linguistically, a verbality, that 
spaces and times itself against the background of a world it is in 
communication with. The subject is not therefore most primordially a 
temporal being, as both early- critical -Kant and e arly- quasi -transcendental - 
Heidegger maintain. Interiority, the form of inner sense, as the locus of a 
synthesis of representations across co-existences, or as the site of an 
impossibly ecstatic being-towards -death, is not privileged over exteriority. 
The body is not introduced as an invariant factor in our experience only to 
be de-valued ontologically in the face of a primordiality ascribed to time. A 
transcendental space should not be considered as inferior to a transcendental 
time. And yet this refusal is the moment of disruption of the transcendental 
itself, at least in the fully determined sense of its aprioricity. One of the key 
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elements of the apnori, its universality, is replaced by contingency. We 
shall have to see what becomes of the apriori in the face of this replacement. 
The downgrading of time is achieved once an oppositionality between the 
inside and outside is questioned to the limit. Through such a questioning, 
the subject becomes the site of both an interiority and an exteriority. The 
subject is therefore no longer merely the 'site' 8 of a temporality that always 
differs from its own present, a succession that itself reaches at least as far 
back as Augustine, passes through Kant, and closes with Derrida. Refusing 
to equate and equiprimordialise the subject with its own differing time 
allows thinking, for the first time, to actually consider a form of 
transcendence that is not a dissimulated immanence. For this refusal of the 
primacy of the subject's temporality first signals a return to the body. With 
the opening towards a space of the subject, an acorporeal transcendental 
horizon of possibility is radically questioned. The space of the subject is 
itself not a purely subjective space, and not the only horizon of possibility. 
Rather, the subject's space exceeds the sphere of immanence itself The 
subject's space is its envelopment within transcendence. In other words, the 
'As we shall see in the first chapter, it is always irnpossible to avoid even a preliminary spacing of tiMe III 
language. 
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subject, as a spatiated being, unfolds upon a world which transcends it. 
Until this 'chiasmic' space is brought to thought, all primordiality gets 
locked within different modes of the immanent. 
As a spatio-temporal unfolding upon the world, the subject's 
communication with the world becomes its 'apriori'. Instead of universal 
conditions of possibility for experience and representation, conditions 
which proscribe the incarnation of historicality if not historicality itself, 
contingent conditions of possibility are announced. The body is the site of 
these conditions being inscribed. The body is the surface of all cultural 
meaning. Culture, the practice of difference, is fundamentally embodied. 
The body therefore becomes what was required of it above: it is both a sign 
and so much more than a sign. It is, that is, the way in which history, pain 
and privilege get inscribed. Moreover, without the inscription upon the 
body, these words would make no sense. 
First of all, there is then a body, in communication with the world. The body 
is not therefore the equivalent of a merely physical entity, it is not, in 
Merleau-Ponty's words, the 'momentary' body of this present and then that 
present. The body does not simply see or be seen, touch or simply be 
touched. The body is not simply 'my' body, the grounding site of my 
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subjectivity and my sense of interiority. Nor is it simply, from an external 
or recognition. point of view, 'his', 'her' or the body, the grounding marker f 
As the ground of being, that from which the subject emerges in relation to 
the world, the body is therefore seen in the act of seeing, touched in the act 
of touching. The body is the quintessential site of ontological difference, 
opening up, in each act of perception, the limits of the subject and the 
object. It is not reducible into either a sphere of immanence and interiority 
or to that which exceeds it, transcendence and exteriority. The body is the 
ground of all subsequent abstractions: subject, object, Being, beings. It is 
then, as the phrase above- 'envelopment within the transcendent' suggests, a 
transcendence within immanence. The body is prior to the orders of 
subjectivity and objectivity, grounding both in a pre-oppositional 
communication of worldly contingency. 
Secondly, as I stated, this ontology of difference requires a method. The 
method chosen here is that of phenomenology. In this thesis, I am in 
fundamental agreement with Heidegger when he holds, in " Being and 
Time" . that only through a phenomenological method is ontology possible. 
Phenomenology, as will be clarified in detail in the first chapter, is the 
project to uncover how things appear in their appearing, as appearance. 
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Phenomenology is the attempt to raise us to the surface of existence, 
resisting a fall back into the depths of a conventional mode of perception. In 
phenomenology, one does not simply accept what one sees. Doing 
phenomenology requires a vigilance on the part of its subject and its object. 
More simply, phenomenology requires, in my view, a suspension of the 
habitual (ways of seeing, ways of doing). Phenomenology in this sense is 
not a conservatism; it does not seek to return us to what we already knew 
but had somehow forgotten. For phenomenology, at least under my reading 
and within the terms of this project, leads by its own light towards 
rethinking its ontological ground. In other words, when we begin to ask 
after seeing, after touching, after experiencing our bodies in space and time 
(both in the sense of the time-space of our bodies and the time-space 
situation within which the body itself is grounded), what is demanded is a 
rethinking of the subject, and a rethinking of the object. Phenomenology 
and ontology are therefore reciprocally determinative; only through 
phenomenology can an ontology of difference be clarified (and the only 
ontology available is such an ontology of difference), and yet only through 
ontology can phenomenology be clarified. 
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To return to the point just made, that of refusing to consider 
phenomenology as conservative: this refusal can be seen to take place on 
two levels. At the level of theory, phenomenology attempts something 
radically new in the history of philosophy. In returning to the surface of 
existence, as Nietzsche desires in the opening citation, phenomenology is 
refusing to capitulate to the patterns of devaluation conventional in 
philosophy for most of its history. As M. C. Dillon writes of the positive 
import of phenomenology, 
For the first time, the phenomenon began to assume positive 
importance (against the predominantly negative connotation it 
traditionally had as something less than real), and the mere- 
ness of appearance, the essentially negative definition of 
appearance in contrast to reality, began seriously to be 
questioned. In short, it became increasingly viable to accord to 
phenomena some kind of positive ontological status. 
(Dillon, 19 8 8: 4) 
This radical positive-ism accorded to the phenomenon has its second level, 
the correlate of a radical interpretation of our experience itself 
Phenomenology returns us to a place from which we were not aware we had 
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come from, let alone left. That is to say, phenomenology's reworking in this 
thesis towards a new formulation of ontological difference has ramifications 
for our interpretation of concrete experience. We return to the body, as that 
from which we have been absent. ' And this return is not the moment of a 
fall back into an incorporated subjectivism, or an incorporated objectivism. 
The body we return to, as irreducibly in communication with the world, 
leads to a phenomenological grounding of both community and history. 
Chapters four and five will be essentially concerned with clarifying this 
relation. 
These last two chapters require preliminaries. After outlining the 
significance of the phenomenological method in the first chapter, I go on to 
problematise Heidegger's neo-Kantian privileging of time over space in 
" Being and Time". I will argue that for three reasons, this privilege is 
'The use of the first person plural in this paragraph can well be questioned. But first of all, for whom of the 
readers was it an obvious problem? Who are the 'we' being referred to? Is it human-being, or does it 
conceal a culturally and historically specific event of humanity? My own view is that I write as someone 
from the West, and as a white male westerner it is always necessary to be aware of constructing false 
univesalisations of human experience. Therefore, at the most, the collectivity being implicitly brought into 
question is that of a western collectivity. The 'at the most' here is however significant, and should not be 
silenced. It leads to another question: that of the evasions of complexity at work in attributing the 
possibility of reducing experience and difference within the west to a 'we'. In the fifth chapter, using James 
Baldwin and Frantz Fanon, I will contest such a reduction. Thereby, even such a designation of myself as 
'a white, male westerner' will be seen to be inadequate. At this moment in the text however, I leave the 
twe' as it is, to display both its power to conceal itself in the guise of styllistic familiarity, and to allow the 
reader to question his or her own relation to the aporetics of textual construction. 
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untenable. Firstly, because Heidegger himself calls it such in " On Time and 
Being" years later. Secondly, because in the thirties, Heidegger started 
referring to "Zeit-Raum", therefore implicitly rejecting his earlier 
ontological distinction between the primordiality of time over space. These 
first two points however are merely background to my main argument, 
which is that section 70 of " Being and Time" itself cannot privilege time as 
the transcendental horizon of Dasein's being without involving an 
irreducible spacing of time. Beyond this, I will show that Heidegger's 
distinction between space and time from the point of view of ontology leads 
to a treatment of death which pushes his own phenomenological 
methodology to the limit. I shall argue that Heidegger's purely temporal 
notion of " Being-towards-death" cannot be sustained as phenomenological. 
This questioning of the move to split space from time leads to an 
exploration of its 'original' site, that of the first edition of the "Critique of 
Pure Reason" in the first part of the second chapter. I will show that this 
privilege gets put into unstable crisis with the second edition of Kant's first 
Critical work. The reason for this is because of a textual insertion which 
works to undercut the privilege and primordiality of time and subjectivity. 
This comes about principally with Kant's addition of the " Refutation of 
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Idealism" and the "General Remark on the System of Principles". I shall 
argue that just as Heidegger's " Being and Time" is fundamentally 
destabilized because of an illegitimate devaluation of space in relation to 
time, so too is the second edition of Kant's first Critique. The move towards 
inserting a spatio-temporal schematism in the second edition brings Kant's 
first Critique into an unresolved tension with itself. In response to this, the 
second part of this chapter undertakes to explore how a spatio-temporal 
conception of the object can be constructed, from a phenomenological point 
of view. In other words, I try to explore how Kant's second edition of the 
first Critique can be developed in the direction of a spatio-temporal 
schematism. In order to achieve this, I shall draw on the philosopher Alfred 
Whitehead and Marcel Proust. We will see that Whitehead's notion of a 
processual 'object I is a combination of a process of synthesis and analysis 
(what he calls the prehensive and the separative). In other words, behind 
appearance, the phenomenon actually appears as a gathering of what is 
always already dispersed. The object individuates itself in the present as a 
distinct and unique mode of being that nonetheless relates essentially to 
itself by way of difference. 
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This line of research leads to the question of the subject. The question can 
be raised as follows: if the object can be reconsidered as always already 
complex, differing from itself within space and time, what implications does 
this have for the subject? What relation does the object now have for the 
subj ect? Or I if it is possible to establish that the subject itself is spatio- 
temporally ecstatic, (to use a word that will have much mileage in the work 
to come), what difference is there between subject and object? The third 
chapter will open up a phenomenological return to the subject and its work, 
in the face of its disappearance by the time of Heidegger's post-turn work. 
Heidegger's error, I suggest, is to displace subjectivity onto certain forms of 
apparent transcendence, for example the work of architecture and the saying 
of language. As displaced modalities of subjectivity, these forms of 
monumentalist signification are in actual fact dissimulated forms of 
immanence. What goes missing is the subject, experiencing built space and 
working with language. In response to Heidegger, I will develop a 
conception of the subject's worklessness, as expressing the way in which 
the subject re-works what is given (in space, in language). On these terms, 
meaning is therefore neither the sole domain of the subjectAor that which 
transcends it; it is rather produced ftom within a relationship between the 
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given and the present of its possible transformation. It is in the poetry of 
Rilke that I locate the most lyrical expression of this possibility of 
transformation. 
This poetic opening will then be developed, in the following chapter, by a 
reading of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. I suggest that Merleau-Ponty 
provides the spatio-temporal schematism that Kant's second edition of the 
" Critique of Pure Reason" suggested without resolving. In the late 
Merleau-Ponty's work, "The Visible and the Invisible", this schernatism is 
called 'The Intertwining". In order for a schematism to be more than just 
temporal, it must involve the transcendence of the other, beyond the subject. 
In this chapter, I find myself in agreement with M. C. Dillon when he argues, 
in his book " Merleau-Ponty's Ontology", that the difference between the 
early Merleau-Ponty and the late Merleau-Ponty is linguistic, not 
conceptual. The "Phenomenology of Perception" repeats a Kantian 
transcendentalism only at the level of appearance. Beneath this superficial 
reading, I will develop an interpretation which brings to the fore the issue of 
the embodiment of difference, and the difference of worlds. An apparent 
universality to Merleau-Ponty's early phenomenology lies in extreme 
tension with a radical specificity and phenomenology of singularity. As 
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such, the prevalent embodied normativity of much of that work is undercut 
by an implicit ontology of difference. 
At this point, we arrive at the goal of the thesis: rethinking a 
phenomenology of embodiment from the perspective of an ontology of 
difference. Such a goal would of itself act to reposition how we think of 
Merleau-Ponty's beautiful, often voluptuous prose. Phenomenology, as 
much as it involves a poetics, will be seen as the site of the political. A 
phenomenological ontology of the body leads to thinking difference, 
community and historicality. As such, a phenomenological ontology of the 
political is broached and opened up to thinking. In my final chapter, I 
attempt to outline this project first of all by looking at Frantz Fanon's essay 
'The Fact of Blackness. ' I read this text in terms of its overt relation to 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, and the way in which Fanon provides a 
powerful critique of Merleau-Ponty on the basis of a corporeal capacity to 
act being undermined by the fact of having a differently coloured skin. This 
critique of Fanon's is not condemnatory of Merleau-Ponty however; I will 
argue that Fanon merely develops a capacity for thinking difference that is 
made available through Merleau-Ponty's work. The importance of Merleau- 
Ponty today lies just in this fact: that he can be used as a resource for 
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thinking the embodiment of difference. That phenomenology of difference 
was only ever implicit within his text however. As such, a critique of 
Merleau-Ponty from the position of a thinker like Fanon is a wholly positive 
critique. 
After this, I will perform a reading the black American author James 
Baldwin, specifically passages from his novel " Another Country". 1 will 
read into this work a brilliant thematisation of what is involved in the 
embodiment of difference. Difference lies prior to epistemology, before 
questions of what is or is not known. Embodied difference determines the 
parameters of the known, and as such, grounds it. I argue therefore that 
Baldwin enacts, in prose form, the very argument of this thesis: that 
epistemology must be grounded in a phenomenological ontology of the 
body. It cannot be regarded in itself as primary, for to do so would be to fall 
into the universalist mode of an ahistorical, aspecific aprioricity; a mode 
which cannot think its own ontological committments. 
This thesis, in sum, will attempt, through a phenomenological ontology, to 
think the politics of difference. By doing so, it will firstly contribute to the 
debate on the present and future of phenomenology. Secondly, it will 
ground the current moves away from the abstractions of an overplaced 
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emphasis on the sign and codification. Thirdly, it will lead philosophy back 
to a relation with concrete experience itself In particular, it will ground 
everyday discourses on the embodiment of difference within theory. 
Finally, it will re-evaluate the position of various themes within philosophy. 
In particular, epistemology will be shown to be derivative upon a 
phenomenological ontology. 
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CHAPTER 1: HEIDEGGER. AND PHENOMENOLOGY 
Heidegger and phenomenology. In my view, the relation between these two 
terms of reference has yet to be fully explored in any secondary text. And 
yet, I contend, this relation is of crucial importance, if we are to proceed 
towards understanding and developing either. My interest in Heidegger in 
this chapter lies in examining this relation in some of his texts, in particular 
"Being and Time", with a view to ft-ying to explain its initial form, and to 
show how this relation changed. The reason for doing this is not in order to 
uncover another form of scholarly approach to Heidegger's oeuvre, it is 
rather in order to begin again with phenomenology. 
The situation today is that no-one asks about Heidegger's relation to 
phenomenology. This is a curious mode of silence, if we consider the 
following facts. 
In Heidegger's magnum opus, "Being and Time", the destruction of 
ontology, the philosopher's project of re-evaluating and transforming the 
western tradition of philosophy, has an explicitly stated methodology: a 
phenomenological one. In section 7, entitled "The Phenomenological 
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Method of Investigation", Heidegger writes, 
With the question of the meaning of Being, our investigation 
comes up against the fundamental question of philosophy. This 
is one that must be treated phenomenologically. 
ilT 
krieidegger, 1962: 49-50) 
It would be hard to accord phenomenology with a more significant status in 
this work. ' Phenomenology, in this early masterpiece, is the method 
necessary in order to perform the destruction of ontology. Heidegger repeats 
and affirms Husserl's methodological rallying call of 'Sachen selbst', 'to the 
things themselves'. Ontology, as the uncovering of the Being of beings, 
aspires to return the philosophical project to the concrete facts of existence. 
In order to do so, it must proceed through an analysis of Dasein's existence. 
Phenomenology is the manner in which philosophy begins to do this. 
2) And yet. Something occurs along the path of Heidegger's thinking which 
decenters an explicit phenomenology to the periphery, if not beyond this to 
the realm of silence. Phenomenology is abandoned. In Heidegger's "A 
1 Readers will recall that the work is dedicated to the founder of twentieth century phenomenology, 
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Dialogue on Language"', Heidegger responds to the Japanese enquirer's 
puzzlement over the ' dropping' of the words 'hen-neneutics' and 
gphenomenology' as follows, 
That was done, not - as is often thought- in order to deny the 
significance of phenomenology, but in order to abandon my 
own path of thinking to namelessness. (Heidegger, 1971: 29)2 
The question that I will address in this chapter is how we are to understand 
the nature of this transformation of the way in which Heidegger positions his 
thought in relation to phenomenology. How can Heidegger at once affirm 
phenomenology's significance and yet distinguish, in his later work, 
between a phenomenological methodology and his 'own path of thinking? ' 
What is the difference between phenomenology and Heidegger's voyage 
towards namelessness that the philosopher suggests here? More importantly 
still, why does Heidegger begin to make the distinction between his own 
thought and the phenomenological methodology he abandoned? What 
becomes problematic for Heidegger in relation to phenomenology? In other 
words, we will try to understand the following passage of mystery, written in 
Edmund Husserl. 
2 As John Llewelyn writes, '. if the movement of Heidegger's reflection is "through phenomenology to 
thought, " it is "through" in the sense that phenomenology is not left behind. Thought remams a thought of 
appearing- and disappearing. ' Llewelyn, 1986 p16. 
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a late text of Heidegger's entitled "My Way to Phenomenology". 
And today? The age of phenomenological philosophy seems to 
be over. It is already taken as something past which is only 
recorded historically along with other schools of philosophy. 
But in what is most its own phenomenology is not a school. It is 
the possibility of thinking, at times changing and only thus 
persisting, of corresponding to the claim of what is to be 
thought. If phenomenology is thus experienced and retained, it 
can disappear as a designation in favor of the matter of thinking 
whose manifestness remains a mystery. (Heldegger, 1962: 82, 
emphasis added) 
In this chapter, the argument put forward is that Heidegger's break with 
phenomenology occurs within the movement of "Being and Time" itself. 3 In 
particular, I will argue that the privileging of time over space in that text 
takes Heidegger's thinking to the cusp of breaking with phenomenology. 
The reason for this is that the way in which Heidegger enacts the privilege of 
time over space involves sacrificing space. In "Being and Time", time 
' By using the word 'break' I am relying on the tension between two of its senses, that of the snapping of a 
given form of continuity on the one hand, and that of a rest or suspension of activity on the other. As 
Michel Haar writes in Chapter VI of "The Song of the Earth" 'Heidegger's distance from phenomenology 
never went so far as to reach a point of rupture'(1990: 78). 
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privileged involves space denied. But this sacrificial logic of privilege and 
denial cannot be successful, and this for two reasons. Firstly, to privilege 
time and to ultimately deny space involves a sacrifice of phenomenology 
itself. For, as Heidegger himself shows in the early sections of the work, 
essential to the phenomenological analysis of existence is an uncovering of 
spatiality. Dasein exists in the world fundamentally as a being directing and 
directed in space. Therefore, the later privileging of time over space involves 
discriminating against and devaluing what had previously been deemed 
essential to phenomenology. In order to discriminate against space, I argue 
that Heidegger must break with the phenomenological method, which, as 
was shown in the quote from section 7 above, he would not avowedly want 
to do. Secondly, and concomitantly, the essential spatio-temporality of 
human existence entails that the attempt to privilege time over space has 
phenomenological repercussions which Heidegger cannot control. I will 
show, in my reading of section 70 of "Being and Time", that Heidegger's 
attempt to privilege time over space relies upon a spacing of what is 
designated as time's ante-spatial character. In other words, Heidegger's 
attempt to privilege time over space involves positing a construction of time 
that already involves a 'spacing'. And given the ambition of this section, this 
ineradicable spacing goes against Heidegger's wishes. These 
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phenomenological repercussions take place most obviously on the level of 
language. Heidegger's attempt to articulate a time free of space involves an 
irreducibly spatial and temporal vocabulary. 
will argue then that the attempt to privilege time over space in section 70 is 
illegitimate. After having demonstrated this, I will go on to explore the 
implications for the rest of Heidegger's analysis in that work. Devaluing his 
important analyses of existential spatiality in the face of time leaves 
Heidegger with the apparently more primordial phenomenology of 
temporality and being-towards-death. I will argue that this phenomenology 
of death itself is problematic in that it entails the possibility of an impossible 
revelation. Transcendence is named as the 'possibility of the absolute 
impossibility of Dasein'. 4 Named in this way, transcendence must always 
fall back into immanence, as its unsayable limit. In other words, the 
transcendence of death lies beyond representation and experience, and as 
such, 'beyond' phenomenology. This is witnessed in the constant deferral of 
an answer to whether a phenomenological ontology of death is possible in 
sections 46 to 53 of "Being and Time". Again, I contend that at bottom 
Heidegger's error lies in eschewing a phenomenological spatio-temporality. 
Most fundamentally, Heidegger's error is that of taking space and time to be 
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primordially distinct. In this, Heidegger can be seen to be repeating the 
analytic emphasis placed upon their apriori forms in Kant's "Critique of 
Pure Reason". For Kant, space and time are aprion forms of perception. By 
this, he meant that prior to all actual seeing, hearing, touching and so on, our 
perception is already conditioned by an understanding of the form of the 
object perceived as involving both space and time. In other words, space and 
time do not begin with the object perceived, they are on the contrary the 
framework by which we perceive. Most significantly, for Kant, space and 
time are separate aprion forms. One could say that they are in a sense 
'ontologically' distinct. This distinction allows Kant, most clearly in the first 
edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason", to privilege time as the form of 
inner sense. Time, as the condition of possibility of all representations, has a 
greater extension than space, which is the form of outer sense alone. Time, 
as the form of the subject, becomes the transcendental horizon upon which 
space is grounded. Heidegger repeats this separation or schism between 
space and time, as well as the privilege accorded to the latter, in "Being and 
Time", such that space and time are ontologically distinct orders of being. In 
simple terms, the structure of this work involves an early emphasis on a 
phenomenology of space giving way to a later emphasis on Dasein's 
4)7 Being and Tune", p294. 
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temporal nature. Heidegger refuses to think the possibility of a 
phenomenological spatio-temporality. Instead, he begins by holding that 
space is a vital aspect of existence, and ends by concurring with the first 
edition Critique's contention that time is more primordial still, to the extent 
that any apparent primordiality of space is annulled. By grounding space in 
time, Heidegger therefore subjects his thought to a subtle repetition of the 
subjectivism his pre-dualistic ontology of the phenomena had sought to 
escape. 
I will suggest that perhaps more than anything, the subjectivism which 
ensures time is given transcendental privilege in "Being and Time" is the 
motivation for Heidegger subsequently to drop phenomenology. By 
grounding inner time and historicality in Dasein"s ecstatic temporality, 
Heidegger repeats the subjectivism Dasein's Being-in-the-world campaigned 
phenomenologically against. In seeking a non-subjectivistic 'ground' for 
historicality, Heidegger is led to become suspicious of the notion of 
'phenomenon' itself 
Therefore, by repeating the Kantian tendency to separate time from space, 
Heidegger becomes blind to the inevitable spacing involved in any construal 
of time, and blind moreover to the inevitable temporisation involved in any 
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construal of space. Section 70, as I shall show, bears testimony to the 
difficulties Heidegger gets himself into by overprivileging an analycity 
which separates time from space. That is, the error in Heidegger's thinking 
in section 70 is an error derived from an inadequate attention to 
phenomenology. Or rather, Heidegger neglects to question the Kantian 
privileges (of the first edition of the "Critique"), blocking his thought to the 
possibility of thinking phenomenology differently. 
The problem for Heidegger, as we shall see, is that section 70 is absolutely 
crucial in terms of the direction of "Being and Time's" argument. If it is 
possible to undermine the privileging of time over space in "Being and 
5 Time", the whole project collapses. The subsequent analysis of temporality 
and historicality after section 70 will constantly be nagged by a spacing and 
a spatiality that must be there at its inception. The analysis of spatiality 
becomes an essential part of a fundamental ontology. As such, the 
'temperocentrism 56 of "Being and Time", its abiding bias, would be 
challenged. And Heidegger's desire to ground a notion of historical freedom 
(or freedom to 'histonse' - to be a part of history's unfolding) will take on 
the mantle of a manifest failure. 
5 Didier Franck notes, in "Heidegger et le probleme de 1'espace, " 'if "spatiality" has to intervene in the 
derivation of inner-time from onginary temporality, the whole project called Being and Time would thereby 
36 
Chapter 1: Heidegger and Phenomenology 
* 
I will begin by examining how Heidegger introduces and justifies his own 
methodology. In section 7 of "Being and Time", Heidegger attempts to 
provide a determination of what he means by the word 'phenomenology' 
and a preliminary conception of the role it will play In his research. To 
begin, he states that phenomenology is the method by which ontology will 
be uncovered. The destruction (Abbau) of ontology which Heidegger 
proposes involves ignoring the resources of the tradition of ontology. This 
eschewal is justified for Heidegger because he thinks it is not possible to 
derive a methodology from the history of that methodology's results. The 
history of ontology has been a history of covering over that which the 
methods and vocabularies employed in order to proceed have attempted to 
disclose. The history of metaphysics has been the history of an error. 
Phenomenology, as a possibility rather than an actual historical tTadition, 
will on the other hand allow the Being of beings to be described. 
Phenomenology will allow, that is, for an understanding of the things 
themselves which is not buried within the sedimentations of past 
philosophical movements. 
be called into question. ' p 115 
61 take the teim from Ed Casey's book "Gettmg Back Into Place". 
7 t, Being and Time", p63 
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Nor will the understanding of the things themselves be merely ontic. Or, as 
Heidegger puts it, he is not interested in the 'what' but the 'how' of the 
objects of philosophical research. He explains the relationship between 
phenomenology and the object of ontic science as follows, 
'Phenomenology' neither designates the object of its researches, 
nor characterizes the subject-matter thus comprised. The word 
merely informs us of the "how" with which "what" is to be 
treated in this science gets exhibited and handled. (Heidegger, 
1962: 59) 
Heidegger therefore uses the phenomenological method in order to get 
beneath any technical description of objects available through the various 
sciences. These sciences work on the presupposition of objective being for 
Heidegger. The ground of this objectivity remains hidden as long as any of 
these sciences are taken as primordial. Without an ontological ground, the 
different ontic sciences therefore remain 'free-floating'. 
Heidegger proceeds by separating out phenomenology into its two ancient 
Greek constituents: phenomenon and logos. It is through the exegesis on the 
former that Heidegger somewhat densely attempts to distinguish between an 
ontic understanding of the phenomena of objects and an ontological one. He 
38 
Chapter 1: Heidegger and Phenomenology 
does this by calling the former 'appearance' (Erscheinung), and the latter 
cphenomenon' (Phanomenon). The appearance of objects is derived from 
their being as phenomena. Heidegger elaborates several modes of derivation 
of appearance from phenomena, each of which demonstrates itself as a form 
of concealment or privation of the phenomena itself. I shall not explore these 
distinctions. What is more important is to understand that for Heidegger, the 
etymology of the word "phenomenon" suggests the following definition: 
"that which shows itself in itself'. The phenomenon is therefore not shown 
to the subject as a mode of subjectivity. That is, uncovering the phenomenon 
does not directly involve a research into unmediated forms of experience. 
And on the other hand, the phenomenon is not self-evidently available in the 
manner of an apparent scientifically grounded transparency. The 
phenomenon is not, therefore, of the order of subjective nor objective Being. 
Heidegger notes that ýoavufflat is a 'middle-voiced form'. This reference to 
a form of grammar that lies between the subject and object is therefore 
ontologically significant. The verbality of the phenomenon's manifestation 
is neither active, the work of the subject, nor passive, the work of that which 
transcends the subject. The phenomenon lies prior to appearances as given to 
the subject and appearances as ascribed to the object. As such, the 
phenomenon is antenor to the clefting of a dualistic epistemology. Both pre- 
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subjective and pre-obj ective, the phenomenon therefore designates the 'how' 
of how something appears as itself. It contrasts with a mere 'representation' 
of the percept to the subject, a modality that would always be grounded In 
subjectivity. All forms of appearance of the object where it appears as 
something else will therefore be deemed derivative upon an originary 
possibility for the ob ect to appear as itself The appearance of the j 
phenomenon as appearance therefore refers to ways in which the object is 
given, by external or subjective means, a different designation to the way in 
which it would appear, if it were to appear as itself. I will provide an 
excursus on an example of this in the following chapter, which can be 
mentioned briefly here to clarify the distinction between appearance and 
phenomenon I take Heidegger to be making. 
Dp 
Reading A. N. Whitehead, I will introduce his idea of the 'fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness'. This refers to the way in which modem thinking 
has reified an abstract conception of reference and the percept and therefore 
displaced what is most concrete. The most concrete is henceforth in modem 
ontology deemed to be the 'simple' object. The simple object refers to the 
here and now discrete presence of the object to perception. The object 
appears as a non-relational entity, independent of its relation to its context in 
both a spatial and a temporal sense. Whitehead provides a detailed analysis 
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of the procedure whereby the abstract is taken to be most concrete, and 
suggests ways to return thinking to the object according to a non-abstract 
framework. The object is not simple in the most concrete sense, for it always 
involves relationality. Under the influence of Leibniz, Whitehead propounds 
what can be described as a phenomenology of process, whereby the object is 
seen to always already refer to the unfolding of its spatio-temporal context 
and vice versa. I shall examine this argument in more detail in the following 
chapter. 
What it is important to note here is that Whitehead can be seen to be 
providing just the sort of distinction between appearance and phenomenon 
referred to in Heidegger above. The appearance of the object as appearance 
(rather than as itself) is its misconstrual as a 'simple' obj ect. And, with 
Heidegger, Whitehead provides what can be described as a 'genealogy' of 
the simple object, locating its emergence in the birth of modem conceptions 
of space and time. In other words, the object acquires layers of 
significational sedimentation which cover over the manner in which it 
actually appears as itself. Whitehead's proposed return to the object seen as 
a process or 'event' therefore marks the move back from a derivative and 
ontic comprehension of the object to its phenomenologico- ontological 
source. This movement is, if we read what I am calling Whitehead's 
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4phenomenology' in the light of "Being and Time" section 
phenomenology's very necessity. That is, phenomenology is necessary 
because our conception of the object has become distorted by the 
appearances given to it by the tradition of metaphysics and the groundless 
reworkings of ontic science. As Heidegger writes, '.. just because the 
phenomena are proximally and for the most part not given, there is need for 
phenomenology. Covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to 
'phenomenon'. '(Heidegger, 1962: 60) 
Again, it is not to the point of the work of this chapter to examine in detail 
Heidegger's mining of the etymological resources of the 'logos', save to say 
that it produces a middle-voiced conception of 'letting something be seen, in 
letting entities be perceived. 8 This enables Heidegger to derive the following 
full-length definition of the phenomenological method: 'to let that which 
shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from 
itself'9Again, appearances both subjectively and objectively sourced are 
therefore derived from an ontological between. The phenomenon appears as 
itself through an exchange between the immanence of subjectivity and the 
transcendence of the world. The phenomenon is therefore neither the sole 
work of the subject, a path that would lead to the psychologism 
42 
Chapter 1: Heidegger and Phenomenology 
phenomenology has always sought to counter, nor the work of external 
being. The character of this exchange of something like a 'transcendence 
within immanence9 is clarified in the ensuing sections, where Heidegger 
introduces the notion of "Being in the WorIX'(In-der-Welt-Sein) 
By this stage in his analyses, it is clear that Heidegger is providing a way out 
of the dichotomous trap of Cartesian dualism. In Chapter III of Division One 
of "Being and Time", Heidegger contrasts the modem ontology of the object 
and space with the phenomenological ontology which he will set out. He 
writes, ý.. a discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the 'world' will provide 
us likewise with a negative support for a positive explication of the spatiality 
of the environment and of Dasein itself" OThe Cartesian ontology referred to 
sets out the primordiality of the world in terms of res extensa. For 
Heidegger, this ontology is reductive, exemplifying a dualism between 
extended matter and thinking being which cannot support and clarify the 
spatiality of Dasein's relation with the world. The human's experience of its 
relation with the world cannot be articulated solely in tenns of an interaction 
between two forms of extension, that of a finite extension (the body) in 
relation to an indefinite extension (the world). Prior to the 'appearance' of 
81bid, p58 
9fbid. 
loIbid. ppl22-123. 
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objects and the seenungly self-evident givenness of physical being, an 
existential attachment to the world needs to be uncovered. Preceding the 
external spatiality of extension, something like an 'Intrinsic' spatiality has to 
be sought. Only thus could extension and physical/objective/mathematical 
being be seen to have legitimacy, as a derivation and abstraction from 
concrete existential relations. In other words, prior to an ontic layer of 
description, an ontology of space is required. And again, with Heidegger's 
method of phenomenological ontology, this analysis is sought through an 
examination of the spatiality of Dasem, the being who most obviously resists 
the reduction of being described merely as a physical entity, extended in a 
world of extension. 
In contrast with the object as it appears within Descartes' thinking, 
Heidegger's notion of the phenomenon in a sense occupies a 'third space' 
between subject and object. With this in mind, the Being of beings which 
manifests itself in the phenomenon, the thing itself and its spatiality, requires 
fleshing out and determination. Heidegger elaborates this determination in 
terms of Daseins In-der-Welt-Sein being ordered and given significance 
through use and function. In the simplest terms, the object's ontological 
significance lies in terms of its functional relation within Dasein's world. 
Dasein exists in a world of objects that signify on the basis of their slot 
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within a totality of functions, what we might call a 'praxis horizon. ' Instead 
of Dasein confronting an object that signifies on the basis of its simple here 
and now presence, its presence-at-hand (Vorhanden) as for example a simple 
extended thing, Dasein more primordially encounters objects in the world as 
'availabilities' (Zuhanden). Each object-thing is not a 'simple object I in 
Whitehead's sense; on the contrary, it makes sense only in terms of a 
background of a task-horizon within which it fits. Heidegger's most 
celebrated example of this are the meanings ascribed to the hammer and nail 
in the world of the carpenter. Both are understood most primordially not in 
terms of their present-at-hand signification, as if they would bestow their 
value to an outsider in terms of a simple inspection in isolation from the 
purposes to which they are put. Rather, they signify in terms of their role 
within the carpenter's work. The hammer and nail allow the carpenter to 
perform tasks which themselves only make sense in terms of the wider 
context of the work being undertaken. So, for example, banging this nail into 
this plank of wood, what we might call a 'local' task, itself only makes sense 
in terms of the boat the carpenter is building. Each tool therefore signifies on 
the basis of the tasks to which it is put, and these tasks themselves only 
signifiy on the basis of the wider context of the job being done. Instead of an 
attempt to derive the significance of objects from an atomistic, discrete, 
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present-at-hand snapshot of the tool, the notion of a tool or object as an 
'availability' allows Heidegger to think the complex interrelationality of 
things in the world. 
Heidegger holds that Dasein exists in-the-world through a series of contexts 
analogous to that of the craftsman. Dasein is not given the ontological 
privilege of an existence prior to the worldly significance of context upon 
context of praxis. Rather, Dasein exists ecstatically, as always already 
embedded within the world. At the same time, the horizon of worldly praxis 
is already there for Dasem only on the basis of that horizon being shaped by 
Dasein. Objects are 'available' as ready-to-hand, a more literal translation of 
Ahandenheit. The significance of the equipment of the world cannot be 
separated from the capacities and availabilities of Dasein's ways of being-in- 
the-world. Again we return to the middle-voiced character of the 
phenomenon. The object does not bestow its significance in a manner 
extemal or extrinsic to human existence. Dasein is not passive in the face of 
its encounter with the signification of things in the world. And yet Dasein's 
shaping of these things is not totalizing. For how could Dasein shape the 
extra-significational. materiality of things themselves? The phenomenon 
therefore appears as itself, through its involvement within the praxis-horizon 
of Dasein's taskful comportment in the world. The paradigm example of this 
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would be a sculpture in wood or clay, where the materiality of the object is 
at one and the same time expressive of the work of the hands of the 
craftsman that worked it. 
Dasein's third space of 'being-in-the-world', prior to the clefting into res 
cogitans and res exkis-a is, as the gammar of the middle voice implies, 
ontologically pre-dualistic. Dasein enters a world already shaped by human 
ways of comportment, a world of signification and value that we can call 
cstrangely familiar'. The familiarity of the world lies in its modes of 
adaption to human possibilities. Things in the world are primordially 
4 available', that is they fit into patterns and contexts of action which are the 
traditions of bodily being Dasein will acquire through practice and 
habitualisation. The strangeness of the world lies in the fact that it pre-exists 
any signification Dasein might desire to stamp upon it. Dasein is 'throwirl' 
(Gewurf) into a world that exceeds the significational matrices the individual 
might want to project onto it. And yet this excessivity is not wholly alien, for 
it offers itself in ways which will become recognisable to Dasein as it learns 
the ways of the world. 
A key aspect of the prior-ity of the world lies in the way in which the 
always already established practical horizons of comportment are shaped 
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around a materiality that Dasein cannot comprehend in advance of 
experimentation. In "Being and Time", Heidegger is reticent in developing 
the alterity of the object in this direction. It is as if every object, whether 
equipment or a non-artefactual entity, is accorded the same significational 
value. Natural entities, potential sources of the sublime, are refused their 
difference. But this refusal of an excessive materiality does not hold 
throughout the text, for Heidegger writes in section 15, 
"Nature" is not to be understood as that which is just present- 
at-hand, nor as the power of Nature. The wood is a forest of 
timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, 
the wind is wind 'in the sails'. As the 'environment' is 
discovered, the 'Nature' thus discovered is encountered too. If 
its kind of Being as ready-to-hand is disregarded, this 'Nature' 
itself can be discovered and defined simply in its pure presence- 
at-hand. But when this happens, the Nature which 'stirs and 
strives', which assails us and enthralls us as landscape, remains 
hidden. (Heidegger, 1962: 100) 
Despite this brief yet sublime intervention against the functional relatiVities 
of the tool, the 'natural', as that which is strangely familiar, cannot survive 
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the emphasis on an inclusive ontology of the world that Heidegger sets out. 
The sublime, as that which stirs, strives, assails and enthralls is ultimately 
reduced to the status of the 'not-yet' available. The worldliness of the world 
encompasses any possible alterity of the natural, comforting and reducing 
the possibility of the sublime, that which would exceed the limits of the 
world. The world is therefore hardly shaken or solicited by nature rearing its 
face as briefly as it does in this passage. In the third chapter, the possibility 
of an exterionty and a materiality that lies beyond the remit of the subject 
will be explored and named as 'worklessness. ' The determining force of use 
and function, as the dominant mode of articulation of the interrelationality 
between Dasein and the world, silences modes of being that are extra- 
functional. There is no space in "Being and Time" for an enthralment not re- 
appropriated in tenns of function. Nor is there any space in this work for any 
less dramatic forms of extra-functional being-in-the-world: contemplation, 
absorption, meditation, rapture. 
Despite this limitation, it is nonetheless true that the phenomenological 
ontology of worldliness in sections 14 to 24 of "Being and Time" provides a 
rich resource for thinking non-dualistically about Dasein's spacing of the 
world and the world's spacing of Dasein. In addition to what has been 
outlined above, we should note that these sections also incoporate the 
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notions of the 'here' and 'there', and the idea of place or region as the 
encompassing horizon for Dasein's practical comportment in the world. 
However, with all these terms in mind, one could criticise the 
phenomenological work Heidegger performs here on the basis of an absence 
of an irreducible temporality at work in these aspects and terms of 
worldliness and worldhood. For instance, the notion of 'here' and 'there' 
necessarily involves more than just a spatial proximity or distance. For if 
there were no temporal distance between the near and far, the spacing 
between them would be pressured by the threat of collapse. "The reverse 
problem occurs, in my view, in Division 11 of "Being and Time", where a 
phenomenology of temporality encounters difficulties on the basis of an 
attempt to think time's irreducibility. In both cases, I hold that an irreducible 
spatio-temporality of Dasein's Being-in-the-world gets distorted as it is first 
of all pushed through the filter of a pure existential spatiality, and secondly 
reduced into the extrapolations of an 'ecstatic' temporality. Heidegger 
commits the methodological (and therefore ontological) error of believing 
that space and time can be treated separately. In the latter part of "Being and 
Time", this leads to the isolation and privilege granted to the ultimate form 
of ecstatic temporality, being-towards-death. 
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* 
Before approaching the impossible phenomenology of death, that 'ahead of 
which' that resists manifestation, in my view, in terms of a 
phenomenological showing 'as itself , it is necessary to review how 
Heidegger tries to persuade the reader against the obviousness of 
phenomenological spatio-ternporality. For this purpose, I now turn towards 
the work of section 70 of "Being and Time". It is in this section that 
Heidegger attempts to assert the ontological primordiality of time over 
space, thereby repeating the privileged transcendental role of time in Kant, 
which Heidegger will come subsequently to recognise as a recrudescence of 
the subjectivism he sought to undermine. 
In this section, entitled, 'The Temporality of the Spatiality that is 
Characteristic of Dasein' (Die Zeitlichkeit des daseinsmässigen 
Rdumlichkeit), Heidegger makes clear the hierarchical relation he wants to 
install between temporality and spatiality, 
Dasein's constitution and its ways to be are possible 
ontologically only on the basis of temporality, regardless of 
whether this entity occurs 'in time' or not. Hence Dasein's 
1 'This idea is developed in terms of the death of architecture wrought by the mstitutionalisation of other 
51 
Chapter 1: Heidegger and Phenomenology 
specific spatiality must be grounded in temporality. (Heidegger, 
1962: 418) 
I shall begin to explore this transcendental privilege by constructing 
Heidegger's phenomenological justification of it. Heidegger holds that only 
with the threefold ecstatic play of Dasein's temporal structure as care 
(Sorge) can spatiality be made available. He writes, 
Because Dasein as temporality is ecstatico - horizonal in its 
Being, it can take along with it a space for which it has made 
room, and it can do so factically and constantly. (Ibid: 420) 
Heidegger is claiming that the space that Dasein is presented with has no in- 
itself qualia, is not 'simply located', rather it is significant only in relation to 
the dyadic series of 'here' and 'there', or the 'near' and 'far'. Moreover, 
Heidegger wants to claim that the 'here-there' relation itself is 'grounded' in 
Dasein's anticipatory temporal horizon. Heidegger in effect is arguing that 
one is 'here', on the way to the region 'there' (negotiating a specific course 
across the praxis horizon) only on the basis of a temporal stTucture which is 
always already there. One is 'here' in a specifiable relation to any number of 
regions only on the basis of the present being the locus of time stretching 
modes of communication and information transfer in Paul Virilio's "The Lost Dimension". 
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across from the preceding moments (Husserl's 'retention') and into the 
openness of pro-jective possibility ('protention'), a stretching whose 
momentum is always futural; one is always here, having been there, always 
on the way elsewhere. Heidegger suggests that what is present, the matter of 
how the present presents itself, is to be thought of in teinns of an 
exhaustively temporal relationality, 'Only on the basis of its ecstatico- 
horizonal tem orality is it possible for Dasein to break into 
11 tTik s ace. kiLuid: 421) p 
In Heidegger's view, the world, prima facie structured by spatial relations, 
manifold extensionalitie, s, is in fact ordered more primordially by Dasein's 
projective temporal character, and at the limit, (subverted) by being towards 
death. The 'here' and 'there' dyadic structure of Dasein's orientation in the 
world uncovered by Heidegger's phenomenological analysis is itself 
disclosed and structured by Dasem's three-fold ecstatic temporality. The 
temporal distentia founds the spatialising dispersion (Zerstreuung). Only 
because Dasein exists outside of itself in time can it emerge as open to the 
modalities of space. 
This phenomenological justification of time's primordiality over space is 
evidently problematic. The phenomenological array of terms Heidegger 
53 
Chapter 1: Heidegger and Phenomenology 
employs to describe worldliness are obviously taken from a spatio-temporal 
lexicon. To be 'here' on the way 'there', to be in this region of 'nearness', 
against the background of the far, and above all, to exist ec-statically - these 
references are clearly distorted and reduced when read in terms of a more 
primordial and solely temporal reference. It is as if Heidegger commits his 
own version of what the next chapter will call the 'fallacy of Misplaced 
concreteness. ' He seems to abstract from the spatio-temporal matrix of the 
body's relation to place, as if a deeper layer of significance could be 
uncovered beneath the interleaving of space and time. In other words, a 
transcendental privilege accorded to time appears to be at work which 
distorts the conclusions Heidegger draws from his phenomenological 
analysis. As Maria Villela-Petit argues, that in terms of the section's 
heading, 'The Temporality of the Spatiality that is Characteristic of Dasein', 
.. Heidegger was trying to eliminate the possibility of adding 
to 
this title an 'and reciprocally' which would make it possible to 
write another paragraph entitled: 'Die Rdmlichkeit der 
daseinsmdssigen Zeitlichkeit. ' It was precisely the possibility of 
just such a reciprocity which it was important for Heidegger to 
exclude. (Villela-Petit. 1991: 118) 
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A spatiality of Dasein's temporality would disrupt the possibility of 
founding inner-time (Innerzeitlichkeit) and historicality (Geschicht-lichkelt). 
Here then is one of the supreme tensions present in "Being and Time": on 
the one hand, Heidegger wants to surpass or subvert the legacies of a 
cartesian ontology that will not allow thinking to access the phenomena of 
existence. The notion of 'ecstasis' allows Heidegger to demonstrate the 
Dasein exists as embedded within the world. The early sections on Dasein's 
spatiality demonstrate that Dasein has no ontological privilege over the 
world; that Dasem is shaped by a world itself shaped according to Dasein's 
ways of being. The 'middle-voice' of phenomena therefore occupies what I 
have called a 'third space' between the subject and the object. 12 In other 
words, "Being and Time" distinguishes itself out of all the texts of Western 
philosophy through a profound attention to the spatiality of being. 
Heidegger's temperocentrism falls into the seductive trap of conceiving 'a 
place that is not a place' (loco con loco). 
13 On the other hand however, 
Heidegger wants to assert the ontological primacy of time (and therefore, 
inner-time and historicality) over space. Heidegger can then develop a 
conception of the authentic (Eigentlich) acting individual whose freedom 
12 The middle voice of existential phenomenology is most marked in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
For instance, in "The Visible and the Invisible", he writes, '.. my body does not perceive, but it is as if it 
were built around the perception that dawns through it. ' (Merleau-Ponty: 1962,9) 
13 1 take this last reference from David Farrell Krell's book "Archeticture: Ecstasies of Space, Time and the 
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lies in becoming individualised as a historical being contributing to the 
future of the community. He does this by repeating the Kantian move of 
ascribing to time the form of the subject. Dasein's ecstatic temporality is 
taken to be the transcendental horizon from which Dasein's spatiality of 
dispersion will emerge. As such, only Dasein's ecstatic temporality will be 
taken to have the ontological significance of Care (Sorge), hence foreclosing 
the possibility of a middle-voice of ecological conscience. 14 The rich 
resources of a phenomenological ontology of Dasein's spatiality are 
henceforth completely undermined. 
The phenomenological illegitimacy of privileging time over space has a 
repercussion at the level of language in section 70. At the end of the section, 
Heidegger attempts to make the obverse point to the one he makes at its 
commencement. That is, he wants to expand upon the ways in which Dasein, 
as temporally grounded across (and ontologically prior to) space, 
nevertheless becomes fixated or 'dependent' upon space. Dasein's everyday 
1 -r inauthentic temporality, as 'essentially falling', as a mode of losing oneself 
in the present of concern amidst and towards objects of concern, 'makes 
intelligible' Dasein's spatialising comprehension of the world. Dasem 
Body". The original formulation was made by St. Augustine in the "Confessions". 
14 John Llewellyn's book "The Middle-Voice of Ecological Conscience" is a sustained attempt to think how 
a chiasmic reading of Levinas and Heidegger can lead to ascribing an ethical relation to non-human others, 
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always interprets the world in wholly spatial ways, and this Heidegger 
explains is because of the nature of Dasein's temporal character. Hence we 
might say that Dasein's ontic refusal of an ontological comprehension, a 
failure to maintain an understanding of Sorge as 'grounded' in temporality, 
is itself ontologically 'grounded'. Dasein forgets its own resolutely temporal 
character, according to its essential tendency to become absorbed and de- 
individualised in the everyday. Only by becoming an authentic historical 
individual can Dasein uncover its Being-in-the-world as most primordially 
temporal, not spatial. For Heidegger, the ontic inauthenticý interpretation 
resu ts in 
.. the well known phenomena that both Dasein's interpretation 
of itself and the whole stock of significations, which belong to 
language in general are dominated through and through by 
4spatial' representations. (lbid: 42 1) 
Here one might imagine Heidegger was thinldng of the work of Bergson, 
especially "Time and Free Will" where Bergson examines the tendency in 
both philosophy and everyday life of spatialising time, of constructing 
temporality on the unacknowledged basis of a spatial frame. The 
spatialisation, of time hence consists of transposing spatially-based 
be they animals or inanimate natural beings. 
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predicates into an account of temporality, without registering this 
transposition or outlining its legitimacy. As Ed Casey writes, 
Whenever we think of time as a stringlike succession, we 
spatialise it, giving to it- supposedly an exclusively mental 
concern- predicates such as "continuous" and "linear". which 
we borrow surreptitiously from the "extemal" world of space (a 
world into which we just as surreptitiously reimport these same 
predicates in order to reinforce its externality). (Casey, 1993: 9) 
It is just such a string of subreptions that Heidegger sought to avoid in 
separating space from time in section 70. However, Heidegger's desire to 
avoid one conception of time leads to him misrepresenting the 
phenomenological significance of his alternative. The illegitimacy of the 
argument in section 70 at the level of language can now be stated. In each 
instance previously in the section where Heidegger attempts to cleft time 
from space and construct a 'grounding' relation between them, his 
temperocentrically motivated thinking becomes most plagued by 'spatial 
representations' that work to articulate his concepts. To take just two 
sentences already cited 
Because Dasein as temporality is ecstatico-horizonal in its 
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Being, it can take along with it a space for which it has made 
room.. '(Heidegger, 1962: 420) 'Only on the basis if its ecstatico- 
horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into 
space. '(Ibid: 42 1) 
Of course, it is not surprising that a phenomenological distortion of Dasein's 
spatio-temporal existence feeds into subreptions at the level of language. 
Returning to the concrete facticity of existence implies a return to the how 
that concrete facticity is expressed. 
15 1 contend that in each of the two 
quotations, the moment of Dasein's 'Irruption into space' enabled and made 
possible by the horizon of temporality, is figured and articulated according 
to a construction of temporality that is already spatialised. Temporality, as 
the 'ground' of spatiality, numes or repeats a space pnor to space, a pre- 
spatial spatiality or a loco con loco. As Krell writes, 
In the designated section 70 of Being and Time, Heidegger tries 
to show how temporality "founds" the human experience of 
'5That Heidegger was yet to fully affirm the significance of everyday speech in "Being and Time" is 
evident towards the end of section 7. Heidegger writes, 
With regard to the awkwardness and 'inelegance' of expression in the analyses to come, 
we may remark that it is one thing to give a report mi which we tell about entities, but 
another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the 
words but, above all, the 'grammar'. (Heidegger, 1962: 63) 
It is in part this avoidance of everyday speech and grammar as given that allows Heidegger to 
underestimate the fundamental spatio-temporality of experience. 
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space. However, the "founding function" of time itself rests on 
a traditional architectural metaphorics of foundation and 
construction-in space ... Heidegger's own language disrupts what 
his analysis wants -f6- say, namely that space invariably reverts 
to time in human experience.. (Krell, 1997: 43-44) 
It is hence somewhat striking that in noting Dasein's tendency to spatialise 
time after the last cited sentence of Heidegger's, in the passage above, that 
Heidegger clearly repeats 'time and time again' the 'error' in his own 
exposition. This error can hardly be defended by a description of the section 
as a text where Heidegger himself testifies to the intractabilities of escaping 
the given paradigms of Dasein's ontic language. 16 In each section of the 
work, is it not Heidegger's aim always to think the ontic in relation to its 
dissimulated ontological ground? Hence we might say that it is section 70's 
purpose to position the spatialised present in relation to the temporality that 
'grounds' it. Unfortunately, in terms of his explanation of why Dasein is apt 
to err in not regarding this 'grounding' relationship, Heidegger must resort 
to 'spatial representations' in order to install the 'gound'. 
16 This is where I part company with Krell. I think Krell is being overgenerous with Heidegger when he 
continues, 'His own choice of words ... compels him to admit that 
language itself is permeated by "spatial 
representations". (Krell, 1997: 44) It does not make sense to argue, as Krell does, on the one hand that 
'Heidegger's own language disrupts what he wants to say', and on the other to hold that Heidegger is fully 
aware of the spatialised nature of his own language. At the end of section 7, it is clear that when Heidegger 
is discussing "spatial representation", he is referring to Dasein's tendencies, and not to his own 
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But is this failure a failure of language, an inadequacy of Heidegger's such 
that he could not develop a 'purely' temporal ontological lexicon (or a 
failure of grammar? ), or is it a failure within Heidegger's construction of the 
ontological ground, a failure wrought by the transcendental privilege 
inscribed within it? I contend that the latter is the case. On the one hand, 
Heidegger sought to separate time from space in order to develop a notion of 
temporality that is not plagued by spatial representations, in other words to 
develop a non-linear temporality. However, by eschewing the representation 
of time as a line, Heidegger merely covers over the way in which 'ecstatic 
temporality' itself involves spacing, in language and as a phenomena. 
Heidegger failed to see that the ineradicable spacing of time need not be 
reducible to the linear. 
The phenomenologico-linguistic illegitimacy of Heidegger's argument 
purporting to ground space in time has a further significant consequence. 
Dasein's spatiality, one can readily agree, is ecstatic. It is self-evident that 
we commonly experience ourselves in daily tasks as absorbed into those 
tasks. As I sit typing this chapter into the computer, I am most of the time 
not aware of an experiential gap between the screen, the keyboard, and my 
fingers that punch the keys. In Merleau-Ponty's words, 'Our organs are no 
conceptuallsation. 
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longer instruments; on the contrary,, our instruments are detachable 
organs. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 178) That is, our everyday experience of the 
world is one whereby a distinction between ourself as subject and the world 
as object breaks down, or is rather a possible reflective moment that is 
always already preceeded by worldly absorption. However, the 'there' of 
ecstatic existence has its necessary corollary, the 'here'. Absorption implies 
that the 'here' becomes the absent pole of the couplet. 17 It is arguable that 
Heidegger's early phenomenology repeats and installs this experience of 
corporeal absence at the level of thought. By grounding space in time, 
Heidegger enables Dasein to be conceived as most primordially outside 
itself in non-corporeal terms. It is not my task to explore this absence or 
sublimated role of the body in Heidegger's early phenomenology. However, 
the avoidance of an engagement with the body through a transcendental 
privilege accorded to time seriously impairs Heidegger's ability to resolve 
problems in ontology bequeathed by Kant, as we shall see. For the moment, 
I will merely cite several texts which elaborate the point. Erwin Straus 
writes, 
The Da in which, in Heidegger; s own words [Anspruch], our 
being is thrown, is our corporeality with the structure of the 
17 Drew Leder has written a book about the unrepresented half of this dyad, entitled "The Absent Body" 
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world which corresponds to it. " In other words, with a view to 
getting rid of the dualism of mind and body (which is certainly 
one of the principal objectives of the fundamental ontology of 
Sein und Zeit), was it really necessary for Heidegger to 
subordinate the spatiality inherent in corporeality to ecstatic 
temporality? (Villela-Petit, 1991: 119) 
We may cite also Ed Casey, 'We are ahead of ourselves not just in time (as 
Heidegger emphasizes in his notion of anticipatory, ecstatic temporality) but 
also in space. '(Casey, 1993: 84) 
or finally the work of David Levin, 
.. Heidegger attempts to think the thrownness, the attunement, 
the binding, and the beholdeness of Dasein in the dimensions of 
time, history, and tradition; but he does so without taking up the 
question of the body, even though- as I am wont to believe- it is 
by virtue of the body, the body first and foremost, that Dasein 
is claimed and approPnated, bound and beholden, and 
decisively thrown into the ecstasy of an original attunement, in 
relation to time, history, and tradition. It is because Dasein is 
embodied that it finds itself ecstatically decentered in a 
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threefold field of time, a repetition of history, and a living 
tradition. (I 984: 173-4) 
It is now well known that Heidegger's evident discomfort in 
transcendentalising ecstatic temporality over Dasein's spatiality in section 
70 led to him replacing this operation with the notion of Zeit-Raum 
('Timespace') by 1935 when he wrote the Beitrdge zur Philosophie. Hence 
we do not need to posit the much later time of 1952 when Heidegger wrote 
"On Time and Being" as the occasion when Heidegger finally exposed these 
particular tensions in his earlier text. This text, we might nonetheless remind 
ourselves, included the following terse admission, 'The attempt in "Being 
and Time", section 70, to derive human spatiality fTom temporality is 
untenable. ' [Unhaltbar] (Heidegger, 1962: 23) In the following chapter, I will 
show that the move from "Being and Time" to the texts written after it 
repeats a similar transition in Kant, between the first and second editions of 
the "Critique of Pure Reason". In particular, Kant's addition of the 
'Refutation of Idealism' and the 'General Remark on the System of 
Principles" both insert a block to a privilege accorded to tiMe as the form of 
inner sense and thereby the essential condition for all possible 
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representation. 
* 
Heidegger's phenomenology of finitude, contained for the most part in the 
first chapter of the second division, becomes more significantly problematic 
in the light of the illegitimate temporal grounding of space that has been 
noted above. However, even on its own terms, it is to be expected that death 
lies in at least a relation of tension with Heidegger's existential 
phenomenology. For if death is a phenomenon, it is the strangest sort. I shall 
now examine briefly the sections of this chapter, in order to show that 
Heidegger's difficulties in expounding a phenomenology of death and dying 
are understandable, given the strangeness of the phenomenon of death (if it 
can be said to be such). This argument will allow me to begin to think 
finitude, as a phenomenon, differently. Again, this difference will involve 
returning the phenomenology of existence to its spatio-temporal roots. 
Heidegger's problem, in the light of the above commentary on section 70 of 
"Bemg and Time", is that the most primordial register of Dasein is alleged to 
be temporality. Of course, so far, apart from the illegitimacy of Mstalling 
this horizon as transcendental in relation to Dasein's body and spaces, it is 
not obvious that Heidegger's account of temporality is problematic in itself 
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The problem explored above of space and time being 'out of joint' is not to 
be construed in terms of problematising ecstatic temporality per se. Indeed, 
at no point would I wish to argue against the conceptual productivity 
inherent in the notion of 'ecstasy' itself However, by examining how 
Heidegger tries to think the phenomenon of death, Dasein's temporality 
itself becomes problematic. And the site of this problematic must be 
ultimately articulated in terms of the legitimacy of Heidegger's 
phenomenological method itself For if Heidegger's phenomenology cannot 
think death as a phenomenon, this difficulty cannot be put at death's door. 
Rather, death itself must be thought differently. 
The problem of Division two's first chapter is easy to set up. We recall that 
phenomenology, as determined through the etymological findings of section 
7, involves the following definition: to let that which shows itseýf be seen 
from itseýf in the very way in which it shows itseýffrom itseýf In terms of the 
world of functional objects, a pre-subjective and pre-objective uncovering of 
Dasein's involvement in the world is straightforward to supply. But how can 
Dasein's 'involvement' with death be shown in an analogous manner as a 
letting appear as itself? Death of course can be conceptualised, theonsed, 
described from the point of view of an external event, but how is dying itself 
to be allowed to appear as itself, in the non-dualistic tenns of the middle- 
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voiced that-which-happens? No one has articulated the impossibility of a 
phenomenology of dying more profoundly than Georges Bataille, 
.. death, in fact, reveals nothing. In theory, it is natural, animal 
being whose death reveals Man to himself, but the revelation 
never takes place. For when the animal being supporting him 
dies, the human being himself ceases to be. In order for Man to 
reveal himself ultimately to himself, he would have to die, but 
he would have to do it while living- watching himself ceasing 
to be. In other words, death itself would have to become (self-) 
consciousness at the very moment that it annihilates the 
conscious being. (Bataille, 1990: 18) 
For Bataille, death cannot be known immediately. One lives death through a 
subterfuge, the sacrifice of the other. In Bataille's tenns, sacrifice is a 
phenomenon which exists in ritual form and, in western cultures, as the work 
of tragedy in literature, film and so on. Heidegger, on the other hand, does 
not so readily accept the impossibility of an existential phenomenology of 
death. Sections 46 to 53 attest to the difficulties he thereby puts his thinking 
through. The heading for section 46 is 'The Seeming Impossibility of 
Getting Dasein's Being-a-whole into our Grasp Ontologically and 
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Determining its Character. ' By being-a-whole, Heidegger is referring to the 
ultimate limit of Dasein's ecstatically temporal character. As existing 
futurally in the present, the 'ahead of which's' ultimate limit is of course that 
of death. If Dasein can think itself in terms of its ultimate demise, 
Heldegger's contention is that the human can individualise its own destiny 
and become a histoncal being. As such a being, Dasein would have what 
Heidegger calls 'freedom towards death' 18 That nothing is resolved finally 
about the phenomenon of death and dying is evident on the last page of the 
chapter (thirty pages later), where Heidegger writes, 'The question of 
Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole and of its existential constitution still 
hangs in mid-air. ' 
After dismissing the significance of the other's death for me, and this 
because the other's death implies a loss that can have no relation to the 
experience of dying itself, Heidegger proscribes the possibility of 
experiencIng dying by way of Bataille's subterfuge. Heidegger writes, 
By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it 
6 iS5 at all. And indeed death signifies a peculiar possibility-of- 
Being in which the very Being of one's own Dasein is an issue. 
In dying, it is shown that mineness and existence are 
"Being and Time" p3ll 
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ontologically constitutive for death. (Heidegger, 1962: 284) 
As I am arguing, Heidegger's sacrifice of the sacrifice, of folbiing 
J? a UAVs move towards dramatising the other's death, is the moment when 
all hope for his phenomenology of dying breaks down, given the terms in 
which the 'Phenomenon' and 'finitude' have been defined. This is at the 
least regrettable, for in my view it leaves Heidegger with no capacity to 
t. appreciate the power of tragedy. HeiJe-3-y. 4- otxýý d*veýopS cA 
6 ve TWN 
I 9E ry moment of the chapter is witness to a kind of 
slippage of failures, whereby Heidegger tries one approach to a solution only 
to concede defeat. The solution, of thinking Dasein as a totality, becomes 
deferred to a moment of thinking that is never realised. For instance, in 
section 47, after having denied the potentiality for a phenomenology of 
dying to be uncovered through the other's death, Heidegger concludes that a 
4 purely existential' conception of the phenomenon must be attained, or else 
his project would fail. 20 In the following section, Heidegger distinguishes a 
sense of the 'not yet' character of death from that required for an existential 
phenomenology of dying. He argues that the 'not yet' thought in terms of 
something still outstanding, like for instance the 'not yet' of the unripened 
19For Bataille, the death of the other is experienced as dying, and this is because of a process of 
identification with the other (rather than a Heideggerian distance). Bataille writes, 'In tragedy, at least, It Is 
a question of our identitdng with some character who dies, and of believing that we die, although we are 
alive. ' (Bataille, 1990: 20) In terms of a later development of the tragic in Heidegger, see "H61derlin's Ister" 
! (Gesamtausgabe 53,1984) 
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fruit, cannot be the sense sought after, for to think of dying as a state that can 
be reached is to treat death in an ontologically inappropriate manner. 
Thinking phenomenologically about death as something 'still outstanding' 
involves the 'ontological perversion of making Dasem something present-at- 
hand. '(Heidegger, 1962: 293) Instead, Heidegger suggests that the 'not yet' 
character of death is experienced as something 'impending' (Bevorstand). In 
order to distinguish different possibilities of the impending, Heidegger 
specifies the impending not yet-ness of dying as the 'possibility of no-longer 
being able to be there. '(Ibid: 294) 
As enmired in everyday absorption in the world, Heidegger argues that 
Dasein is not explicitly aware of the end of existence as a possibility. The 
lack of awareness is not completely concealed however, for it surfaces as a 
mood or attunernent (Bestimmung). He writes, 
Dasein does not, proximally and for the most part, have any 
explicit or even any theoretical knowledge of the fact that it has 
been delivered over to its death, and that death thus belongs to 
Being-in-the-world. Thrownness into death reveals itself to 
Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in that state 
of mind we have called "anxiety". (Ibid: 295) 
Mi Being and Time" p284 
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Anxiety therefore reveals the essential everyday concealment of the death of 
Dasem. As a mood expressed towards the future, anxiety conceals the dying 
that is proper to ecstatic temporality. As Heidegger says, Tactically, DaseM 
is dying as long as it exists.. '(Ibid: 295). Dying is concealed, in Dasein's 
inauthentic everyday worldliness. This raises the question of whether an 
authentic attitude towards the dying- within-life proper to ecstatic 
temporality and care is possible. Heidegger asks, at the end of section 52, 
6can Dasein maintain itself in an authentic Being-towards-its- 
end? '(Ibid: 304) 
At this point, Heidegger"s attempt to provide a solution to a phenomenology 
of dying becomes acutely asymptotical. Death 'reveals' itself as the 
impossible, as the possibility of the impossible. In other words, dying cannot 
reveal itself as such, and this impossibility just is the manner in which death 
is experienced within Dasein's ecstatically temporal unfolding. Heidegger 
writes, 
ry7l 
J ne closest closeness which one may have in Being towards 
death as a possibility, is as far as possible from anything 
actual. The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, 
the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it as the 
possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all. Death, as 
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possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be 'actuallsed', nothing 
which Dasein, as actual, could itself be. It is the possibilitY of 
the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards 
anything, of every way of existing. (Ibid: 307 Emphasis in 
original) 
Death, as that which happens to others, cannot be of interest to a 
phenomenology of dying, for the sense of loss involved always happens to 
those who did not die. The loss of 'death' is not equivalent to the loss of 
'dyMg'. On the other hand, Heidegger's careful analysis shows what was 
clear from the outset, that thinking dying as a 'phenomenon' must involve 
impossibility. But 'impossibility' in Heidegger's sense of the 'possibility of 
the impossible' cannot be understood as another modality of the 
phenomenon. The impossible impending death, that manner in which dying 
is lived, cannot reveal itself, let alone reveal itself as such. Dying only 
expresses itself in anxiety. But a phenomenological analysis of anxiety will 
not of itself contribute towards a phenomenology of dying, for it is merely a 
symptom of dying's phenomenal deficit. 
Therefore, Heidegger's phenomenology of dying is shown, in his own 
words, as impossible. In this case, it is not dying which must be refuted, for 
how could it? Rather, what has been uncovered is the limit of Heidegger's 
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thinking of finitude. Dying can only be presented to Dasein as that beyond 4-ý, - 
the possible. But as that which cannot reveal itself as such, a phenomenology 
of death must involve death falling back into immanence, at which point its 
signficance 'as such' is lost. Heidegger's thinking of the fiMte becomes 
indefinite, unthinkable. Impossible. Ontological difference, construed as the 
difference between immanence and transcendence, is, in "Being and Time", 
sacrificed for the sake of a failed attempt to construct a phenomenology of 
dying. This sacrifice is carried out for the sake of a glorified ontological 
significance bestowed upon a possible subjectivity. Dying presents itself as 
the transcendent, as that beyond all possibility and project. As such, it 
simply cannot make itself manifest to Dasein, even in the terms of an 
impending 'not yet'. In order for dying to maintain its transcendence, it 
would have to be thought as the other side of immanence as its obverse 
inverse, not as that which falls back within the terms of immanence. In other 
words, what would be required would be a transcendence within 
immanence, to use again a locution that will become increasingly jmpoTtant 
in this thesis. Transcendence within immanence does not entail that the 
former is somehow contained within the latter, for such containment would 
again reduce the fonner into the ternis of the latter. The 'within' does not 
signify inclusion; it is rather the presence of difference within the present. 
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Transcendence within immanence marks the moment where the present is 
thought as differing from itself according to ontological difference. This 
difficult point will become clearer in the following chapters. 
Dying therefore would have to present itself as a transcendence maintained 
within immanence, as the death present as the difference within life, rather 
than being that which collapses in the face of the subject's presence. As 
such, dying would become the mystery of the limits of being, the mystery of 
transcendence itself. It precisely would not be the measure of 'ownness', 
authenticity, and being-as-a-whole. The crucial point to be made is that 
dying, thought of as transcendence within immanence, is no longer the 
privilege of an hypothetically authentic subjectivity. Dying must be renamed 
asfinitude . 
21 Ontological difference, the question of nammg transcendence's 
relation to immanence, no longer turns on the subject, as it does in "Being 
and Time". The transcendent names not the limits of Dasein's being, but 
rather the limits of immanence itself As such, transcendence names the 
limits of finitude. Transcendence is therefore excessive to the subject, and as 
such no longer thinkable on its terms. The difficulty to be faced and 
articulated is that although transcendence and immanence lie beyond each 
211t is clear that this is what occurs to Heidegger after "Being and Time", when the subjectivism of 
Being- 
towards-death is renamed as Dasein's 'mortal' character, a mortality that is no longer self-appropriable. By 
the time of the Geviert texts, mortality rests within an interplay with the elements and the 
divinIties. As 
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other's limits, they are mutually constitutive. If this thought becomes 
possible (rather than being impossible), we will no longer need to equate this 
limit of finitude with a phenomenology of dying. And in this way, I suggest 
that dying could be made present as the tragedy of existence, without either 
the need for subterfuge or an heroic construction of subjectivity. 
For the moment, it is important to note that dying cannot be considered as a 
phenomenon. And yet the phenomenology of Being-towards-death is crucial 
for Heidegger in terms of a sustained distinction between an inauthentic, 
absorbed everyday anonymity (of das Man) and artauthentic self-possession. 
Being-towards-death, as a realised possibility of the impossible, determines 
Dasein's capacity to become a historical individual, free to transform the 
collective's future in the present of decision. As such, it is important to take 
issue with the following claim against Heidegger made by Alphonso Lingis, 
Heidegger recognized the having to die with all our own forces 
to be our very nature, but he equated it, dialectically- and to us, 
incomprehensibly- with the resolute and caring hold on things 
and on the world. (Lingis, 1994: 24) 
Being-towards-death, as that which determines Dasein's possibility of 
beconUng its own free historical being, is precisely not a resolute caring hold 
such, a phenomenology of Dasein's finite, spatio-temporal ecstatic being is made available. 
75 
Chapter 1: Heidegger and Phenomenology 
upon things and on the world. The see-saw effect of section 70 is to 
demonstrate that Dasein's temporality is more fundamental than its spatial 
dispersion in the world. Authenticity becomes available to Dasein only on 
the basis of a suspension of holding onto the world. The world, and Dasein's 
historical position within a given world-community, can only be transvalued 
and transformed on the basis of the world-as-given being relinquished. The 
Kantian privilege accorded to time as the form of inner sense becomes 
reworked, in "Being and Time", as the possibility of Dasein transforming the 
given, as that which is represented by spatial dispersion in the world. 
But this transformation is impossible, because dying cannot be the basis for 
a resolute grasp of Dasein's being-as-a-whole. Heidegger, in this early work, 
commits something like a hubris of finitude. His hopes for establishing a 
notion of political freedom based on a phenomenological ontology of death 
die still-bom in the first chapter of Division two. He will not begin to try and 
install being-towards-death at the ground of political freedom again. 
* 
Earlier, the 'phenomenon' in Heidegger's etymologically generated 
determination was described as a 'transcendence-within-immanence'. It is 
now possible to begin to determine how Heidegger's thinking of the 
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phenomenonfails in terms of the phenomenon being that which incorporates 
this ontological difference. Heidegger's error is Kant's first-edition error in 
"The Critique of Pure Reason", that of marking an ontological distinction 
between space and time, at the same instant privileging the latter over the 
former. Heidegger's difficulty in attempting a phenomenology of dying is 
that he takes finitude to be a purely temporal phenomenon. In this thesis, I 
will argue that it is absolutely illegitimate to make any such ontological 
distinction between space and time. Space and time are inextricably 
interwoven, from the point of view of a phenomenological ontology. Being- 
towards-death cannot therefore act as the ground of auto-appropriation and 
authenticity. Finitude reveals itself in the object, as a spacing of time and a 
timing of space. The object, if one is permitted to talk in such abstract terms, 
attests to a fundamental reversibility between space and time. Using AN 
Whitehead, I will show in the next chapter that a phenomenological 
ontology of the spatio-temporal object allows the object's transcendence 
within immanence to be presented. The object presents itself as a percept in 
the here and now. But this hic et nunc singularity individualises itself on the 
basis of that of the object which does not present itself in the present. In 
other words, the object presents itself as itself in the present, and at the same 
time transcends this present through an alterity that is always already co- 
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implicated. 
This thinking of the spatio-temporal object's transcendence-within- 
immanence itself raises a question, that becomes the question of the third 
chapter: how do we think the subject in relation to the object's 
transcendence-within-immanence? That is, how is the subject implied within 
an ecstasis that is no longer merely temporal? How can we begin to think a 
spatio-temporal phenomenologico-ontological ecstasy of the subject? A 
phenomenology which must, by its spatio-temporal character, release itself 
from transcendentalism. 
In this third chapter, I will only manage to begin to answer the question by a 
process of reduction. I will only be able to say how we do not begin to think 
such an ecstasy of the subject. This argument by exclusion involves a return 
to Heidegger. The significance of the return to Heidegger lies in the fact that 
it is strongly arguable that after the failings of "Being and Time", which, as I 
have shown, Heidegger was aware of soon after its publication, he does 
return to the phenomenon as a spatio-temporal being. Hence, his thinking of 
the work of art, of the Greek temple, of the bridge, the jug and so on all 
involve phenomena whose evident spatiality itself lies in relation to a 
temporality and a historicality. As I shall argue in that chapter, these spatio- 
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temporal evocations involve a displacement of immanence itself, from 
Dasein towards that which transcends it. As such, the work of Dasein itself 
gets reduced to a nullity. 
Only then, after the 'subject' and the 'object' have been shown to MVolve a 
spatio-temporal phenomenological ontology, can their interlacing be brought 
together. In the fourth chapter, a positive conception of the subject's spatio- 
temporal ecstasy will be presented, through a reading of the thinking of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. By this stage, a distinction between the subject and 
the object will itself be seen to be committing the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness. Of course, as I have shown, an ontology that privileges an 
originary schism between subject and object is precisely the position 
Heidegger sets out to challenge in "Being and Time". As I have also shown 
however, his transcendental privileging of time over space leads to a more 
primordial pre-subjective pre-objectiVe middle voiced phenomenology 
breaking down. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology will therefore allow my project to return to 
the early insights into the nature of the 'phenomenon' in "Being and Time", 
whilst at the same time absolutely rejecting the subsequent transcendental 
privilege of time over space which sunders the value of those insights in that 
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work. In the fifth chapter, I challenge a 'purely' poetic reading of Merleau- 
Ponty's chiasmic phenomenological ontology. I argue that it is vital to see 
that the intertwining of that which is commonly named as the 'object' or the 
gworld' and the subject implies questions of community and belonging. As 
such, I locate a politics of difference at the core of Merleau-Ponty's 
ontological work. 
So much for a plan of what is to come. For the moment, it is time to return to 
the first questions of this chapter. In the light of the argument thus far, what 
can be said about Heidegger's relation to phenomenology, and what can be 
put forward as reasons for his abandoning of its imperative in order to follow 
his own path? I suggest the following as guidelines for a more sustained 
reflection that will take place elsewhere: 
1) As I pointed out through the use of citation, Heidegger never re . ected the j 
notion of the phenomenological method as the possibility (M6glichkeit) of 
and for thinking, from "Being and Time" section 7 all the way to 'My Way 
to Phenomenology'. I contend that Heidegger held onto this formulation 
precisely because he never wanted to contest the distinction he made 
between appearance and the phenomenon he made in section 7. After 
"Being and Time", Heidegger began, after his profound engagement with 
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early Greek thinking, to establish a more specific historical engagement with 
ontology. Appearance becomes thought in terms of the framing (Gestell) of 
modem calculative technological representation. The phenomenon, by 
implication, persists as that which must be uncovered against this 
historicised mode of appearance. 
2) However, Heidegger does abandon the phenomenological method as an 
explicit dynamic of his thinking and as a term used as a fundamental of his 
language. Why this abandonment takes place remains, even in the light of 
the preceding argument, extremely difficult to ascertain. For it is clear that 
the work of art, the temple, the bridge, the jug and so on mvolve a work of 
signification that bears phenomenological motifs at the least. And, as the first 
point just made has shown, an appearance-phenomenon distinction is always 
implicit within Heidegger's thinking. Perhaps Heidegger began to associate 
the evident failure of his phenomenology of dying with as a failure of the 
phenomenological method itself Moreover, it is possible that Heidegger 
began to associate phenomenology as ineradicably bound up with a 
tTanscendental subjectivity, a binding that itself could have been questioned 
had Heidegger allowed his phenomenology of Dasein's ecstatic character to 
be spatio-temporal. For, as I have begun to show, a spatio-temporal ecstasy 
involves a transcendence within immanence, whereas an ecstatic temporality 
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must suffer the fate of falling back into the form of subjectivity. As such a 
spatio-ternporal ecstasy, the limits of Dasein's finitude are circumscribed by 
an alterity which cannot be reclaimed through the hubris of being-as-a- 
whole. Finitude is no longer equated with subjectiVity and an impossible 
phenomenology of dying. Phenomenology, in allowing the phenomenon to 
be thought of as both immanent and transcendent, is released from the 
horizon of a transcendental subjectivity as it is released from privileging 
time as the form of inner sense. This releasement would be the form of a 
return to thinking ontological difference, as that which marks the limits of 
the finite and immanent, always in relation to an irreducible and 
paradoxically constitutive transcendence. 
In summary, one can say that a phenomenology that does not suspend or 
withdraw itself through enacting a sacrifice of space for the sake of time is 
the issue. If we go back to sections 14 to 24 in "Being and Time", we find 
much by way of a phenomenology of space. But the eventuality of 
Heidegger's privileging time over space fifty sections later means that we 
have to find another route to the phenomenological redemption of space. For 
a redemption of space in phenomenology would have to entail that it cannot 
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be reduced into or grounded by time and temporality. To achieve this, it is 
necessary to see that for the early Heidegger at least, space and time are 
oppositional to each other; Heidegger does not allow for the possibility of a 
phenomenological spatio-temporality. This foreclosure is demonstrated by 
the basic structure of the book. In "Being and Time", Heidegger begins by 
emphasising the spatial character of Dasein's existence, only later to 
emphasise the temporal character of that existence. Moreover, as has been 
said, in this book Heidegger distrusts the very grammar which he is forced to 
use - as if at the base of this distrust is a distrust for an ineradicable spatio- 
temporality. Henceforth, at no point in "Being and Time" does Dasein live 
spatio-temporally. Therefore, the suggestion is that space can be redeemed 
in phenomenology by contesting the Heideggerian oppositional relation 
between space and time. If spatio-temporality can be thought in 
phenomenological terms, the option to privilege one over the other can be 
eschewed. This is what I attempt to achieve in the following chapter, 
beginning by looking at Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". 
Most significantly of all, in terms of the future of thinking, is the following 
consideration, which will be present in all of the following chapters. A 
spatio-temporal phenomenology, as one which incorporates ecstasy as a 
spacing of time and a timing of space, itself involves the rejection of a 
83 
Chapter 1: Heidegger and Phenomenology 
transcendental privilege accorded to time as the form of the subject. The 
transcendental horizon of time as the form of inner sense henceforth 
becomes seen as that which forecloses the possibility of thinking ontological 
difference. And yet, dropping the privilege accorded to the form of inner 
sense does not of necessity involve dropping the subject. On the contrary, 
only through a phenomenological ontology can the possibility of thought be 
upheld. For we still live in an era dominated by appearance. That is, we still 
live under the sway of a seemingly ineradicable schism between an 
contology' of the subject and an 'ontology' of the object. 
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CHAPTER 2: AGAINST THE SIMPLE OBJECT 
In the previous chapter, the central argument lay in the direction of 
Heidegger's illegitimate privileging of time over space. This argument was 
performed principally through a reading of section 70. The subsequent 
argument against the possibility of a phenomenology of death ultimately 
served to confirm this earlier discussion. ' In addition to this main argument, 
it was also mentioned that Heidegger reverts to the notion of 'Zeit-Raum' 
soon after "Being and Time", with the publication of the "Beitrage". This 
reversion serves as an implicit critique of his earlier distinction and 
privilege. On top of this, in "Time and Being", Heidegger refers back to 
section 70 and rejects it. All in all, the project of "Being and Time", 
although rich in phenomenological and ontological insight, is ultimately an 
unresolved one, on these terms alone. 
In this chapter, I want to argue that the tensions and philosophical 
illegitimacies of "Being and Time" are an echo of an earlier work of 
philosophy, Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". The problems encountered in 
'That is to say, the limits of Dasein's ecstatic temporality exceed the boundaries of what is possible as a 
phenomena. As the 'possibility of the impossible', Heidegger's beMig-towards-death suspends the 
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Heidegger can therefore be situated within the tradition. I will do this by 
way of examining Heidegger's text, Wntten at the same time as "Being and 
Time", "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics". 
The reason for approaching Kant through Heidegger's text can be clearly 
stated. In the Kant book, Heldegger expresses an emphatic preference for the 
first edition over the second edition of "The Critique of Pure Reason". The 
problem with the second edition for Heidegger, in particular with the 
addition of the "Refutation of Idealism" and the "General Remark on the 
System of Principles", is that the privilege accorded to time as the primordial 
function of the transcendental imagination is devalued. Kant introduces the 
condition that the intuition of external objects is equiprimordial, with time, 
for the possibility of all representation. In other words, Kant no longer takes 
inner sense to be more fundamental than outer sense. Moreover, Kant seems, 
on Heidegger's reading, to substitute the transcendental understanding for 
the transcendental imagination as that which grounds the synthesis between 
concepts and the receptive faculty. Given this substitution, Kant's thought 
paves the way for the Idealism to come. Kant ends his re-writing by erring 
on the side of the concept. In this light, one could say in extension of 
phenomenological project, in a manner which he later will avoid. See note 14 in the following chapter. 
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Heidegger's reading that the empiricism of the 'Refutation' acts as a 
counterbalance to the privilege accorded to the concept granted through the 
substitution. Put simply, the transcendental unity of apperception, on the one 
hand, would seem to further sediment the privilege accorded to inner sense. 
But this second edition substitution comes hand in hand with the sections 
devoted to introducing an equal primacy accorded to exteriority. Kant seems 
to exaggerate further the primordiality of time, only to install at the same 
time an attention previously absent on the transcendental conditionality of 
space. The second edition can therefore be seen, under Heidegger's careful 
and yet violent reading, to bring the first Critique closer to an unresolvable 
tension over the question of ontological primordiality. 
For these reasons, Heidegger's preference becomes clear to understand. 
Heidegger prefers the first edition to the second because it chimes with his 
own findings in "Being and Time", especially with the work of section 70. 
Heidegger wants, in "Being and Time", to privilege the fundamentality of 
time. It is only in Kant's first edition that it is possible to do this without 
ambiguity. 
The question to put to Heidegger's early Kant text is this: if his privileging 
of time over space in "Being and Time" has been found to be suspect, and if 
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he himself reneges upon the privilege in later work, how are we, in this light, 
to go on to read his preference for the first edition of Kant's first Critique? If 
the later Heidegger returns to a time-space of equiprimordial proportion, 
would it not be possible to establish in retrospect that the specific argument 
and preference for the first edition of "The Critique of Pure Reason" in 
"Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" is itself Unhaltbar, that is, 
unsustainable? In other words, when Heidegger recalls section 70 in "Time 
and Being", should he not also have recalled his preference for the first 
edition of the first Critique and rejected it? 
This question, to be explored in a moment, leads to a further one. If Kant's 
text in the second edition is witness to an equiprimordialisation of space to 
time, such that something like a spatio-temporal schematism is opened up, 
what becomes of the apriori conditionality itself? If space gets involved 
within the subject's construction, in particular the space of the other and the 
space of exteriority, does not this transcendence occur aposteriori? 
In order to develop this conception of a 'transcendental' spatio-temporal 
horizon, I shall have to leave the tenns of Kant's Critique. This is because 
the juxtaposition of both editions in one volume leads to an unresolvable 
work of philosophy. I shall argue in the fourth chapter that it is only 
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beginning with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology that a spatio-temporal 
schematism can be fully resolved. In this current chapter however I will 
argue that the 'phenomenology' of Wbitehead goes some way towards 
providing the grounds for such a resolution. 
* 
To begin then, with Heidegger's text, "Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics". I propose to concentrate on just two sections of the text, 
sections 10 and 35.1 will show that Heidegger's relation to the two editions 
of Kant's text is ambivalent. Furthermore,, I will ground this ambivalence in 
Heidegger's own unresolved (at this stage) thinking about time in relation to 
space. In other words, I will show that the tensions and illegitimacies within 
the argument of "Being and Time" section 70 have their place in 
Heldegger's Kant text, at the same time. 
Heidegger's preference for the first edition of Kant's first Critique appears, 
prima facie, to be the result of an issue in Kant at the most indirectly linked 
with the relative ontological import of time over space. Heidegger states that 
it is the centrality of the transcendental imagination in the first edition 
which leads to his preference. This faculty, as opposed to the transcendental 
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unity of apperception (emphasised in the second edition), is the faculty 
which opens Dasein up to an understanding of metaphysics. The 
transcendental imagination, Heidegger asserts, is rooted in primordial 
temporality. As such, the synthesis of the imagination is at the same time the 
subject's temporalisation of time. Time works through the subject, 
Heidegger claims. And therefore time is a matter of what he calls 'auto- 
affection'. On these terms, time's grounding in the subject and the subject's 
grounding in time is a matter of equiprimordiality. Both are grounded or 
rooted in each other. And henceforth, Heidegger argues that metaphysics, as 
the possibility of transcendence, can be thought. 
The interpretation of the transcendental imagination as a root, 
i. e., the disclosure of the manner in which the pure synthesis 
puts forth and sustains the two stems [of sensibility and the 
understanding], leads naturally back to that in which this root is 
rooted, primordial time. The latter alone, as the original tri- 
unitary formation of future, past, and present, makes possible 
the "faculty" of pure synthesis and with it that which it is 
capable of producing, i. e., the unification of the three elements 
of ontological knowledge, the unity of which forms 
transcendence. (Heidegger, 1962: 201) 
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Heidegger therefore reads a threefolded ecstatic temporality into Kant's 
notion of the transcendental imagination as being the root of subjectivity's 
temporisation and the timing of the subject. The transcendental imagination 
is the ground of transcendence, and therefore of metaphysics. In contrast, the 
second edition's substitution of the transcendental understanding for the 
faculty of imagination leads Kant's Critique, in Heidegger's eyes, to fall 
back on the side of the concept, thus paving the way for Idealism. By falling 
back on the concept, Heidegger is claiming that the centralisation of the 
understanding over -the imagination in the second edition 
forecloses the 
possibility of transcendence being thought. The understanding, as the faculty 
concerned with the application of the concept, can only think within its own 
terms. As such, the understanding would, one might presume, remain merely 
logical, or blind. At the very least, it would be non-metaphysical, stuck 
within an immanence whose limits it cannot think. Hence, Heidegger states 
his preference in the clearest terms, 
The first edition is more faithful to the innermost character and 
development of the problematic which charactenses the laying 
of the foundation of metaphysics because, by virtue of its 
indissoluble primordial structure, the transcendental 
imagination opens up the possibility of a laying of the 
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foundation of ontological knowledge and, hence, of 
metaphysics. Therefore, relative to the problem which is central 
to the whole work, the first edition is essentially to be preferred 
to the second. (lbid: 202) 
Because the transcendental imagination, as the 'root' of synthesis is rooted 
in primordial time, transcendence, as the opening to metaphysics, can be 
inaugurated. Heidegger's preference for the first edition therefore appears as 
a clearly stated claim (whether or not one, agrees with him). He is claiming 
that the first edition is the more metaphysical work, precisely because it 
allows for the metaphysical opening of transcendence to be thought. 
However, it is important to note what I would claim to be the more 
fundamental issue at work in Heidegger's text, beyond a debate about 
whether the transcendental imagination ought to be privileged over the 
tTanscendental unity of apperception. TMs more fundamental issue concerns 
the ontological status of space with respect to time. 
In the Kant text, Heidegger prefers the transcendental imagination as the 
root of synthesis because it stands for the synthesis that produces (or is 
C produced by' - Heidegger's text unwittingly circles around an abyssal 
subjectivism that threatens to englobe all other fon-ns of conceptuality) the 
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transcendence of time. In this respect, the preference for the imagination is a 
way of stating the metaphysical primordiality of time over space by proxy. 
The interesting point one notices in reading the two sections under analysis 
here is that one can witness Heidegger's own uncertainty about the 
ontological function of space projected into his reading of Kant. In other 
words, although Heidegger clearly wants to maintain a temporal 
primordiality in arguing the case for the first edition of the "Critique", he 
struggles to uphold this privilege at key points in the text. 
For instance, in section 10, after reviewing Kant's argument concerning time 
as the pure intuition applied to the data of internal sense, he wonders 
We will not pass judgment at this time on the question as to 
whether this argument in support of the universality of time as 
pure intuition justifies the central ontological function of time 
attributed to it. We will also leave open for the present the 
further question as to whether space as pure intuition is 
deprived thereby of a possible central ontological function. 
(lbid: 53) 
Heidegger's concern over the ontological status of space becomes intensified 
in his later discussion of the two additions to the second edition already 
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mentioned. Although Heidegger had stated, a couple of pages previously, his 
preference for the first edition, later on in section 35 he somewhat 
confusingly attempts a vigorous defence of Kant's second edition. This 
defence turns precisely around the apparent destabilising of time's privilege 
in the second edition. But again, there are moments in this defence where 
Heidegger's ambivalence over the Kant's argument reveal much about his 
own quandanes at the time. 
Heidegger begins his examination of the second edition insertions by 
registering Kant"s apparent refusal to continue the ontological privilege of 
time. Heidegger writes 
It is true that in the second edition, Kant apparently refuses to 
acknowledge the transcendental priority of time in the 
formation of transcendence as such, i. e., he disavows the 
essential part of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, the 
transcendental schematism. (lbid: 204) 
Heidegger is referring to the additions of the "Refutation of Idealisni7' and 
the "General Note on the System of Principles". As we shall see in a 
moment, these two sections both introduce, for the first time in Kant, the 
idea that the reception and comprehension of things requires an outer 
94 
Chapter 2: Against the Simple Object 
intuition at the same time as an inner intuition. In other words, that the 
aphori form of space is always already involved in any cognition, through 
the work of the temporising subject. Heldegger's contention in the above 
passage is that this novel equiprimordiality accorded to space interferes with 
the schematism. Until the second edition, the schematism had been taken to 
be the operation by which the concepts and categories of the understanding 
are applied to empirical objects. In the first edition, Kant claimed that the 
mode of this operation is purely temporal. Therefore, Heidegger would 
appear to be correct in drawing attention to the fact that the two added 
passages refered to above disrupt the work of the transcendental schematism. 
After a brief discussion on the "General Note", Heidegger continues 
Here appears the transcendental function of space, which 
unmistakably opens up a new perspective for Kant. Space 
enters into pure schematism. It is true that in the second edition 
the chapter on schematism has not been modified to take this 
into account. But is it not necessary to conclude, nevertheless, 
that the primacy of time has disappeared? This conclusion 
would not only be premature, but to attempt to infer from this 
passage that it is not time alone which forms transcendence 
95 
Chapter 2: Against the Simple Object 
would also be a complete misunderstanding of the whole 
interpretation carried out so far. (lbid: 205) 
Thus Heidegger begins his 'defence' of the second edition. In this section, 
Heidegger notes, in passing, that the schematism would need to be 
6modified' in order to take a revamped spatio-temporal ontology into 
account. This one sentence condenses and contains the root of the trouble, 
both for Heidegger and for Kant. Before examining this trouble, let us carry 
on with what Heldegger has to say. 
In the next paragraph, we see why Heidegger wanted to mininlise the 
difficulties and disruptions involved in shifting fTom a temporal schematism 
to a spatio-temporal schernatism. Here, Heidegger attempts to argue that 
Kant was nonetheless correct in restating the primordiality of space in the 
second edition. Heidegger argues that this restatement does not interfere 
with the real primordiality of time itself 
However, it is not in this form but as pure self-affection that 
time is the primordial ground of transcendence. As such, it is 
also the condition of the possibility of all formative acts of 
representation, for example, the making manifest of space. It 
does not follow, then, that to admit the transcendental function 
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of space is to reject the primacy of time. Rather, this admission 
obligates one to show how space, like time, also belongs to the 
self as finite and that the latter, precisely because it is based on 
primordial time, is essentially spatial. (Ibid: 205) 
We now have all the pieces of Heidegger's argument put together, so that we 
can begin to see their fault-lines. Heidegger, in the above passages, attempts 
to defend the second edition's equiprimordialisation of space with tinle. This 
is on the basis that time's privilege does not in reality get displaced. For 
Heidegger, the transcendental imagination can be considered as spatio- 
temporal. This is because spatio-temporality itself can only be grounded in 
the primordial root of all transcendence, time. Therefore, Heidegger agrees 
with second-edition Kant that space is an essential intuition for the subject's 
understanding of objects. And he grounds this agreement in an underlying 
temporality which is not affected by introducing the primordiality of the 
transcendental function of space. Hence Heidegger holds that Kant's second 
edition schematism can be 'modified'. 
In disagreement with Heidegger, I contend that his agreement with the 
second edition (after stating a preference for the first a couple of pages 
previously) cannot however be maintained. In refusing the 'apparent refusal' 
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of acknowledging the transcendental priority of time, Heidegger attempts to 
hold on to two incompatible positions: 
1) That the schernatism is spatio-temporal. In other words, that in tenns of 
the subject's intuitions, inner sense and outer sense are equiprimordial. The 
object's space (a/part from the subject) is woven inextricably into Its time. 
Space and time are therefore reciprocally determinative forms of intuition. 
2) That time is ultimately more fundamental ontologically than space. 
His attempt to ressurect an appreciation of the second edition would turn 
around resolving these two points into one thesis. And resolution would 
come if Heidegger himself could provide the 'modification' necessary to 
Kant's account of the schernatism. But, I suggest, how could Heidegger 
attempt this reworking, on the basis of the absolute value he places on time 
itself? How can a spatio-temporal schematism, translating or infom-ling our 
reception of the world in relation to pre-ordered ways of seeing and 
receiving, be itself grounded in primordial temporality? It would appear that 
something more than a mere 'modification' to Kant's schematism. is in 
order. That is, Heidegger has two choices. Either he continues to develop a 
quasi-Kantian spatio-temporal schematism by rejecting the absolute 
primordiality of time, or he maintains time's primordiality and rejects the 
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transcendental equiprimordiality of space. 
In other words, the above cited passages from "Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics" repeat the same problems encountered in the reading of 
section 70 of "Being and Time" performed in the previous chapter. 
Heidegger's phenomenologico-ontological appreciation of the sub . ect's 9 
spatiality is undervalued by the subsequent grounding of space in time. In 
the Kant book, the question of the transcendental-ontological function of 
space is in the same way at stake in Heidegger's repetition of the Kantian 
temporal privilege. And just as in "Being and Time", the priority accorded to 
time feeds into an implicit subjectivism, so too does a subjectivism manifest 
itself in the Kant book. A form of this was uncovered in the last Heidegger 
passage quoted. Time as 'pure self-affection' is the ground of all 
transcendence. In other words I it is the subject's self-differentiating play 
(operating as the transcendental imagination) that opens up transcendence. 
Again, it is clear that this construction of the ground must lie in tension with 
the two added passages of the second edition of the "Critique" that we have 
been discussing. For Kant, at least the Kant of the second edition, would 
surely disagree with Heidegger that time as self-affection is the ground of all 
transcendence. Is it not the very point of these two passages to affirm that 
time as the fonn of inner sense cannot be considered as sovereign over 
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space? That is, that space itself must be involved in the production of 
transcendence (or rather, to avoid subjectivism, that transcendence produces 
itself through spacing as well as temporising? ) 
Subjectivism also rears its head in the earlier passages from Heidegger's 
Kant text, as mentioned in passing above. It remains unclear all the way 
through the text whether primordial time is the ground of all synthesis or 
whether synthesis and transcendence are reciprocally determinative. If we 
assume the former position, then time itself exists as something outside of 
the temporising agency of the subject. In other words, primordial 
temporality becomes something quite mysterious. Alternatively, if 
primordial temporality just is the manner in which the subject temporises 
itself through auto-affection, then time and subjectivity become 
equiprimordial. On this basis, the transcendence of metaphysics is grounded 
in the subject. 
In section 35, the conflict between a primordial time that temporises 
mysteriously beyond the primordial synthesis of the transcendental 
imagination and a primordial time that just is that operation of synthesis is 
condensed into two sentences, 
.. the primordially unifying element, 
the transcendental 
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imagination, apparently only a mediating, intermediate faculty, 
is nothing other than primordial time. Only because the 
transcendental imagination is rooted in time can it be the root of 
transcendence. (lbid: 202) 
In these two sentences Heidegger is making two incompatible claims. On the 
one hand he is arguing that the transcendental imagination can be called by 
another name - 'primordial time'. On the other hand, he is claiming that the 
transcendental imagination is grounded in time, as if time had some 
independent ontological status. 
To complete the parallel between the two sections under analysis here and 
section 70 of "Being and Time", it would be necessary to show how the 
Kant text employs wholly spatio-temporal language in order to access what 
are apparently most primordially temporal phenomena. I shall not however 
rehearse the words and the contexts in which this denial of the spatio- 
temporality of language is ordained. 
How then is it possible to look again at Kant's first Critique in a manner 
sustained and influenced by the way in which Heidegger looked again at 
section 70 and rejected it? I suggest that in order to begin to clarify the 
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import of the second edition of the "'Critique", we need to return to the 
question of a spatio-temporal schematism, as something that, in order to be 
thought, must involve much more than a mere 'modification' upon a pure 
temporality. To begin this task, I will return to look at the two passages in 
Kant that Heidegger has been discussing. 
In the "Refutation of Idealism". Kant writes 
Certainly, the representation 'I am', which expresses the 
consciousness that can accompany all thought, immediately 
includes in itself the existence of a subject; but it does not so 
include any knowledge of that subject, and therefore also no 
empirical knowledge, that is, no experience of it. For this we 
require, in addition to the thought of something existing, also 
intuition, and in this case inner intuition, in respect of which, 
that is, of time, the subject must be determined. But in order so 
to determine it, outer obj ects are quite indispensable; and it 
therefore follows that inner experience is itself possible only 
mediately, and only through outer experience. (1929: 246) 
Already, in this passage, it is clear that the schematism cannot be maintained 
in the same manner merely by 'adding on" an account of the space of the 
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subject. Kant is clearly disagreeing with his claim in the 'Transcendental 
Aesthetic' that time is the more primordial form of intuition. What needs to 
be decided is how fundamental this disagreement is. What would have to 
change in Kant's account in order for the equal primacy of outer sense to be 
maintained throughout his text? 
suggest that the modification would have to be absolutely fundamental. 
Time can no longer be taken to be generated out of an "auto-affection. This 
is because, as Kant argues in the above passage, there cannot be an 'auto', an 
au, ro or self, without the experience of outer objects. The self alone 
therefore cannot be the basis for the genesis of time and temporisation. The 
'within' of the subject's time cannot ground itself without the 'without' of 
exterionty. And therefore, the subjectivism that both Kant and Heidegger are 
prey to early on in their thinking collapses. The subject's self-differing 
temporisation of itself cannot be the sole basis for transcendence, for rising 
above the present moment through an encounter with time's horizon. 
Transcendence, the opening to metaphysics, would henceforth become 
grounded in both the within of interiority and the without of the world. 
Transcendence would be chiasmically grounded in immanence, and vice 
versa. 
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But then a more fundamental collapse still would have had to have occurred 
through Kant's additions- a collapse of a strong ontological distinction 
between the inside and the outside of experience and self-knowledge. The 
figure of the 'mobius strip' would have to be mserted at the core of 
ontological difference. Through the supplementation of the above remarks, 
the Kantian notion of self is decentred and displaced from the centre of 
metaphysics. It is as if Kant is enacting the final flourish of his Copernican 
tum in the Refutation. Only in this second edition supplement does Kant 
relinquish a metaphysical equivalence between time and subjectivity. The 
problem is that he did not realise the absolutely revolutionary nature of this 
flourish, at least in the terms of the first Critique. The "Refutation 911 and the 
"General Note" act like silently ticking bombs that must wait two hundred 
years to detonate. The sub . ect's inner space is constructed only on the basis 9 
of the external world. What needs to be acknowledeged is that this 
equiprimordiality would fundamentally challenge and shake all traditional 
forms of transcendental argument. The transcendental forms of the subject's 
representational capacity are, in Kant's words, apriori, or set in place prior 
to all experience. However, with the equal primacy accorded to the 
experience of outer objects in the passage above, this aphori framework 
cannot be maintained. The experience of outer objects cannot be a pure 
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intuition. Rather, the experience of outer objects can only come, with an 
obviousness to the point of tautology, through experience. The space of the 
subject would therefore become an aposteriori intuition. 
And yet the collapse of the transcendental through the collapse of an 
unambiguous ontological distinction between interiority and exteriority goes 
further. If interiority is dependent upon exteriority (and vice versa), then the 
internal time-consciousness of inner sense itself can no longer be a pure 
intuition. The apriori, the most important and central aspect of all 
transcendental structures, is put into crisis. Nothing is decided in advance of 
existence in the world and the experience that takes place within it. Kant's 
supplementary remarks would therefore, if their work was implemented 
throughout his text, lead to something close to one of the founding tenets of 
existential phenomenology. Under these conditions, there is no notion of the 
'universal' available, since all beings exist, and on the basis of that 
existence, they exist in time-space. The transcendental, as the pre-historical 
and pre-subjective ground of the subject, is shown to have been a chimera. 
The transcendental is revealed, through a critique of critique, as particularity 
masquerading as the phantom of the universal. As Gilles Deleuze has shown, 
Kant's construction of the transcendental merely privileges one arbitrary 
form of thinking about objects, structuring this privilege around the 
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deception of an ahistorical universality. 
If we heed the words of the Refutation correctly, I argue that we are forced 
to the following conclusion: there cannot be a universal subject, nor a 
universal object. The subject comes to be aware of itself and to express itself 
only in and through interaction with the world. The subject therefore 
becomes a self-reflective being only in the time-space of the world. Only in 
this here and now of the present can the subject have any sense of self. The 
subject becomes something like an event in the history of the world. 
As I have said, Kant himself was not capable of registering the revolution in 
thinking he had set in place. He maintains an epistemic separation between 
inner and outer intuitions that cannot remain legitimate in ontological terms, 
given his remarks on their reciprocal nature. For instance, in the 'General 
Note' - the addition that follows immediately on from the 'Refutation', he 
writes 
But it is an even more noteworthy fact that in order to 
understand the possibility of things in conformity with the 
categories, and so to demonstrate the objective reality of the 
2 See chapter 3 of "Difference and Repetition". 
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latter, we need, not merely intuitions, but intuitions that are in 
all cases outer intuitions. (lbid: 254) 
How is it possible to set about rethinking the self and its spaces and times, 
outside of a privilege granted to the subject to inaugurate those spaces and 
times? What becomes of what had been referred to as 'inner' and 'outer' 
sense, if the space of the outside is introduced as of equal primacy to time in 
the transcendental realm? How can we draw away from the centrality of the 
subject, and draw upon its decentering? And how do we think beyond 
transcendentalism, given the crisis of the apriori discussed above? How can 
we flesh out the idea that far from being a logically necessary hypothesis for 
the production of sense and cognition, the subject is an event in the history 
of the world? 
I contend that it is not possible to do this within the terms of Kant's first 
Critique, even though it is only on the basis of its second edition that it is 
possible to begin to clarify how one can proceed beyond transcendentalism. 
Nor, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, is it possible to proceed 
beyond the impasse of the cleft between space and time in the early 
Heidegger. In both cases, an attention placed upon the spatiality of 
knowledge (knowledge of self and knowledge of the world) is critically 
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undermined by an illegitimate temperocentrism. In Heidegger's "Being and 
Time", space, as of the world, is mund-ane. From the mundanity of space, 
Heidegger is only one slippery step away from describing its banality. The 
space of the world is henceforth the average, down-levelling space of das 
Man. Time, on the other hand, remains unadulteratable, the repository for all 
that is higher. Time remains the key to the transcendence which acts both as 
the base for metaphysics and its ultimate destiny: authentic being. 
For these reasons, I will leave Kant and Heidegger aside for the rest of this 
chapter, in order to proceed towards what both thinkers have thus far been 
seen to fail in their attempt to think: a spatio-temporal schematism, or a 
phenomenology of time-space. 
* 
In order to begin outlining such a schernatism, I will turn first to the thought 
of the British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. I will examine his book 
"Science and the Modem World", in particular what he introduces there as 
the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness. This thesis is the key to Whitehead's 
genealogy of the abstraction of space and time in the history of modem 
thought. Whitehead's aim is to rethink immediacy, and ask after the 
structure of concrete reality in our experience. As I shall argue, an implicit 
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phenomenology governs Whitehead's thought, a desire to return thinking tO 
the facticity of lived or inunediate experience which at key pomts in the 
work tries to act as ground to what we might call Whitehead's general theory 
of nature. 
The fallacy of misplaced concreteness asserts principally that modem 
science and thought has posited as most concrete or real that which has what 
Whitehead calls 'simple location'. Epistemologically speaking, what is most 
concretely real is paradigmatically an object fixed in a determinate space 
across a determinate time series. The criterion of concrete reality is hence 
measured by the degree of an object's separation and fixity, what we might 
think of as its ' certainty in space'. Perceived objects are non-relational, 'in- 
itself entities, and as such are known according to a one to one 
representational mapping between the subject's cognitive act and the ob ect. j 
In short, the thing as a non-relational, discrete, in-itself entity, is potentially 
available to the subject as transparent knowledge. In the present of the 
perceiving act, the object does not refer outside itself, it has no 'ecstatic" 
value. 
For Whitehead, this thesis about the primordial epistemological and 
ontological constitution of objectality is at one and the same time a thesis 
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about the modem epoch's thinking about the nature of space, 
There were different theories as to the adequate description of 
the status of space. But whatever its status, no one had any 
doubt but that the connection with space enjoyed by entities, 
which are said to be in space, is that of simple location. We 
may put this shortly by saying that it was tacitly assumed that 
space is the locus of simple locations. Whatever is in space is 
simpliciter in some definite portion of space (1946: 65). 
The connection between the thesis of simple object location and the 
'structure' of space as a whole is therefore clear: the object, occupying a 
simple determinate location itself implies that space in totality consists of 
the sum of possible simple locations for objects. Space, like the objects 
within it, has a non-relational character. Each portion of space is an absolute, 
in-itself zone that may or may not be occupied by objects. Space itself is 
therefore absolute, (onto)logically independent of objects. 3 Space is like an 
empty container, an insubstantial substance that locates (or dislocates) other 
substances. Therefore, just as the relation between objects is not essential to 
3 As Whitehead writes, 'According to the absolute theory, which is the traditional view (held explicitly by 
Newton), space has an existence, in some sense whatever it may be, independent of the bodies which it 
contains.. '(1 946: 177) 
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the character in itself of each object, there is merely a juxtaposed relation 
between them, so the relation between portions of space is not essential to 
the character in itself of each portion of space, there is merely juxtaposition 
across spaces. Moreover, the space for simple objects is indifferent to them. 
This construction marks space out as an homogenous and isotropic expanse. 
There is, in effect, no depth to space. Depth is reduced to being a repetition 
of the x or y axis. The z axis has no unique quality that marks out a 
difference in the object or in space. 
At base, this paradigm of concrete reality can be shown to privilege analysis 
as the most primordial level of being. What comes first are separate entities. 
They have no attachment, either to other entities or to the place in which 
they are situated. To repeat what was stated above, entities are therefore 
devoid of any 'ecstasy'. Entities are given relationality only after they are 
fully constituted in their being. This subsequent production of relationality 
can be called 'synthesis'. The binary of analysis and synthesis can therefore 
be seen as a frame which reduces all claims to a precessive non-relationality. 
From this summary of Whitehead's characterisation of the epistemology of 
modem experience as patterned by a scientific world-view, we may 
extrapolate several points. Firstly, the nature of the object as set up through 
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the modem scientific paradigm implies that the object cannot resist the 
epistemological drive to capture it as a known object. Nothing is hidden 
about the object; it can potentially be exhaustiVely analysed and ordered and 
measured by the systems of thinking of scientific method. The object 
therefore is transparently assimilated / assimilable into the order of the 
known, it is without alterity. For this reason, the object is not essentially 
confined to a certain place- the ideal object of experience is reducible to the 
pristine possibility of being understood without context. There is no 
disclosive background or horizon (be it spatial, temporal, historical, 
linguistic, cultural, or a combination of all five) within which the object 
must be embedded in order to reveal itself, in a clearing of truth. There is no 
relation between the object's availability for cognition and a nuanced 
Heideggerian-style a-lethe-ia. The paradigm of locating the object- for 
instance ma physical space ordered mathematically- as object 'a' located at 
specific values given within the variables x, y, z, demonstrates the minimal 
significance of the coordination of the object in terms of its structure and 
essence. The object can be wrenched from the specific boundary limitations 
of the current context, or alternatively those boundary limitations may be left 
unspecified, and yet the entity would not suffer a reduced epistemological 
value. The object exist and is known without obscurity and without doubt, 
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and it can be known by anyone, at any place and any time. The object is 
paradigmatically mathematical. In mock-Saussurian terms, one might say 
that the first principle concerning simple objects is that they have an 
arbitrary relation to their enframing spatial context. 
The simply-located object, situated in absolute, non - relational space, is 
therefore constructed as the most concrete, the form of the most immediate 
concrete reality, in modem scientific thinking. The idea that knowledge must 
be embedded within practices, contextualised, in order for it to be such, the 
founding tenet of existential phenomenology, is rejected. The modem 
paradigm minimises attention placed upon the praxis-horizon of immediate 
experience, an attenuation that effectively installs a non-horizon as the 
horizon of experience; that is it conditions any reading of experience in 
terms of the possibilities of transparent, calculable knowledge. 
This claim that the simply located object is not context - dependent, made 
available only in relation to a placial. matTix or horizon, that space itself is 
absolute, and as such, independent of objects, has severe implications for the 
status of human 'lived experience' in modem thinking. In terms of the 
modem paradigm, objects in space are seen as distorted by the inherent 
perspectivism of the subject of experience. Scientific method posits as its 
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ideal a non - perspectival standard of recording the object. As with Kant's 
notion of space as an apriori pure intuition, absolute space returns in the 
guise of a non-metaphysical necessary hypothesis for the experience and 
measurement of objects. Space no longer hypostatised as a global entity, an 
etherous container, but rather understood as an abstract universal form. The 
"Ideal" space of measurement in the modem era would be that of the 
axonometric, an absolute space where all perspectival value is erased. In 
architectural forms of spatial representation, axonometric diagrams are 
drawings without depth. Lines going into the distance of the drawing do not 
converge upon a vanishing point. Perspectivism is, according to the 
esteemed value placed on the axonometric, a distorting element, a derivative 
subjectivism. Not an intrinsic value of immediate concrete reality. Although 
the axonometric is a more recent form of visual representation, in a sense it 
applies the Cartesian logic and ontology of space as a mathematical co- 
ordinating grid, as an abstract frame devoid of content, to the limit. The 
simple object, slotted into the place it arbitrarily occupies in the grid is 
therefore 'purely Cartesian. ' 
Implicit therefore within Whitehead's symptommatology of the conditions of 
modem experience is an account of the devaluation of the subject's 
experience of the world through an intemalisation of the values of modem 
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scientific thinking. What we have by and large rejected or forgotten is a 
sense of the concrete relations at work between the body and place, of the 
truth of an embodied perspectival relation to the world, in favour of a purely 
cobjective' hermeneutic of experience. For the sake of transparency and 
certainty in space, our understanding of our experience has lost its depth. 
Within the conventions of all scientific programmes, perspectival accounts 
of experience must always, in order to achieve an approximation to the truth 
of nature, or, in the grandest sense, of a possible metaphysics of the truth of 
being, be filtered by some version of an axonometric programme. That is, all 
perspectival value must be sieved out or erased. The vanishing point 
vanishes. Space is made absolute, ontologically independent of objects, as 
the site of their possible location, in order that they may be measured. Only 
after this idealising process has been achieved can concrete reality be 
determined as an objective actuality, as the relation between an object and a 
determinate location. This reality of the entity is presumed to be a non- 
relational, concrete, in-itself object, measured across universally isotTopic 
space, a space of measurement with no characteristics unique to itself 
beyond this minimal role as the matrix of metrication, of abstract measure, 
the sum of simple locations. 
Against this prevailing devaluation of the embedded character of the 
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subject's experience, Whitehead's 'fallacy of m1splaced concreteness' marks 
the beginning of an attempt to return philosophy to an appreciation of the 
immediate profundity of lived experience. Whitehead's text is imbued with 
an under-theorised drive towards a phenomenological methodology. Hence 
we come across the following passages and phrases. He writes of a 
motivation towards ', ka analysis more concrete than that of the scientific 
scheme of thought' (1946: 9 1) [emphasis added]. He also suggests a return to 
the 'ultimate. fact of experience' (lbid: 81). Here Whitehead's language 
comes closest to those of his continental contemporaries, the use of 'fact' 
approximating to Heidegger's Faktizitdt. As with Heidegger, the subject's 
ecstatic facticity of being in the world is fundamentally grounded in the 
corporeal character of Dasein, 'I shall argue that among the primary 
elements of nature as apprehended in our immediate experience, there is no 
element whatever which possesses this character of simple location' 
(Ibid: 72) [emphasis added]. And later on, he writes, 'In being aware of the 
bodily experience, we must thereby be aware of aspects of the whole spatio- 
temporal world as mirrored within the bodily life. ' (Ibid: 113) 
However, it is not possible to find a sustained methodological development 
behind Whitehead's desire for a return to the inumediacy of experience. We 
can nonetheless glean from what is there in the text certain principles which 
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organise 'Whitehead's phenomenological bias and allow him to develop it. 
The key principle at work in his thinking are the possibilities and limitations 
opened up by the embodied nature of perception. In order to begin to see the 
ontological importance of the body for Whitehead, it is necessary to 
introduce some of the basic concepts of his thinking. 
To begin with, in his opening remarks on the complexity inherent in our 
actual experience of immediate concrete reality, Whitehead positions his 
thinking on an abstract level. One has a sense of a residual scientificism 
driving him to abstract yet again from the complex influence of embodied 
perception on how we understand spatiality. It is as if Whitehead falls into 
his own trap of an over-valued abstraction. He starts by distinguishing the 
'separative' from the 'prehensive' aspect of space-time. The former refers to 
discreteness or the interval between things in space. In other words, the 
separative refers to what I called 'analysis' above. The prehensive on the 
other hand refers to the ways in which things are 'together' (or 
'synthesised') in space or time. He then adds a third aspect of space-time, 
that of its 'modal' nature. In Spinozist fashion, Whitehead's notion of 
'mode' corresponds to the process of individuation and determination of the 
object. He adds that taking determination or modality in-itself, one is 
tempted to posit simple location as the most concrete. It is easy to imagine 
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that that which is determinate and deten-nined in space-time is that which is 
simply located there. In other words, it easy to fall into the trap of equating 
indiViduation with simple location. Whitehead suggests that only by thinking 
modality in terms of the separative and the prehensive (in terms of analysis 
and synthesis) that we can escape this inclination to posit an equivalence 
between individuation and an analytic simplicity. As we shall see, this 
attempt to think synthesis as equi rimordial to analysis is vital to IP 
understanding the radical opening offered up in Whitehead's philosophical 
project. In the following chapters, I shall be arguing in effect that treating 
analysis and synthesis as equally significant allows for ontological 
difference to be thought of as a transcendence within immanence. But I am 
already leaping ahead of myself in suggesting this. 
From this basis, Whitehead launches into a quasi-Leibnizian account of the 
essential relationality of space. The abstract character of this account 
mentioned just now appears in the form of a inininialist notion of 
perspectivism. Rather than embodied perception being the essence of 
perspectivism- a position which demands that embodiment itself is thought 
on all its levels, or at least that the plurality inherent within a thinking of the 
body is gestured towards, the perspectlVal is registered as the mere 
locatedness within space of the agent of perception. A monadic generality 
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invades the text. Whitehead's aim is to show how the perspectival character 
of the experience of space entails that relationality, or the 'prehensive' is the 
most important aspect, the 'prime fact. ' He introduces an example, 
Thus if A and B and C are volumes of space, B has an aspect 
from the standpoint of A, and so has C, and so has the 
relationship of B and C. This aspect of B from A is of the 
essence of A. The volumes of space have no independent 
existence. They are only entities as with the totality; you cannot 
extract them from their environment without destruction of 
their very essence. Accordingly, I will say that the aspect of B 
from A is the mode in which B enters into the composition of 
A. This is the modal character of space, that the prehensive 
unity of A is the prehension into unity of the aspects of all other 
volumes from the standpoint of A. (Ibid: 18 1) 
In this passage it is as if the deeply placed relationality of space, its 
ontologically grounded relationality, subjects the body of perception to a 
pre-phenomenological perspectivism. Prior to our experience of the world 
from our determined position, prior to reflection on this experience, there is 
the brute facticity of positionality itself Whether or not we reflect or are 
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conscious of our positioned reading of the world, we are none the less 
positioned. Perhaps this is why Whitehead sounds quite abstract here; in 
order to think the relationality of space, we need not refer to the embodied 
nature of perception, we need only think the locatedness of perception that 
makes spatiality inherently relational. That this is Whitehead's point, that he 
affirms a basic physicalism in his thinking against simple location- that he 
locates location itself in the simple manner of a cartographics, a 
physicalism- is confirmed a few pages later, when he explains the use of the 
word 'Prehension' rather than 'apprehension', 
The word 'perceive' is, in our common usage, shot through and 
through with notion of cognitive apprehension. So is the word 
'apprehension', even with the adjective cognitive omitted. I will 
use the word 'prehension' for uncognitive apprehension: by 
this I mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive. 
(lbid: 86) 
The 'may or may not', I am suggesting, confirms a preference for thinking 
perspectivism on the basis of a pre-expefiential mathematical positionality, 
rather than on the complex basis- extra-physical in part- of the embodied 
nature of perception. The perspective of the subject of experience is 
120 
Chapter 2: Against the Simple Object 
modelled in the abstract with A's and B's. We shall pause to question this 
privileging of a certain way of thinking about perspectivism shortly. 
Nonetheless, prehension, the gathering of the environment, of Whitehead's 
A's and B's and C's construed only from the relation between them, already 
takes us outside of simple location. A thing in space, or a volume of space, 
can only have spatial significance in and through its relation to the 
surrounding spaces. What is present, the object of perception, cannot make 
sense solely in terms of a one to one epistemological mapping between 
presentation of the object and representation in the mind, the optics of 
capture. The object of perception, the thing or volume of space, is perceived 
and made sense of only through the relationality inherent within and through 
the subject's delimiting perspective on the world. 'The volumes of space 
have no independent existence. ' The object of perception, what is given to 
cognition, cannot be discrete, simple, simply located. It contains within itself 
aspects of its surrounding context. In other words, instead of the 
inaugurating primordiality of analysis which acted as the basis of the fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness, Whitehead posits an equiprimordial synthesis or 
prehension. The thing discloses itself on the basis of its environment, starts 
presencing from the boundaries that separate it from the other (things in 
space), a separation that yet affirms relation. The immanence of this mode 
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of being in this present (Whitehead's 'prehensivity') only occurs on the basis 
of its being a gathering of what is always already dispersed or separative. 
Immanence can only be constructed in relation to a precessive transcendence 
(and vice versa). 
This privilege ascribed to a primordial synthesis accords with the findings of 
Gestalt psychology's investigations into the figure-ground relation. 
Whenever we perceive an object, the argument goes, we only make sense of 
that object in terms of the background of the context in which it is situated. 
We can only understand and makes sense of this being a tree on the basis 
that it is a tree in a field near other trees. A tree that floats around as a sprite 
on a computer screen-saver is sense-less. Or rather, whatever 'sense' we 
ascribe to it is derivative upon the possibilities of contexts being given. For 
example, one such possibility is that whenever we see an image of a tree (or 
any other image) in abstraction from the lived reality of trees (or the lived 
reality of x), we make sense of that image to the extent that we associate it 
with its context. 
For Whitehead, there is no simple interiority, no in-itself objectival 
transparency. The spell of simple location is broken by the constitutional 
necessity of exteriority: 'you cannot extract [the volumes of space] from 
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their environment without destruction of their very essence. ' (lbid: 81) 
Furthermore, one might add that whilst there may be no optimum place for 
witnessing the presence of the object (for example, how would we determine 
the perfect vantage point and context within which to experience a tree - 
from close up, at a distance? ) this does not entail, as previously with the 
simple object, that the object can be viewed from anywhere in the same way. 
The object's presence is at work in its enviromnental context. This context 
can never be 'saturated'; it is always excessive to the imposition of a 
limiting frame. Beyond this, the object signifies across time as the 
presencing of the trace, of memory. In other words, after the collapse of the 
illusion of simple location, there comes the collapse of the dream of a 
transparent knowledge of objects. We can never be certain of the space of 
objects. After imbibing the philosophical resources of the following 
chapters of this thesis, we will be able to say that understanding objects can 
only occur through a perceptual faith that faces the world in light of an 
acknowledged and irrevocable uncertainty. 
In order to develop the prime significance of the relationality of space given 
through the pre-reflective prehension of the transcending environment and 
to show the philosophical significance of such an account, Whitehead 
returns to Berkeley, in this return enacting a striking subversion of the 
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idealism of the latter. Berkeley's idealism, as is well-known, is epitomised 
by the dictum esse est percipi. To be is to be perceived. Beyond perception, 
the existence of things in themselves, hence the unity of nature, is 
guarranteed only in the mind of god. Whitehead furnishes several citations 
where Berkeley is seen to argue that what is taken to be the perception of the 
thing in itself, of trees in a park or books in a closet, or of the distant object 
on the horizon, though apparently outside of a perceptual relation, are 
nonetheless constructions of the mind. The clearest example to demonstrate 
this argument comes when Whitehead quotes from the Alciphron. 
Berkeley argues in the dialogue between Euphranor and Alciphron that the 
small round object perceived on the horizon cannot be the same thing as the 
'large square building with battlements and turrets'- i. e. the small round 
object when one is much closer to it. Euphranor concludes, 'Is it not plain, 
therefore, that neither the castle, the planet, nor the cloud, which you see 
here, are those real ones which you suppose exist at a distance. ' (1946: 85) 
In Berkeley, the ontological deficit between appearance and the reality of the 
thing in itself, between the perceived object and being, is bridged by the 
mind of God. When the tree in the forest is not being perceived by human 
(or animal? ) eye, it does not cease to exist because God, in his fly-like 
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infinite ocularity, continues to watch it. What is of interest for Whitehead in 
Berkeley is the idea that there is, in this way, always a beyond to the present 
moment of perception. In other words, it is impossible to trap or contain an 
object through the precision of a rigorous gaze. The object is not simple, and 
therefore it will not yield to the metaphysical desire for transparency and 
certainty. 
Berkeley therefore provides Whitehead with the beginings of a solution to 
the abstTactionism of modem scientific thinking. He allows Whitehead to 
begin thinking the ecstatic transcendence of the here and now of perceiving 
an object. In order to use Berkeley in this way, all Whitehead must do is 
substitute transcendence (of this illusion of simple analytic truth) for the 
'mind of God'. 
This unity of a prehension defines itself as a here and a now, 
and the things so gathered into the gasped unity have essential 
reference to other places and other times. For Berkeley's mind, I 
substitute a process of prehensive unification. (lbid: 87) 
Let us try to expand upon this quote. The object that is perceived cannot ever 
be perceived exhaustively. Each 'here and now' of perceiving leaves a 
remainder of the unperceived. In Heideggenan fashion, each moment of 
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revealing brings with it an attendant concealing. The difference between 
Heidegger and Whitehead on this point is only one of varyMg modes of 
expression. If anything, I would argue that Whitehead allows for a more 
concrete formulation of the thing's transcendence of the present. It is 
possible to describe 'the thing in itself from this framework as an 
unrealisable virtuality, an inex k-avsLilk resource for actualisation. The 
possibility of a nournenal absolute realisation of the object therefore 
becomes strictly impossible. The 'Real"- transparent absolute reality, is the 
virtual (and as such unobtainable and unrepresentable), whereas appearances 
are actual. As such, appearances occur within an always already relational 
spatiality. Spatiality is the manifold of appearances across their intervals, or 
the levels of their being. An object - appearance does not occupy a slot in an 
independent spatiality; it is rather a moment within spatiality. It is therefore 
ineradicably temporal. Space is no longer the absolute form of outer sense, a 
series o frozen frames or tableaux vivants, transcendental. It is no longer 
purely spatial, or absolutely separate from the pure intuition of inner sense. 
It is rather always transcending itself across its moments. Introducing 
ecstasy into our experience of things therefore equates with a realisation of 
the ftmdamental spatio-temporality of our experience (or our selves and the 
world). Furthennore, each revealed aspect of an object is partial, its 
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embeddedness within a relation to other things entails that no one 
perspective can provide a totalizing comprehension, a saturated context. The 
sum of all aspects, a view of the object from everywhere, is a non-realisable 
hypothetical construction. VA-iitehead can be seen to be providing a spatio- 
temporal schernatism, a phenomenological ontology of the object. 
We can therefore begin to re-imagine the basic constituents of each simple 
act of perception of external 'objects'. It is possible to say that elements of 
the present preliensive unity have been present before this gathering event of 
being, and will be present after its evanescence, and yet this elemental 
repetition does not reside within Sameness. Each actualisation occurs within 
the singularity of an unrepeatable moment. The virtuality of the thing, the 
plenitudinous ding an sich, is not a universal that receives undifferentiated 
particularity through each actualisation. Elements, for example colours, are 
never the same everywhere. 4 They form, in each durational patterning, a 
'style'- each element of the prehensive unity mirrors or exemplifies the rest. 
For example, the green of this leaf exemplifies its textural qualifies, its 
weight and so on. The prehensive unity of the leaf, the sensuous qualities it 
gathers, tend towards a 'synaesthetic conformity'. This green differs from 
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the greens present on the surface of an apple, even though they may be of 
the same shade. In other words, the green transcends its own 'sense 
modality'- synaesthetic conformity or styling is the first mark of the thing's 
ecstatic elemental composition. Each experience of colour therefore resides 
within the singularity of the thing and the moment of its being experienced. 
It cannot be reduced to the 'sameness' of the universal colour whose name it 
shares. This universal colour is a virtual, unrealisable thing-in-itself, a 
virtuality. 
This difference of the singularity of experience becomes more marked when 
taken in relation to the environmental character of the prehensive unity. For 
instance, when we move beyond the elemental composition of the thing to 
the ecstatic relation to its (back)gound(s); the leaf as it rests balanced on 
this shoot, on this twig, on this tree, in this place, at this time of day, in this 
season and so on. In this way, we can see that the thing gathers or articulates 
or exemplifies its context, gives it a significance it would not otherwise 
have, as the figure is said to articulate the ground of the Gestalt. We begin to 
see that something like a 'double ecstasis' of style is taking place: the thing's 
presencing singularity in this moment reflects the background horizon of its 
The painter Josef Albers in "The Interaction of Colour" comprehensively formallses this assertion. 
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context, and vice versa. The leaf s tangible greenness would begin to 
embody the spirit of the place, capture the season, illuminate the light of 
day, as the place, season or day is articulated by the leaf. Or the smell of the 
seaweed or the sound of the waves would exemplify the seaside town, the 
town itself at the same time expressing the way in which this odour or that 
sound is experienced. The event of perception therefore is seen to occur 
amidst a dynamic durational, field; the particular extends beyond itself both 
in space, condensing the significance of the landscape or the cityscape into 
the living essence of a thing, and in time, as the thing and its elemental 
constituents refer to themselves across contexts, through differentiation. 
These insights into the phenomenological structure of experiencing the 
transcendence of 'things' beyond the simple locationalism of classical 
epistemology are elaborated, with a nod to Whitehead, in Alphonse Lingis' 
text , "Foreign Bodies". In the quote 
below, it is possible to note how 
singularity, the ground or embeddedness of the perceived object and its 
synaesthetic essence are registered, 
The sensible elements themselves are not really particulars. 
They should not be defined as items that are what they are, 
when and where they are. Not one of them is just a here-and- 
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now particular, contingent and unfounded such that it can only 
be recorded or not recorded. Each of them goes beyond simple 
location; there is not one that is instantaneous, that does not 
prolong itself in duration. And there is not one that is simply 
here: a point of red reduced to itself is not visible and is not red; 
it needs to be reinforced, prolonged by other spots, to be red. It 
is not simply red within its own borders since it can be the red it 
is only if the background is the color or colors it is. And this red 
looks tangible, is a tangible red. (1994: 6) 
The colour red cannot, under Lingis' argument, be reduced to an a- 
contextual essence. In Bergsonian fashion, Lingis is arguing that red 
endures by differentiating itself from itself across its moments and within its 
contexts. Red is an immanency that 'signifies' or expresses itself only on 
the basis of a transcendence of that immanence being constitutive of its 
appearance. 
The phenomenology developing out of this model of the prehensive unity in 
process, of a gathering expressed in two moments- of the perceived object as 
a synaesthetic conformity of elements firstly, and secondly, of the thing's 
capacity to articulate and condense its context, suggest that a return in 
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philosophy to the complexities of the lived experience of perception is best 
articulated as a poetics, rather than a science. The event of perception, as a 
singularity, forecloses the universality necessary for strictly universalist 
categorisation. At the least, the conventional name ontology often at work in 
scientific discourse must be rethought as naming process rather than objectq 
as Whitehead goes on to argue. Each event of perception, actualising itself 
by differentiating itself from the paradigmatic recession of the virtual thing 
in itself, can only be thought as a singularity, in the here and now, as lying in 
essential (differentiating) relation to other places and other times. And the 
expression of the singularity of experience (and therefore of the singularity 
of things in the world, caught within and yet forever transcending the 
finitude of experience) has often been the 'aim' within the poetic work. 
For example, such a poetics is exemplified in Haiku poetry, where the 
particularity of a thing experienced in a specific time and place is captured, 
the mode of capture often taking the form of a condensation of context, an 
elsewhere that maybe simply a spatial there always in relation to the near 
dwelt upon, or the context of place placed in relation to memory and 
5 
repetition, as Casey argues. Dancing with the present entails that the 
See Casey's "Getting Back Into Place" p280. 
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footsteps mark the time of the absent. In Western literature, it is Marcel 
Proust who most profoundly contributes to a phenomenological ontology of 
difference, of transcendence within immanence. In the last volume of "A la 
D,:, c 
. Re 
herche du Temps Perdu"' he writes for instance, 
An image presented to us by life brings with it, in a single 
moment, sensations which are in fact multiple and 
heterogeneous. The sight, for instance, of the binding of a book 
once read may weave into the characters of its title the 
moonlight of a distant summer night. The taste of our breakfast 
coffee brings with it that vague hope of fine weather which so 
often long ago, as with the day still intact and full before us we 
were drinking it out of a bowl of white porcelain, creamy and 
fluted and itself looking almost like vitrified milk, suddenly 
smiled upon us in the pale uncertainty of the dawn. An hour is 
not merely an hour, it is a vase full of scents and sounds and 
projects and climates, and what we call reality is a certain 
connection between these immediate sensations and the 
memones which envelope us sIMUltaneously with them- a 
connection that is suppressed in a simple cinematographic 
vision, which just because it professes to confine itself to the 
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truth in fact departs widely from it- a unique connection which 
the writer has to rediscover in order to link for ever in his 
phrase the two sets of phenomena which reality joins together. 
(1970: 253) 
Here, with the example of the book, Proust can be read as providing a 
literary counter to the simple locationism that is endemic to modem 
thinking. The space of the book's title words cannot remain secure within 
their own fixed frame of the present. The space of the letters is automatically 
working within the experience of the narrator as essentially related to other 
times and other places. Conversely, the pure time of Kantian inner sense is, 
in the above passage, interrupted by manifestations of outer sense ('an hour 
is not merely an hour.. '). Each 'form' of pure intuition is chiasmically and 
constitutively interwoven with modes of its transcendence as the 
work of memory perdures within the present moment of perception. 
Moreover, the sensuousity of Proust's prose brings us closer still to 
understanding the centrality of the body in the construction of a spatio- 
temporal schematism. It is only through the residuum of traces of the 
experience of the senses (rather than 'sense-experience') that the present can 
be received and understood. The subject becomes an event in the history of 
the world it has felt, reached out to, caught hold of, loved 
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This last volume is replete with similar passages whose evident influence 
DA 
6 fro(q Bergson andjýlerleau-Ponty's work is striking. There is in Proust's 
project a strong parallelism with Whitehead. Both want to think beyond 
objectivism, beyond a false account of how to express the experience of 
what I have been calling immediate lived experience. In Proust, this takes 
the form of a polemic against a descriptivist model of literary realism, 
And this is why the kind of literature which contents itself with 
"describing things", with giving of them merely a miserable 
abstract of lines and surfaces, is in fact, though it calls itself 
realist, the furthest removed from reality and has more than any 
other the effect of saddening and impoverishing us, since it 
abruptly severs all communication of our present self both with 
the past, the essence of which is preserved in things, and with 
the future, in which things incite us to enjoy the essence of the 
past a second time. (lbid: 248) 
It is striking that in this passage Proust repeats exactly Whitehead's thesis of 
6 However, Proust's multilocular poetics may be criticised for an implicit nostalgia. Involuntarily 
remembering (through the traces of sensibility that alert the body to the past moment) returns the person to 
the Ur- moment, the primal scene of sense. This 'primality' masks the instability of the original. The first 
context itself must be full of traces, lines of flight, resonances. The 'original moment' that encroaches upon 
the present is therefore itself encroached upon, an encroachment that threatens its originary status as a past- 
Present. Proust seems to solicit the present only to privilege past and future presents; we must, in being 
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the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness. ' For Proust, what has been taken by 
novelists to be the most immediate form of reality is but an abstraction. In 
opposition to this history of abstraction in the novel (perhaps culminating in 
the laborious 'realism' of Emile Zola, one might suggest), Proust outlines a 
primordial prehensivity of being. The present, as he says above, is always 
already mi communication with a past which it preserves (through the 
involuntary retentions and releases of memory). The present, acknowledged 
as a plenitudinous enfoldment of spatio-temporal difference is, if we trace 
Proust's hopes beyond their negative expression in the above passage, a 
moment of joyful enrichment, which would reach its most resounding 
epiphany in the poetic or literary work. 
By this stage, with the above initial development of a poetics of the space - 
time event, we have come a long way from the abstract frame of modem 
constructions of space, be it Cartesian or Kantian, axonometric; and isotropic. 
Moreover, we have begun to elaborate a spatio-temporal schematism, at 
work as the condition for all possible experience. Instead of the apriori forms 
of pure intuition, space and time have been seen to be constantly and 
Primordially intertwined in our experience. Through Whitehead and Proust 
faithful to the logic of the trace, go further and destroy all presence. 
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the remnants of a Lockean distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities is thoroughly rejected in favour of what I called a double ecstasis of 
the thing articulating its context and a context being articulated through the 
thing. A colour is neither a secondary quality nor the realisation of a 
universal. It is rather an aspect of a particular thing's 'style of being' that 
makes sense only according to what I referred to above as a 'synaesthetic' 
conformity. The thing reveals itself partially, in the present event of 
perception. What was known in philosophy as the 'universal' therefore 
always differs from itself across the singularities of its manifestation. The 
thing is a 'mode' in the singular transaction between sameness (prehension) 
and difference (the separatiVe) in the present. As Alphonso Lingis writes, 
The sensible field is a realm of being where all points become 
pivots, all lines become levels, all surfaces become planes, all 
colors become atmospheres, all tones become- as in 
dodecaphonic music- keys. There are not particulars and 
universals in the sensible field; what there are are particulars 
generalizing themselves, a whole landscape concretizing 
momentarily in this red, a whole love given in the condensation 
in a vase of flowers, a whole adventure or fatality sounded in 
the five little notes heard in Swann's Way. Each given is the 
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spot and moment in which a schema of being is being 
elaborated. Artists have a precise knowledge of this; their 
knowledge consists in knowing what a color does to a field, to 
another color, to a zone of space; in knowing what a line does 
to the zone it moulds, to the space it bunches up, bulges out, or 
flattens, to the color, to the field of tensions; and in knowing 
what shapes move, creep, crawl, leap, set up movement in a 
whole field. (Ibid: 7) 
The immediate reality of the perceived object lies in its aspects, not in the 
virtuality of the thing in itself as the resource of style. The thing's reality lies 
not in itself, in its simple, discrete, isolateable position, but in the 
interconnected web of aspects that mesh it to the environment of other 
bodies around it, as it exemplifies or mirrors them through the double - 
articulation of prehension. And therefore 'space' loses its ability to function 
as an abstract noun and therefore to suggest an absolute space, be it logical 
or ontological. The object produces space, as space produces the object. 
'Space' therefore becomes irreducibly singular. To refer to it in the abstract, 
all that can be said is that it is anisotropic and heterogeneoQý - 
By this point, we can see that what must be central to a way out of the 
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fallacy of misplaced concreteness is the body of the perceiver. This is most 
obvious in the passages from Proust above, whereby the present becomes 
, 
imbued with past resonances only on the basis of sensuous traces imprinted 
upon the body of the perceiver. The body therefore becomes, in Proust, the 
locus of all transcendence of the present here and now reality of perception. 
The multiple and heterogenous sensations which issue out of each perceived 
image are multiple only through the durational density of the embodied 
subject's expenence. 
In Whitehead, it is clear that the body is central to the difference between 
falling into the trap of modem abstraction and returning our experience to 
the multilocationality of things. We have noted already that in places 
Whitehead falls prey to his own trap of abstraction and thinks the 
perspectivism of the body in terms of something like a simple location. It is 
now time to emphasise how the body is given ontological primordiality by 
Whitehead. I shall begin this by returning to Whitehead placing emphasis on 
the perspectivism of the embodied subject. 
.. note that the 
idea of simple location has gone. The things 
which are gasped into a realised unity, here and now, are not 
the castle, the cloud and the planet simply in themselves; but 
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they are the castle, the cloud, and the planet from the 
standpoint, in space and time, of the prehensive unification. In 
other words, it is the perspective of the castle over there from 
the standpoint of the unification here. It is therefore, aspects of 
the castle, the cloud, and the planet which are grasped into unity 
here. (Ibid: 87) 
The locus of prehension, the site of the aspect of the object, is the body, as 
Whitehead indicates. He writes, 
In this sketch of an analysis more concrete than that of the 
scientific scheme of thought, [a gesture towards a 'poetics' of 
the event is made available here], I have started from our own 
psychological field, as it stands for our cognition. I take it for 
what it claims to be: the self-knowledge of our bodily event. I 
mean the total event, and not the inspection of the details of the 
body. This self-knowledge discloses a prehensive unification of 
modal presences of entities beyond itself (Ibid: 9 1). 
As Whitehead implies in this passage, thinking the structure of the thing's 
availability to perception beyond a one to one mapping between the object 
and its representation to consciousness, beyond an account of perception 
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allied to the metaphysics of simple location, leads to another way of thinking 
the philosophical structure of perception. This in turn leads to a complete re- 
evaluation of the ground of all metaphysical thinking. Far from it being time, 
as an 'auto-effection' of the subject, that allows for transcendence and the 
opening towards metaphysics, it is the body, which produces the beyond of 
the present. It is through the body of the subject that the present is imbued 
with difference. It is therefore through the body that the perceived object is 
most primordially a relational complex. It is the ontological primordiality of 
the body that allows for something like 'synthesis' to be equiprimordial with 
analysis in the structure of perception. form of being. 
The ramifications of this conclusion will need to be drawn out. As we shall 
uncover in the fourth chapter, it is only through a reworking of what it is to 
perceive, that questions of ontological difference can get resolved. And it is 
only in terms of re-evaluating the ontological status of the body itself that we 
can understand perception from the point of view of lived experience. 
For the moment, one can say that the body we are referring to is hardly the 
body as an entity in itself of which we may or may not be aware. To think of 
'the body' in this way is to fall yet again into Whitehead's fallacy. 
Perception, through the body, is not of the body itself, but towards what is 
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outside, beyond the body. Perception is not therefore a matter of reading the 
data that modifies the sense organs, it rather involves a relation to the 
otherness of the Umwelt that displaces any possible 'inspection of the 
details of the body. ' In perceiving the world, my sense of simple location, of 
being this body here, recedes in favour of a sense of bodily ec-stasis. The 
body as simply located disappears, becomes absent. 
* 
Having voyaged through Wbitehead and, along the way, embellished his 
thinking in various directions (principally with the help of Proust and 
Lingis), it is now time to begin to expand upon the philosophical 
implications of going beyond the simple object. As I hinted in the last few 
paragTaphs, Whitehead allows us to realise the reciprocality that lies between 
ontology and perception, through a somatocentric theory. For the moment, 
this drawing out of implications will be succinct, for, as the next chapter will 
show, a lack has gathered around the argument as it has developed. 
7 Drew Leder writes, in "The Absent Body" 'My perceptions are never lived as bare concatenations of 
sense-data but reveal what is Other, a realm of external objects. If I were to apprehend all perceptual events 
siMPIY as modifications of my body located within the perceiving organs, I would have no experience of an 
outer world, and thus, ultimately, even of my own body as a worldly thing. My being-in-the-world depends 
upon my body's self-effacing transitivity. ' (1990: 15) As Alphonso Lingis puts it succinctly, 'From the first, 
not a patch of color or a pressure but some thing touched the sensibility. ' (1994: 9) 
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The leaf in the garden, the sound of the waves slaking against the town's 
stony beach: each event of perception, gathering as it does within its moment 
an environment an ambient framing of things through the ecstatic body of 
perception, therefore embodies an immanence. Environmentality, the 
transcending yet constitutive context of the moment, dwells within what is 
present. What is present, here and now, expresses this context, this place. 
And yet, as was shown in the account of the double nature of ecstasis, this 
in-dwelling gathering of the far in the near has a second moment, that of 
referring or invoking other times and places. The perceptual event's second 
moment is therefore that of transcendence. This event always refers beyond 
itself in its present gathering of the world. This 'beyond' is both the beyond 
of the 'far' as the surrounding environment and as the temporal 'far'. 
It is now possible to state that through embodied perception, there occurs an 
incorporation of transcendence within immanence. Each moment of an event 
of perception is imbued with this double movement whereby what might at 
first sight be taken as simple present and a simple location is subject to both 
a gathering and a dehiscence. The event of perception involves a drawing in 
of the far (Heidegger) and a movement beyond itself in space and in time 
(Whitehead, Proustý Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, Lingis). A phenomenology of 
the difference of the perceptual event incorporates ecstasis as a 
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transcendence within immanence. In this way, the impasse of not being able 
to think the spatio-temporal schematism that Kant suggests and Heidegger 
repeats and yet does not resolve will become available. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE SUBJECT 
Stay loyal to the earth, my brothers, with the power of your 
virtue! May your bestowing love and your knowledge serve 
towards the meaning of the earth! Thus I beg and entreat you. 
Do not let it fly away from the things of earth and beat with its 
wings against the eternal walls! Alas, there has always been 
much virtue that has flown away! 
Lead, as I do, the flown-away virtue back to earth - yes, back 
to body and life: that it may give the earth its meaning, a 
human meaning! 
Nietzsche "Of the 
Zarathustra" (1969: 102) 
In the previous chapter 
Bestowing Virtue" in "Thus Spoke 
much work was done to counteract the 
temperocentrism of "Being and Time" by way of Whitehead's argument 
against the simple object. A spatio-temporal object was thematised as the 
percept of the embodied subject. The deficit in this account can now be 
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introduced. It is not yet clear how the body relates to what it perceives. 
What is required is an account of how a spatio-temporal object produces 
and is produced by a spatio-temporal subject. After the last chapter's 
theorisation. of the work of the, object, what is now needed is an 
examination of the work of the subject. 
In order to proceed, we need to understand the problem at hand. The 
problem is that of agency. In the previous chapter, the intimate relation 
between the subject and a transcendental horizon of time was uncovered. 
This relation was seen to result inexorably in a subjectivism which the early 
Heidegger and the early critical Kant could not escape. How then is it 
possible to think of a subjectivity which does not dominate that which there 
is to think beyond it? How can immanence be thought in relation to a 
transcendence which it does not circumscribe or reduce? How do we think 
about the work of a subject that does not work solely within immanence? 
In this chapter I will argue that Heidegger's attempts to think beyond the 
subjectivism of "Being and Time" result in a reconstituted or displaced 
subjectivity. By examining this failure to think transcendence within 
immanence, the way ahead will be signalled. Heidegger's failure will be 
shown to lie in over-valuing what he takes to be forms of transcendence, in 
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particular that of architecture and language. I will argue that in a sense, for 
the post-tum Heidegger, architecture and language do too much work. As 
such, the work of architecture and the work of language will be seen as 
mere dissimulations of transcendence. They are displaced fonns of 
subjectivity masquerading as transcendence. 
In order to counteract the work of an apparent transcendence which silences 
the agency of the subject, I will have recourse to a distinction between work 
and worklessness. It is in the terms of this distinction that a middle-voiced 
agency of the subject can be expounded. That is, by thinking the 
worklessness of the subject, it will be possible to begin understanding how 
the subject communicates with a world it neither dominates nor is 
dominated by. 
I shall begin this examination of a middle-voiced subjectivity by reviewing 
theoretically the role of the architect in relation to the design of space and 
materials. Examining in theory the role of the architect is of use here 
because it is impossible to access this role without encountering questions 
of agency: does the architect merely use space and materials to fulfill the 
ends of the client, or is the architect used by space and materials? Who acts 
upon whom? The architect's relation to space therefore can act as an 
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amplified model for receiving different constructions of how the subject 
acts in relation to the 'exteriorities' of space and materiality. 
* 
Slyviane Agacinski in her essay "Space and the Work" writes the 
following, 
It follows from these different remarks that the theme of the 
work is on the side of a thought which seeks to master space, 
while what, for want of a more satisfactory expression, I have 
termed the experience of space corresponds to the 
abandonment by the worker (or the ouvrier, the one who 
opens) of any perspective that strives to transcend the playing 
of space with itself, or matter with itself, for in that play the 
opener is already implicated, even undone. This experience of 
space is also that of worklessness, which is the loss of the 
essentially expressive aim of the work corresponding to the 
ambition of subjectivity to impose unity to what it believes to 
be its own outside, i. e. matter or materials in their spacing. 
Abandoning this position is in itself a response to thought 
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beginning to take account of those expenences and tests of 
alterity that submerge the subjectivity which thought it could 
contain the other, both in the sense of enclosing it and 
restraining it by compression. (Agacinski, 1990: 19) 
In Agacinski's terms, the subject 'works' by attempting to dominate what it 
works with. A subjective 'worklessness', on the other hand, would allow 
the worked its own patterns of being. The attempt to master space through 
work therefore enacts a closure and erects a boundary against exterionty. 
Mastering space involves enforcing a form or idea upon its outside. In other 
words, through 'work", the transcendence of the worked is reduced within 
the terms of immanence. On the other hand, worklessness signals the 
attempt to work with things in the world in such a manner that their 
difference is maintained or not dominated. The worklessness of the subject 
involves an attempt to think transcendence within immanence. 
In architectural discourse, what is being called 'work' involves effacing any 
difference beyond the idea, as Agacinski remarks of the traditional 
conception of the architect: 
As the one who 'builds in his head', he is the classic model for 
all makers, planners and designers driven by the idea of 
148 
Chapter 3: The Architecture of the Subject 
mastering space and time by effacing the gap between the end 
and the beginning of the work. (Ibid: 18) 
The end of the work is in the desire to master space, condensed into its 
very beginning, for all aspects of the beyond to the idea- materiality, site 
and perhaps most importantly, time, cannot offer resistance to their 
inclusion within and appropriation by the idea itself Materiality beyond the 
materiality already countenanced within the idea becomes noumenal. The 
architect never leaves his head. ' 
This model of the role of the architect purely in terms of their relation to the 
space to be designed can be given a name. The privileging of spatial work 
over worklessness in architecture is the ground of all monumentalism. 
Monumentalism in architecture has been defined as 'something stubbornly 
closed in on itself in accordance with a fixed arche and telos. " The form or 
eidos is imposed in advance, always prior to the actual building of the 
building. 
'In terms of the history of architecture, the stamping of form upon space, transforming the outside of space 
in effect into a tabula rasa, corresponds to one of the founding tenets of high modernism. Le Corbusier's 
work henceforth becomes an interesting subject in terms of the polarity set up between work and 
worklessness. On the one hand there is a tendency for the ground to be imposed upon space, on the other 
hand a 'regional sensitivity' to local materials and so on engenders a complexity and magic to his 
buildings perhaps unsurpassed in his wake. 
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It is possible to ask at this juncture, "what would take the place of 
architectural work? " The answer to this question is gestured to In 
Agacinski's use of the term worklessness. A 'workless' building would 
allow the difference of time, materiality, and in fact all factors of 
differential variation to interrupt the initial formalism of the blueprint. A 
workless architecture would emphasise and affirm the ways in which the 
extra-conceptual affects the process of building. A workless architecture 
would also be interested in marginalising (at least for a while) the control 
and mastery of space and building, in order to be more receptive to process, 
chance and domains of the unpredictable. An example of a development in 
this direction is suggested by the possible implementation of virtual reality 
Computer Aided Design packages which are beginning to map the complex 
properties of different materials. A design process centred. around the 
exploration of materiality would be a form of workless architecture. 
I will suggest the possibility of a workless architecture at this point without 
developing it with any degree of completion. This project cannot be 
continued, I would argue without the resources of the phenomenology of 
'Edward Casey, "The Fate of Place" p312. 
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Maurice Merleau-Pontyl. For now, let us recognise that with the equation 
between work and monument we have posed, in architectural terms, the 
problem of the apriori and the transcendental mentioned in the previous 
chapter: of the imposition of form upon space. An'overemphasis on the 
formal conditions of experience (and building) precludes the possibility of 
significant aposteriori phenomena. The monumentalism of a formalism that 
excludes time and materiality in architecture and experience proscribes the 
possibility of events that would transform both. The monumental work of 
an overarching architectural eidos or architectonic proscribes the surprise of 
the processual. 
The problem of transcendentalism in architecture (as monumentality) and 
philosophy is therefore quite simply this: it reduces the experience and 
difference of time and materiality to the status of insignificance. 
Transcendentalism threatens any form of experience that cannot be ordered 
in advance. It is the suggestion of this thesis that this reduction thereby 
closes off rich aposteriori veins of significance and signification. In this 
'David Farrell Krell's recent book "Archeticture: Ecstasies of Space, Time, and the Human Body" 
attempts to begin such a project. He writes "The sentient body-occupies a space that cannot be reduced to 
the mausoleum of Cartesian geometry. This is the perdurant insight of a thinker who had not yet had 
sufficient influence on contemporary thinking about architecture - Maurice Merleau-Ponty. "(Krell, 
1997: 7) 
151 
Chapter 3: The Architecture of the Subject 
way it is possible to begin a critique of transcendental phenomenology. 
Transcendental phenomenology can be seen as refusing important aspects 
of experience. And the monumentalist ideology at work in traditional 
practises of architecture would equally be held to foreclose important 
possibilities of building. It is in order to combat this idealist reductivism 
that Agacinski contrasts a mastery of space with what she calls the 
experience of space. That is, it would seem to be implicit in Agacinski's 
distinction that she is gesturing towards a non-transcendental 
phenomenology. Again, the following question must be taken up and 
answered during the course of the rest of this thesis: how do we think 
phenomenology beyond the apriori? How do we avoid falling into a brute 
empiricism? What must become of the relation between phenomenology 
and ontology in order to rethink the subject and object according to a 
spacing of time and temporisation. of space -a spatio-temporal schernatism? 
The aims of this chapter are twofold. The first contention is that thinking 
the worklessness of space, space's transcendence over the subject, is one of 
the chief differences at work between pre-turn and post-turn Heidegger. 
After the early works, in the thirties Heidegger begins to think the 
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transcendence and alterity of space. As I shall show, this tTanscendence is 
however underscored by another transcendence, that of language, in 
particular the language of the poet. This does not weaken the argument of 
thi s chapter. On the contrary, Heidegger's linguistic turn towards 
rzveeLs 
recognising the significance of the poeticA again his Copernican desire to 
transcend the sub ect. I shall argue that the move towards a conception of j 
space beyond the subject becomes present within Heidegger's own 
thematisations of space, after 'the turn'. Space is no longer produced solely 
by the spacing of the subject. Heidegger's journey from work to 
worklessness involves, for example, the move from privileging the tool, 
whose materiality and alterity is always secondary, a ranking ordered 
implicitly by the episteme of modem technology, to privileging the "strife" 
relationship between the world of the work and the earth upon which it is 
grounded. Here alterity and transcendence take centre stage in the 
withdrawing movement of the earth as it shows itself in the work. 
Secondly, after arguing that 'the turning' involves turning away from the 
transcendental conditioning of the subject towards the subject facing 
transcendence, I shall argue that Heidegger goes too far in thinking 
transcendence. Going 'too farý, towards transcendence always involves a 
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dissimulation: a transcendence 'too far' turns out to be another 
circumscription of the outside by a form of immanence. Heidegger comes 
closest to rupturing a relation to phenomenology beyond its abandonment 
in no longer thinking the conditions of subjectivity at all. Or rather, the 
subjectivity of Dasein is displaced onto another form of subjectivity, the 
subjectivity of the work- of the building and of language. I will argue that 
something like an 'ontological monumentalism' holds sway in his post-turn 
work, whether this be the vertical power of the Greek temple or the power 
of language naming itself through the poet. Heidegger's desire to abandon 
the subject and take his leave of phenomenology turns out to result in 
another form of work being expounded. In other words, Heidegger's desire 
for what I am calling 'worklessness' is frustrated. 
I will argue in contrast that worklessness does not imply an evisceration of 
the work of the subject in the face of the transcendence of things and the 
world. What is required, in the movement towards thinking the 
transcendence of the world beyond the subject, is a way of accounting for 
the exchange that takes place between the two. The aporia of exchange 
occurs clearly in Heidegger's readings of Rilke, where, as Michel Haar 
shows, a chiasmus between the subject and the transcending Outside is read 
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against itself in Heidegger as a metaphysical retreat into the invisible 
interiority of the subject. With Haar, I shall show that there is something 
much more mutable in Rilke; that the poet evoking the Open becomes the 
site of an exchange between subject and world. I shall show, in the 
terminology being developed in this thesis, that Rilke thinks the paradox of 
'transcendence within immanence'. 
* 
To argue in full that Heidegger, after "Being and Time", becomes 
increasingly concerned with thinking transcendence, against a Kantian 
background, would take much work, for which there is not space here. One 
would have to look in turn at each of the following as figures of 
transcendence in the later work: the Greek temple, the forest path, the 
region, the bridge, Earth, dwelling, the Event of appropriation, the speaking 
of Language. Instead of looking at each of these, I shall focus on just two, 
that of the Greek temple and Language. 
Much of the discussion in secondary texts around the figure of the Greek 
temple in "The Origin of the Work of Art" centres around the work of the 
Earth (die Erde). I shall be more concerned here to discuss the 
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phenomenological import of the temple itself. That is, I want to develop the 
relation implicit in Heidegger between the built form of the temple and the 
bodies that look up to it or dwell within it. I will focus the following 
discussion in this way because I believe the transcendence at work in this 
figure is first of all phenomenological. As such, it is possible to determine 
the relations between transcendence and immanence at work in the figure. 
For instance, I will claim that the transcendence of the building in terms of 
its effects and affects on the body involves a certain power over the 
citizens. 
To begin, let us read the first two lines of the two paragraphs from "Der 
Urspung" in question. 
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands 
there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. (Heidegger, 
1993: 167) 
Heidegger gives us the most minimal context here for imagining the 
circumstances of the temple. We might well want to ask: is that all there is, 
a temple in the middle of the valley? Or is the temple in the city, or at its 
outskirts? If so, why does Heidegger neglect to furnish more context here? 
Why the absence of, or absence of relation to the noktu? In not furnishing 
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the fullness of the temple's context, Heidegger's thought becomes 
apo itica -4 For the purpose of the argument here, let us assume that the 
temple is situated in an urban context. The text continues, 
The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this 
concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct through the 
open portico. (Ibid) 
The assumption of an urban context begins to gather plausibility. Does 
Heidegger's temple not remind one of that most famous of Greek temples, 
the Parthenon, sheltering the goddess of the city Athena, high up on the 
sacred rocky edifice of the Acropolis? In Richard Sennett's book, "Flesh 
and Stone". a description of an imagined tour through ancient Athens 
further extends the figure Heidegger is sketching, 
Leaving the agora by the Panathenaic Way, however, we 
would find the land begin to rise again, the route now 
ascending from the northwest below the walls of the 
AkTopolis, the street culminating at the great entry house to the 
'This contrasts with another text written in the same year, the "Introduction to Metaphysics", where 
Heidegger thinks the polis as the historical place (Geschichustdue). He writes "To this place and scene of 
history belong the gods, the temples, the priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, 
the council of elders, the assembly of the people, the army and the fleet. "(1959: 152) 
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Akropolis, the Propylaia. Originally a fortress, by the early 
classical era the Akropolis hill had become exclusively a 
religious territory, a sacred preserve above the more diverse 
life in the agora. Aristotle believed this shift in space also 
made sense in terms of political changes in the city. In the 
Politics, he wrote, "A citadel [an akropolis] is suitable to 
oligarchy and one man rule, level ground to democracy. " 
Aristotle supposed an equal horizontal plane between citizens. 
Yet the most striking building up on the Akropolis, the 
Parthenon, declared the glory of the city itself. (Sennett, 
1994: 37-8) 
The temple, although bearing in its position on the citadel the signs of a 
transcendent rule, of an oligarchy, does not in fact signify in such a way. In 
sheltering the goddess of the city, the vertical ordering of its height returns 
itself to the ground, to the ground of all becomings, all projects within the 
city. The temple never imposes itself as an external ordering upon the city, 
for the temple is an icon of the city itself. An apparent transcendence, of the 
temple rising above the horizontal plane, turns out to be the token and 
symbol of immanence, of a reification of an internal order, in Sennett's 
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imaginative reconstructrion. The subject is however no longer Dasein but 
the building as emblem of the city. Therefore, the architectural, symbolic 
and perhaps ontologico- historical power of the temple, of the Parthenon, 
was a unificatory one. Hence Heidegger can write a few lines down, 
It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same 
time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations 
in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and 
disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny 
for human being. The all- governing expanse of this open 
relational context is the world of this historical people. Only 
from and in this expanse does the nation first return to itself 
for the fulfillment of its vocation. (Heidegger, 1993: 167). ' 
The temple is the exemplary monument and work, in the terms of the 
definition given above. The temple gathers the people below by imposing a 
fixed grounding principle and goal. The temple is the determinative 
background for all events that subsequently take place within its purview. 
The temple is, to borrow a phrase from the following chapter, 'more ancient 
'In the German, the 'historical people' is repeated in the following sentence in pronoun form. "Dieses 
geschichtlichen Volkes" stands, in the English translation, for both 'historical people' and the 'nation'. 
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than thought'. But should we follow Heidegger in transferring the terms of 
a transcendental subjectivity from Dasein to the building? Should we 
follow him on a path which renders Dasein workless only at the price of 
installing work beyond the subject, on the rocks above? The suggestion that 
we should not can be developed in the following way. If we remain with 
my specification of Heidegger's temple as the Parthenon, this auto- 
presencing power of the temple to unite and unify the Athenians omits to 
mention other forces at work in unifying the people. For instance, the 
discourse of Athenian 'love of city', a love which, expressed erotically as 
F. pcvywct, prescribes a unification of desire and place. As Sennett writes, 
This choreography of bodies in love shaped the behaviour 
appropriate to citizens of Athens. Indeed, in the Funeral 
Oration, Penkles urged that citizens "should fall in love with" 
the city, using the erotic term for lovers, erastai to express love 
for the city. Thucydides gave Perikles a phrase to speak here 
which was common parlance, other Athenians employing the 
sexual term erastai to indicate those who love the 
city.. (Sennett, 1994: 50) 
In light of the fact that the unification of a people might be achieved by 
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various means beyond the monumental, a question arises as to the primacy 
of discourses and powers at work in the Athenian citizenry's sense of 
6 identity. On what basis does Heidegger hold that it is the temple-work 
which first gathers the historical people circulating around it, for instance 
the Athenians beneath the Akropolls? Why donate and ascribe such a 
power to the architectural? Why lend silence to the prescriptive discourses 
of the day? Is it perhaps that the rustle of discourse can be hidden by being 
translated into a monumentalist theory of architecture? That the figure of 
the temple on the hill, which 'in itself has no necessary unifying power 
(beyond a phenomenological ordering of a vertical element interrupting the 
planes of horizontal space) is being given a power beyond itselP For how 
can a temple resonate order and unity beyond itself outside of the context of 
discourse, the prescriptions of the day and so on? If we concur with 
Heidegger's neo-classical romancing of the stone, those subjected to the 
ordering force of the temple-work can no longer be considered as subjects. 
They do not resist the work of the temple with an active synthesis of their 
'Of course, the obvious 'Athenians' discounted here are all those not citizens. As Sennett notes, 'certainly 
throughout the classical era citizens comprised never more than 15 to 20 percent of the total population, or 
half the adult male population. ' (1994: 52) 
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0-7 
We are beginning to uncover the way in which the figure of the temple 
introduces transcendence into the text. In mentioning only the temple, as 
the paradigm perhaps of classical greek architecture, Heidegger omits to 
discuss other greek spaces. Why privilege the vertical space of the sacred, 
over the horizontal spaces at work below and around it? With Sennett, we 
can continue to explore the space of the polis, and visit the agora, 
Those who could participate found in the agora many discrete 
and distinct activities occurring at once, rather than sheer 
chaos. There was religious dancing on the open flat ground, in 
a part of the agora called the orkhestra; banking took place at 
tables set out in the sun behind which the bankers sat facing 
their customers. Athenians celebrated religious rites out in the 
open, and within sacred ground such as a sanctuary called the 
"Twelve Gods" located Just north of the orkhestra. Dining and 
dealing, gossiping and religious observance took place in the 
' Heidegger is by no means alone in privileging the architectural figure of the temple of Athens. For 
instance, Le Corbusier writes the following, 'The Parthenon is, by definition, the great monument, 
meeting-place of all possible nuances. It is a true sculpture and not just a building. The number of 'optical 
coffections' due to its situation on a slope of the Acropolis, and to the intensity of the Attic light, is 
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stoas, which in Periklean times lined the west and north sides 
of the agora.. The evolution ofAthenian democracy shaped the 
surfaces and the volume of the agora, for the movement 
possible in simultaneous space served participatory 
democracy well. [emphasis added here] By strolling from group 
to group, a person could find out what was happening in the 
city and discuss it. The open space also invited casual 
participation in legal cases ... In the open space of the agora the 
Athenians did their most serious political business: ostracism, 
or sending people into exile from the city ... Orthos ruled 
bodily behaviour in the agora. A citizen sought to walk 
purposefully and as swiftly as he could through the swirl of 
other bodies; when he stood still, he made eye contact with 
strangers. Through such movement, posture, and body 
language, he sought to radiate personal composure. (Ibid: 54-55 
Emphasis added) 
The agora then presented itself as the quintessential open space. It served as 
the paradigmatic exemplification of Aristotle's statement in the "Poll I 
Inallifold. ' "The Modulor" p209. 
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that 'a city is composed of different kinds of men; similar people cannot 
bring a city into existence. '(Aristotle, 1968: 310) In mentioning only the 
temple, Heidegger neglects to discuss the ways in which different bodies 
negotiate space, be it just the space of the temple or the space of the temple 
within the context of the urban. As I shall show in the final chapter, the 
difference between bodies is deeply significant in terms of the availability 
of the spaces thereby opened up or closed down. 
Within Athens, the agora, as the open space of difference, a place that 
encompasses both the sacred and the frivolous, the functional and the 
'artistic'. counterbalances the erastai at work in the temple, situated not 
only in space but also in discourse. As the last quote implies in the 
emphasised sentence, the Athenian bodies shaped the agora itself. The 
agora is henceforth a chiasmic place. The shaping movement in 
simultaneous space reduces any overarching symbolic power of the agora 
to that of the site for politics, the clearing for negotiation and 
transformation of the law and so on. In contrast to the temple-work as 
Heidegger would have it, the agora never transcended the movements and 
activities in space of those (the citizens) that used it. Rather, the agora 
occupies a middle ground, between an ordering spatio-ontological and 
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phenomenological directive, within which bodies are determined 
(physically, symbolically and so on), and being wholly determined by those 
bodies and by discourse. And, to extend the argument, the same could be 
said of the temple itself, situated in discourse as well as in space. 
The temple, as figured in the "The Origin of the Work of Art", shows, 
according to my argument, a privileging of the vertical over the horizontal. 
In a sense, particularly if we imagine the temple to be placed on a rocky 
outcrop above the city as in Athens, this accords with an ordering force at 
work phenomenologically and symbolically in built and urban forms which 
emphasises the vertical over the horizontal. In this way one could agree 
with Heidegger that the temple's vertical presence effects and affects the 
bodies of those wandering beneath it, as mentioned above. Heidegger's 
'mistake' or exaggeration is that he ontologises this symbolic and 
phenomenological ordering for the purposes of constructing a monumental 
historicity. Prior to this ontologisation, one can develop a phenomenology 
of the vertical and horizontal along the lines of John Lechte in the 
following passage, 
Thus all forms of representation, symbolisation, signification, 
and homogeneity, all objectification- all transcendent 
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elements, we shall say belong to the vertical axis, the axis of 
hierarchy and form, by contrast, we shall say that formlessness 
and flows, space without boundaries, the unrepresentable 
abjective elements- elements which are often immanent in the 
hierarchy of the vertical axis- these belong to the horizontal 
axis. Following Bataille, we can also note that, by comparison 
with the illumination of the vertical axis, the horizontal axis, as 
the axis of non-objectification, is also the one of obscurity and 
night, of fate and death, of silence, anonymity and 
absence. (Lechte, 1992: 83) 
Lechte is here discussing the work of an Australian landscape painter. His 
text can nonetheless quite readily be generalised. We see in both Heidegger 
and Sennett moments which accord with the above schema. For instance 
the emanating light of the vertical is demonstrated by the way Heidegger 
stresses the temple's self illumination, as if not dependent upon the shining 
sun, 'The luster and gleam of the stone, though itself apparently glowing 
only by the grace of the sun, first brings to radiance the light of the day, the 
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breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. (1993: 167-8)8 In contrast, as a 
differentiated horizontal field, the agora would have been experienced as a 
relatively obscure place, where all the differences would have made it much 
harder to see what was going on. The vertical presence of the temple 
imposes itself phenomenologically and symbolically upon the body 
through the eye; its ordering takes place through the ocular register. Only 
thus can the temple establish itself as apart, as transcendent, as a symbolic 
imperative to the citizens to love their polis. Moreover, the vertical 
ascendency of the built work is seen at a distance. Representation, 
symbolisation and transcendence therefore take place through the ocular 
affordance of action at a distance. In contrast, the open space of the agora 
refuses a purely ocular reading to the bodies of those dwelling, banking, 
dancing and praying there. The horizontal plane introduces a hapticity, a 
contact space of proximate relations, denying the ocular power and pleasure 
of a panoptic survey. In the shadows beneath the temple, the rustle of 
discourse ebbs and flows with the passage of different bodies. 
Readers will have noted, beyond its mention in the passage from Lechte 
'A coffespondence between verticality and illumination can be found in Vincent Scully's semmal work 
"TIle Earth, The Temple and the Gods: Greek Sacred Architecture", where the Parthenon is described as 
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above, the presence of Bataille in the ensuing development of the 
distinction between the horizontal and the vertical. Before passing on, it is 
appropriate here to make a short comment on Bataille's relation to built 
form. Bataille's explicit views on architecture are in a sense a 
generalisation of Heidegger's (at least during the thirties). In his short piece 
entitled "Architecture". he argues that all building involves monumentality, 
and all monuments impose power. He writes, "Thus the great monuments 
are raised up like dikes, opposing the logic of mastery and authority to 
every troubled element ... [Monuments are] the true masters of the entire 
earth, grouping in their shadow the servile masses .... it is under the form of 
cathedrals and palaces that the Church or State address and impose silence 
on the masses. "' As Anthony Vidler writes, "for Bataille, it was the 
presence of architectural composition itself, underlying all the traditional 
arts, that signaled authority.. "'O This view of Bataille's may seem to some 
to be overly pessimistic, if not a little paranoid. In response to his claims, I 
would suggest initially that the spatial figures Bataille has in mind are 
6 stretching and glowing' p 17 6. 
' The translation from the Oeuvres Completes was taken from Anthony Vidler's "The Architectural 
Uncanny". 
" Anthony Vidler "The Architectural Uncanny" p 136. 
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works of a transcendental kind. It must be left open how Bataille would 
respond to the notion and creation of a workless architecture, an 
architecture of the event. " 
This difference between the vertical axis of ordering, clarity, panoptic 
pleasure and representation and the horizontal axis of obscurity, of an 
ocular aporetics, an invisibility, is narrativised in a short text of Michel de 
Certeau's, where he describes a trip up a skyscraper in New York City, 
To be lifted to the summit of the World Trade Center is to be 
lifted out of the city's grasp. One's body is no longer clasped 
by the streets that turn and return it according to an anonymous 
law; nor is it possessed, whether as player or played, by the 
rumble of so many differences and by the nervousness of New 
York traffic. When one goes up there, he leaves behind the 
mass that carries off and mixes up in itself any identity of 
authors or spectators ... His elevation transfigures 
him into a 
voyeur. It puts him at a distance. It transforms the bewitching 
"Bernard Tschumi's term for what I am calling a "workless architecture" explicitly opposes the 
monumental. Tschumi calls for and designs "eventmental" architecture. See Tschurnl's "Manhattan 
Transcripts". 
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world by which one was "possessed" into a text that lies before 
oneýs eyes. It allows one to read it, to be a solar Eye, looking 
down like a god. The exaltation of a scopic and gnostic drive: 
the fiction of knowledge is related to this lust to be a viewpoint 
and nothing more.. Must one finally fall back into the dark 
space where crowds move back and forth, crowds that, though 
visible from on high, are themselves unable to see down 
below? (de Certeau, 1984: 92) 
The horizontal axis, of the streets of Manhattan, of the space of the agora, 
of all those obscure planes that reside below and across the auto- 
illumination of the vertical, resists the ocular survey of power and 
knowledge. 12 Below the solar eye of the temple, I contend that Heidegger 
neglected to tell a story of that which it cannot transcend, the invisible 
spect-actors within the city. Not only all those not privileged to absorb and 
repeat the discourse of erastai, the metics, the strangers, the non-citizens, 
the slaves, but also those citizens moving outside of the unifying discourse 
of Athena enclosed and sheltered on high- the bankers with their eyes fixed 
"Paul Auster, in "The New York Trilogy" plays with the relationship between the horizontal axis of 
obscurity and a vertical axis of clarity. It is only by switching to a plan view of the pursued's mysterious 
routes through Manhattan that the pursuer discovers how the former has been "writing" the city. 
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firmly on the client and their backs to the temple, the dancers and 
merrymakers shaded by the stoas and so on. The temple discourse, rather 
than the temple-work [Das Tempel-werk], is that which attempts, in each 
ennunciation of its prescriptive, to transcend and order the lives of those 
who dwell in the city. Each attempt is met with forms of resistance, 
invisibility. The horizontal. 
* 
I shall now put forward an analogous argument in relation to Heidegger's 
thinking of language, looking especially again at "The Origins of the Work 
of Art" and at ".. Poetically Man Dwells.. ". That is, I shall argue that 
Heidegger over-emphasises the transcendence of language in relation to its 
users. Language therefore becomes the source of wordly immanence. For 
Heidegger, language marks the productive limits (peras) of the world. Like 
the Greek temple discussed above, language installs a vertical ordering over 
the speech acts of those that make poetry of it, such that an active poetic 
reworking of the name by the poet is denied, just as an active synthesis or 
spacing by the embodied subject in the polis is denied. As I have just 
suggested, the transcendence of the subject, from Dasein's work towards 
the worklessness of space, which in "The Origin" essay slips into a form of 
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monumentalism and returns to being a work, can be thought more openly in 
terms of a non-vertical play between the subject and the spaces of the 
external world. For instance, in the example being used the classical sites of 
function and multi-Rinctionality of the city-state. In an analogous manner, 
the worklessness of language, which no one, least of all Heidegger, would 
deny, leads one away from conceiving of language according to a 
rationalised functionalism, language as the neutral conduit of data 
transmission. Language cannot be mastered, cannot therefore be thought of 
as the object of a transcendental category. Heidegger's error is again to 
exaggerate the claims of this insight; as I shall show, using and critiqueing 
Michel Haar, this exaggeration undermines difference within language, and 
at the same time undermines the expression of difference within language 
on the part of its users. 
Poetry, in particular the work of the 'greats' of modem Germany- 
H61derlin, Trakl, George, Rilke, begins, with "The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology"13 
, to occupy Heidegger's texts as a question 
for thinking. 
Heidegger spends much time attempting to place poetry [Dichtung] and 
"Poetry begins, in this text, to disrupt the structure of ontic differences, between the zuhanden and 
vorhanden of "Being and Time", with the extract from Rilke's "The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge" 
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thinking in relation to each other. To investigate and discuss all the textual 
sites for this juncture would be a lengthy task, well beyond the scope of this 
section and the movement of its argument. What I will discuss however is 
the ontological power Heidegger ascribes to 'great' poetry, and try to 
explain the primordiality of its work in the two texts mentioned above. This 
will lead in to my argument about Heidegger's conception of poetry 
involving transcendence. 
The claim of the 'argument' of "... Poetically Man Dwells... ", is that it is 
only through poetry that we can dwell. It is essential that in order to dwell, 
one dwells poetically. This relation between dwelling and the poetic is not a 
side issue for Heidegger, for by this stage in his thinking he holds that 
Dasein is primordially a placial being, '.. we are to think of what is called 
man5s existence by way of the nature of dwelling. '(Heidegger, 1971: 215) 
Here we note the spatial resistance to a temporal grounding of Dasein. 
Dasein's being-towards-death, the limit of its ecstatic temporal character, 
does not uproot the human from the places in which it dwells, as it does in 
"Being and Time". 14 And it is through the language of poetry that this 
and his description of the standing wall of a demolished house. 
"As Heidegger writes later on in the text, "Only man dies- and indeed continually, so long as he stays on 
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resistance to the displacement of time takes place. 
Heidegger's first premise is that the possible poetics of dwelling opened by 
H61derlin is issued in by thinking language differently. He characterises the 
prevailing conception as follows, 'there rages round the earth an unbridled 
yet clever talking, writing and broadcasting of spoken words. '(Ibid) The 
words that circle the earth's communications systems with ever increasing 
speed and quantity in the time of the planetary dominance of modem 
technology do not allow language itself to say anything. In Heidegger's 
view, as man speaks, language recedes into silence. Language, far from 
being listened to by its speakers, is used solely as a medium of expression. 
Poetry becomes a redundant, unjustifiable distortion of the telos of an ideal 
communication within an ideal language. Language is modelled on morse 
code; it is equivalent to a series of blips and bleaps that convey 
information. Its materiality and resonance, its play, become aspects of 
fantasy for the idle. 
This idea that language is to be valued insofar as it conveys infonnation 
takes us far from the essence of what language says, for Heidegger. Just as 
this earth, so long as he dwells . "(197 1: 22 2) 
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the shrinkage of time and space in general in modemity gives the modem 
subject the illusion that through the apparatus of modem technology one 
can be nearer to the world's worlding". so too the structure of the ideal of 
perfect communication gives the modem subject the illusion that the epoch 
of planetary information transfer entails that we live in the time of the 
zenith of the power of the word. "At bottom, the modem conception of 
language is that it can be reduced to a transparent communicating medium. 
This conception Heidegger refuses, absolutely, 
ýJUMM 6f,, *A 
3 acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, 
while in fact language remains the master of man. (Ibid) 
Heidegger thus begins to enact in the text his classic post- turn manoevjvte--. 
of reversing the accepted relation of the transcendental or ontological 
centrality and dominance of the subject in relation to that which it uses or 
occupies. He continues, 
For strictly, it is language that speaks. Rumm ýetWj speaks when, 
"In "The Thing", Heidegger writes, "Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for 
neamess does not consist in shortness of distance. "(197 1: 16 5) 
"Perhaps Heidegger and Adorno draw no closer than this. In the "Dialectic of Enlightenment", we find the 
following passage, "the more purely and transparently words communicate what is intended, the more 
ýnpenetrable they become. The demythologization of language, taken as an element of the whole process 
of enlightemnent, is a relapse into magic. " p 164 
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and only when, he responds to language by listening to its 
appeal. Among all the appeals that we human beings, on our 
part, may help to be voiced, language is the highest [emphasis 
added] and everywhere the first. Language beckons us, at first 
and then again at the end toward a thing's nature-the 
responding in which man authentically listens to the appeal of 
language is that which speaks 
poetry. (Ibid: 216) 
-j 
in the element of 
Let us note, without commenting for the moment, the work of the vertical 
in this passage. Now, in order to advance quickly into the heart of the text, 
let us ask this question: how does poetry speak the appeal of language? For 
Heidegger, poetry speaks language in the forin of being a measuring. This 
measuring does not accord with the conventions of usage of the word 
however, it is a 'high and special kind of measunng. '(Ibid: 22 I -emphasis 
added). Heidegger insists that poetic measuring therefore cannot be a 
science. Poetry is a 'strange measure'(Ibid: 223)5 'certainly not a palpable 
stick or rod but in truth simpler to handle than they, provided our hands do 
not abruptly grasp but are guided by gestures befitting the measure here to 
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be taken. '(Ibid). 17 Measure conventionally orders the movement from the 
known to the unknown". In contrast, in Heidegger's reading of H61derlin, 
measure refuses to assimilate the measured into the order of the known, or 
to make equivalences. This refusal is confusingly referred to by Heidegger 
as 'the Same'. Measuring as the befitting gesture towards the Same refuses 
assimilation or equivalence; it measures the measured as difference. The 
Same measures 'the belonging together of what differs, through a gathering 
by way of the difference'(Ibid: 218). 
But what does poetry measure? Poetry measures the between of the heaven 
and earth, the dimension of the place of dwelling. For Heidegger, great 
poets are esteemed as Mediating between gods and men. Such voices allow 
the gifts of the sacred to be expressed within the enigma of a speech that is 
not simply human all too human. One could say therefore that poets occupy 
the interspace formerly reserved for angels. Poetry is thus an unfolding 
singing of the ground of human existence; a ground that is less a foundation 
than an interplay between the sky and earth. Poets mediate between the 
sphere of immanence (what is known) and the transcendent, without 
"We shall be reminded of this distinction between grasping and befitting gestures shortly. 
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collapsing each into the other. Thenceforth, as the 'measuring' of poetry 
reftises equivalence, both sky and earth manifest themselves as withdrawal 
or self-concealing. The sky and earth reveal themselves as the Unknown. 
The poet's measure taking allows Dasein to place his dwelling between the 
earth and sky. For instance, not poaching on either, the poet allows 
architects to remain between. Therefore the words of the poet lay the way 
for all building upon the ground of existence. Before ontic building and 
construction of material structures, there must be, for a non-metaphysical 
existence beyond the current episteme, a primordial poetic building. Only 
by placing his dwelling between earth and sky, between immanence and 
transcendence, will Pasein be able to build. 'Authentic building occurs so 
far as there are poets, 
architecture. '(Ibid: 227) 
such poets as take the measure for 
Inspite of the rich enfolding of dwelling within poetry in the text, a curious 
insufficiency haunts "... Poetically Man Dwells... "' The worklessness of 
poetic measure taking bears the mark of a hesistancy, a lack of 
determination. It bears the lack of a relation to naming. This lacuna can be 
" "The Song of the Earth" p224 
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expressed in the form of the following question: how do we mark the 
boundaries of the poet's work in terms of the unmasterable worklessness of 
language? For instance, in discussing the interspace between gods and 
mortals, a region Heidegger at times refers to as the 'dimension', he wntes, 
'We leave the nature of the dimension without a name. '(Ibid: 220) But how 
can cmeasure", taken in Heidegger's sense, avoid a relation to naming, if 
this measure- taking is a matter of the call of the poets? Is there not an 
implicit appeal to poetic naming in the following?: 
But the poet calls all the brightness of the sights of the sky and 
every sound of its courses and breezes into the singing word 
and there makes them shine and ring. The poet calls, in the 
sights of the sky, that which in its very self-disclosure causes 
the appearance of that which conceals itself, and indeed as that 
which conceals itself (lbid: 225) 
In other words, can we understand the poetic agency involved in this 
passage outside of what poets do with language? It is to other texts that we 
must look in order to clarify the poetic force of naming in Heidegger's 
conception of poetry. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger 
describes how the work sets itself back into the earth and brings the earth 
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The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come 
to glitter and shimmer, colors to grow, tones to sing, the word to say. 
All this comes forth as the work sets itself back into the massiveness and 
heaviness of stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into the 
hardness and luster of metal, into the brightening and darkening of 
color, into the clang of tone, and into the naming power of the word. 
(Heidegger, 1993: 17 1) 
That into which the work places itself back and what it allows to come forward in 
this settling back we called the earth. The earth is what comes forward and 
conceals. It is significant that this double movement does not operate through a sort 
of unmediated procedure; the initial appearance of a materialism is indeed an initial 
appearance only. The key to the mediation operating in the terms of the double 
movement is that of language. Heidegger at the end evokes the naming power of the 
word. As Haar notes this double movement between earth and work must be more 
primordial in terms of language and poetry than all the rest, for all the others 
depend upon a prior naming of their appearance. '9 This is confirmed in 
Heidegger's text "Hblderlin and the Essence of Poetry": 
Afterwards it became clear that poetry is the inaugural naming of being 
and of the essence of all things - not just any speech, but that particular 
kind which for the first time brings into the open all that which we then 
discuss and deal with in ordinary language. (Heidegger, 1949: 307) 
Language, in the specific mode of poetic naming, acts therefore as the ground of 
the emergence of things in the world, 
19 
Op-cit. p 113. 
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'Aanguage alone brings beings as beings into the open [die Offene] for the 
first time. '(Heidegger, 1993: 198) 'Language, by naming beings for the first 
time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. (Ibid). The thing does 
not exist prior to its being named, as if a Platonic primacy could be ascribed 
to the "signified". Poetry has ontological significance in that through its 
naming power things are gathered together and condensed into the truth of 
being. " Against Heidegger, I hold that the emergence and appearance of 
the thing in language and being does not shine forth however with an 
equivalent self-illumination of the vertical, as with Heidegger's rhapsody 
on the temple. Each time the work of the name institutes an entity in the 
emergence of its being, the thing is called to appear in its self-concealing, 
as self-concealing. Poetry, in naming things in their emergence into the 
world, brings with it at the same time the withdrawal that is the earth, the 
primordial elernentality that resists the lighting movement of the world. But 
poetry only does this through the work of poets. Thus the poet naming the 
sky allows the sky to appear as the foreign element, as that which resists 
being appropriated through the name as that which can be known. 
"As Haar notes, "Dichten means) etymologically, "to condense", "to thicken", , to gather 
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However, it is important not to overstate the metaphysical prestige of being 
a poet. This power of the name does not constitute a work, in Agacinski's 
sense. It is not through the kraft of the poet that the name acquires its 
ontological significance. Naming, or taking measure in poetry does not then 
refer to the poet's subjective appropriation of the world according to an 
individuality of expression, according to his or her own genius .2' The 
calling of the poet is first of all a listening to language. In this respect there 
is much of value in Heidegger's text. Heidegger thinks of this aural 
sensitivity in his work on H61derlin. as a listening to a primordial speech, an 
Ursprache(Heidegger, 1951: 43). In other words, Heidegger privileges the 
work of the poet without recapitulating upon the poet's 'genius'. Prior to the 
poem of the poet, language gathers itself in a primordial orginary poem, the 
Urdichtung of language. Poetry itself, beyond that of which it names, 
carries with it its own earth, its own domain of silence and withdrawal. For 
Heidegger, the expression of the poetic word carries with it its own 
inexpressibility, what he calls language's "saying" and the appeal to listen 
to it. 
together.. "(1 9q3 ý98) 
"As Heidegger writes in "The Origin of the Work of Art", 'Modem subjectivism, to be sure, immediately 
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This Heideggerian account of poeticising, of conceiving the activity of 
poetry thought in terms of a listening, raises a problem. This problem can 
be articulated in the following way: how do we actually account for the 
work of the poet? What does the poet actually do, in listening to language? 
As Haar asks, 
Once again Heidegger says nothing about the "poetic art" or 
the artistic activity itself, seeming to forget that the poet 
necessarily works with language at the same time as 
"listening" to it.. Following Heidegger, must one believe the 
poet is a medium who writes "under the influence, " as though 
taking dictation from the sacred? (Haar, 19,1,3ý: 116) 
Naming as taking measure, as letting the elements and things be in their 
emergence as the appearing of that which conceals itself, implies, for 
Heidegger, that the ground of that which names cannot be the subject in an 
absolute sense. The poet no longer works, and yet is not workless. 
Heidegger subjects the relation of dominance between the subject and 
transcendence to an absolute reversal, as was shown above. gopitn b6t i OIS 
mastered by language, and not the other way round. If anything, the ground 
Misinterprets creation, taking it as the sovereign subject's performance of genius. '(1993: 200) 
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of naming is the sacred and secret primordial poem of language gathering 
itself, in a silent waiting for the poet. The naming of the interplay of sky 
and earth cannot be a naming of and by the poet, for then what is named 
would be measured according to a subjective appropriation, of poetic 
genius. In Heidegger's view the poet transcends the risk of grasping 
objectality only by returning that which is named to its earthly source 
within language. As Haar writes, '[naming] does not come about through a 
purely human labor but follows from a power of language. '(Ibid). 
Heidegger does not, and cannot, according to the reversals that dominate 
his thinking after the turn, engage with the possibility of the poet's 
encounter with altenty, with naming as measure taking, outside of a return 
to the transcendence of language's silent primordial poem. Heidegger 
cannot think the middle-voiced agency of a worklessness in the present. 
The poet cannot listen and work with the transcendence of language beyond 
a return to the Urdichtung of language. 
Notwithstanding his critical voice, Haar's weaving of Heidegger's thinking 
with his own (a weaving that is often troublingly seamless) makes it 
possible to highlight the 'transcendent' nature of Heidegger"s post-turn 
conception of poetry. This transcendence is bad in the sense that it 
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precludes the differences at work in language and the difference of the poet. 
Haar writes, 
Poetic speech is not recomposed, reinvigorated, recreated 
language but language rediscovered in its initial 
simplicity. (Haar, 1993: 117) 
Here, Haar pointedly shows Heidegger's thinking of poetry (and his own) 
in the light of its own conservative agenda. The poet, in naming and letting 
sing the things of the world in their emergence, must, through resorting to 
the transcendence of language, go back to its 'initial simplicity'. Here we 
have the first denial of difference, the denial of the difference that poets 
make to language through their own difference. 22 Language in the poem 
cannot be about apencroaching inhabitation of the foreign, a minoritisation 
of language", for what form of initial simplicity would that be? The 
transcendence of the silent poem speaks itself as an originary purity. Hence 
a universality: 
"This denial would presumably erase the possiblity, for instance in the English language, of evaluating 
Post-colonial literature and poetry. 
23 Here I refer to Deleuze and Guattari's "A THOUSAND PLATEAUS" and the plateau called "November 
20,1923: Postulates of Linguistics", where the relation between the major and minoritisation (of language 
and in general) is unfolded. They write for instance, 'Minor languages do not exist in themselves: they 
exist only in relation to a major language and are also investments of that language for the purpose of 
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Every poem sings the accord- always the same, always 
changing- which at each moment traverses being-in-the-world 
in its entirety, modulating the difference between things and 
world, between earth and world. (Haýr -5 1901-: 114) 
Despite the reference to the accord which is both the same and changing, 
the Heideggerian conception of the poem nonetheless inscribes the 
historical within itself as the entirety of being-in-the-world. There is no 
other world apart from the one which suspends all the other possible 
significances of the naming power of the word: the world epoch (= 
suspension) inaugurated by the 'great' poet. Thus the second denial of 
difference, the difference that other poets make to the world, shattering the 
possibility of a universal In-der- Welt-sein. This denial is therefore the 
denial of poetry thought of as a poetic zoA, 6pou, as a naming power always 
in conflict with itself across difference. Thus Haar can go on to write, in 
accord with Heidegger, 
That things occur in the world, in the one true world, and 
saying a thing are strictly contemporaneous. (Haar, 19ý3: 11 
Making it minor. ' 0 988: 105) 
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This double denial, of the difference that poets can make, recomposing, 
reinvigorating, recreating, subverting, bastardising and above all reworking 
language, and of the difference of worlds opened up outside of the canon of 
the 'greats', is at bottom a denial of the presence of conflict in naming the 
present. The transcendence of language opened up by Heidegger and Haar 
precisely avoids this conflict by universalising the power of naming 
through the transcendence of the subject. Thus what is 'strictly 
contemporaneous' in Haar's sense involves, somewhat paradoxically, an 
absolute denial of the presence of conflict in the present. 
Measuring and naming for Heidegger ultimately reside beyond the subject 
and the work of the poet in the appropriating reserve of language. This 
transcendent location of the name fundamentally denies the differences 
within language and the world, as I have argued. The ground of language, 
through its relation to Urdichtung, turns out to be language itself. The 
transcendence of the subject, beyond the poet's work, leads to the assertion 
of the primacy of the work of language. On these terms, the transcendence 
of language (with 'of here referring to language's property of being 
transcendent) reveals itself as another form of immanence. Any reference to 
the difference embodied in the speaker or poet must always be subsumed 
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under a pious relation to the work of language itself. 
The following question thus presents itself to Heidegger and Haar's 
conception of the poetic work of language: how can the name name, 
beyond subjective appropriation working according to a mastery of 
language, beyond genius, in such a way that the work and difference of the 
subject is not discounted? The problem with both Heidegger and Haar's 
thinking conceming the work of poetry is that it is based on an oppositional 
logic of mastery and subservience. Within the terms of this logic, language 
must either be mastered by Dasein or master it. But it is possible to 
question the logic that leads to such a diremptive framework. We begin to 
ask again after the possibility of transcendence within immanence. 
* 
This possibility may be read as an opening within the book "The Plural 
Event" by Andrew Benjamin. Benjamin wants to think the name beyond 
representation, beyond that is the name naming without reserve. The name 
would therefore be conceived beyond significational capture of the 
signified. This will allow him to open up a different way of thinking 
judgment, or rather of opening up judgment to the difference of the object. 
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The paradigmatic thinker of representational naming for Benjamin is Rene 
Descartes. Benjamin quotes Descartes in the "Discourse on Method": 
. Ahere 
being only one truth of each thing, whoever finds it 
knows as much about it as can be known about it. (Benjamin, 
1985: 590) 
For Descartes, the object can be exhaustively 'captured' epistemologically 
through its representation as an idea. Consequently, judgment of that idea 
would involve its repetition as the same. Descartes thus claims that the 
ding-an-sich is available as an object of knowledge. Benjamin writes, 
The 'thing' qua object must be - exist - such that it can be 
represented as itself and where the representation represents it 
in its entirety. (Ibid: 5 6-5 6) 
Within the terms of Descartes' nomological. ontology, naming the name 
thus fixes the object in its being. Naming becomes the designated site of the 
ontological, wherein the becoming of the object itself is refused. 
Representation (de)limits being. 
Despite the epistemological totalisation of the object located in 
'Descartes's Thing', Benjamin uncovers with the French philosopher the 
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opening to a different form of naming. This comes about because of the 
importance of forgetting and destruction in Descartes. Precisely because 
Descartes hopes to found the representation of the idea on its presence in 
absolute transparency to the subject, a founding that must actively forget 
the given as the gift of history, a reworking of the implicit destruction of the 
historical is made available. In other words, Descartes' forgetting and 
destruction of the given's historical character is used by Benjamin as the 
basis for the opening to transformation of the given. How the given is 
given by history is open to be challenged precisely by forgetting that the 
given is historical. As Benjamin points out, 
The significance [of the Cartesian beginning] lies in part in the 
fact that showing the latter allows for the redemption of the 
inherent potential of inauguration and destruction via their 
rearticulation or rethinking within repetition. (lbid: 58) 
Using Descartes' notion of forgetting in this way, Benjamin, opens up a 
new way of forgetting, that of the object presenting itself as complex, non- 
totalisable, an 6anonginal heterogeneity'(1993: 59). The name's given, the 
gift of an ontologico-historical designation, is suspended in the present of 
reworking. Each time the naming of the object takes place, a rupture of the 
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ascription of essence imposes itself. This rupture of forgetting opens the 
object up to the temporality of difference. Henceforth, Benjamin's 
"anoriginal naming" renders the conflation of naming and being 
impossible, 
And yet the impossibility does not hinder the fact that the 
name names and in naming designates a specific moment 
which in never being able to be commensurate with the named 
allows, nonetheless, for the name's repetition beyond 
itself (Ibid: 184) 
The object's inadequation, disrupting the possibility of representation, 
leads to a rethinking of ontology itself. Benjamin's ontology of the name 
therefore opens up the being of becoming, or the becoming of being. Each 
naming names the object's event. A difference thus occurs each time the 
object is named differently, a difference of naming with the force of a 
necessity, given the necessary difference of each present of naming. The act 
and sedimentation of a prior naming (what Benjamin calls the 'pragma') is 
suspended and opened up to the expropriation of what is to come. The 
difference thus announced is that of the ontological difference. The name 
whose designation and signification is always in question through each act 
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of naming itself is the site of a 'plural event). 
The conflict to appropriate the name is unending and yet the 
name is always appropriated and therefore inevitably taken 
over. What this necessity entails is that the difference between 
the name as taken over and the unending conflict over the 
name needs to be articulated in terms of two fundamentally 
different modes of being. In other words what is involved here 
is ontological difference. (Ibid: 185) 
For Benjamin, the presence of the object is a moment where what the name 
names becomes a matter of conflict. The name is reworked in the present of 
naming; far from returning to Haar's 'initial simplicity', language becomes 
the site of nokFgoa, an anoriginal complexity. 
Despite this all too brief survey of 'conflict naming' in "The Plural Event", 
it should be clear that Benjamin has offered a clear alternative to the 
Haarian and Heideggerian thinking of the name as outlined in my readings 
of "... Poetically Man Dwells... " and "The Origin of the Work of Art". The 
name allows both for the work of the writer or thinker or artist at the same 
time as allowing for the transcendence of the name's traditional gift itself 
The name does not allude exhaustively to the vertical ordering of language, 
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at the same time, the reworked creative act is no longer thought of as a 
possible act of genius emanating from the nocturnal angst of the poet. The 
name does not refer to the site of a singular essence. The essence becomes 
plural. 
But this gesture against what we can call the 'bad transcendence of the 
originary' raises a question: does the 'conflict name' open up difference 
within the present, such that the present is complex not only in the sense of 
it being the site of a reworking, but also in the sense of the occlusions of 
alterity being at work in the space of the present itself? Is the present 
differential in terms of the order of co-existence, such that co-existence 
itself becomes differentiated? Is an 'anonginal complexity' of the 'event - 
object' made available outside of the disruption of a historical tradition, 
such that the aporias installed against totalisation are worked through the 
difference of the other? Does the other's voice interpellate the present 
naming here in the present, opening up different modes of being-in-the- 
world for dasein? Does the plural event announce the shattering of the one 
'true world' beyond the plurality of a differential historicity? Or is the 
pluralisation of essence merely its complexification through the reworkings 
and ruptures of each present within a tradition? Can Benjamin account for 
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the possibility of incompossible worlds conflicting in their naming, such 
that the difference of the conflict lies beyond an intra-traditional spacing of 
the present? " 
Whether or not Benjamin's construal. of the plural event can accommodate 
such contestation in the simultaneous space of the present, I will argue now 
that it is possible to locate alterity in the naming space of the pTesent not 
only as an opening but as an actuality in Descartes. In the Third Meditation, 
the idea of the infinite, which Descartes must introduce in order to 
establish a relation to God, indicates that the finite understanding can 
"A path beyond mere intra-traditional conflict naming is explicit in Derek Walcott's poem "Names". The 
poem describes and affirms a consciousness opposed to the naming power of the colonisers. Below is an 
extract which exemplifies both the description and the affirmation: 
Their memory turned acid 
but the names held; 
Valencia glows 
with the lanterns of oranges, 
Mayaro's 
charred candelabra of cocoa. 
Being men, they could not live 
except they first presumed 
the right of every thing to be a noun. 
The African acquiesced, 
repeated, and changed them. 
Listen my children, say: 
Moubain: the hogplum, 
cerise: the wild cherry, 
baie-la: the bay, 
with the fresh green voices 
they were once themselves 
in the way the wind bends 
our natural inflections.. (Collected Poems p307) 
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'touch' the infinite or contemplate it. Here we come across, in explanation 
in one of his letters, the distinction between touching (the befitting gesture) 
and grasping mentioned above, 
. just as we can touch a mountain but not put our arms around 
it. To grasp something is to embrace it in one's thought; to 
know something, it suffices to touch it with one's 
thought. (Descartes, 1986: 32)21 
One may thus touch the infinite without fully comprehending it. Descartes' 
argument in favour of touching the infinite is in fact stronger still. He 
argues that 'my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in some way prior 
to my perception of the finite, that is myself. '(1bid: 3 1) That is, all forms of 
immanence are constituted on the basis of a transcendence they do not 
circumscribe or reduce. 
It does not matter that I do not gasp the infinite, or that there 
are countless additional attributes of God which I cannot in 
any way grasp, and perhaps cannot even reach in my thought: 
"Here we can see Cezanne's workless working of Mont StNictoire for all those years as the avowal of the 
impossibility of grasping, even if might say along with Merleau-Ponty that Cezanne, rather than touching 
the mountain with his understanding, touched it through the reversibilities of the flesh of the world. This 
huscendence of the understanding will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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for it is in the nature of the infinite not to be gasped by a finite 
being like myself It is enough the I understand the 
infinite.. '(Ibid: 32) 
In Levinas's words, 'The idea of the infinite consists in grasping the 
ungraspable while nevertheless guaranteeing its status as ungraspable. '26 In 
resisting assimilation into the Same, into Ego or Representation, the alterity 
of the infinite imposes itself upon me as an interruption of my finitude. One 
does not so much encounter the infinite as much as be encountered by it. " 
The inadequation of the idea of God reverses the intentional structure of 
perception. Here we have another form of naming opening itself within 
Descartes' text, a naming that comes very close to the Heideggerian notion 
of 'measuring'. The difference would be that Descartes does not renounce, 
as does Heidegger, the immanence of the subject that names, albeit that the 
former announces subjectivity in a subdued form of subjectivity: Descartes 
SPeaks of the 'darkened intellect. '(Descartes: 36) As Levinas says, 
'Descartes thought that by myself I could account for the sky and the sun 
" "Transcendence and Height" (1996: 19) 
"I note in passing that here again, as in the first chapter, we return to a phenomenology of fmitude that 
can replace the subjectivistic Being-towards-Death of the early Heidegger. 
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despite all their magnificence. '(Levinas, 1996: 15) He refers at this point to 
the very end of the Third Meditation, where Descartes pauses to 
contemplate God in the form of the 'immense light'. 
As Levinas will exploit in many of his texts, this opening to the 
inadequation of the infinite in Descartes, in Levinas' words the 
transcendence of the face, allows for a naming of the other which is not 
simply a naming of historical difference. Although the other naming 
introduces itself necessarily in the form of a difference in time, this time 
may nonetheless be 'co-existential', in the sense that the present is the site 
of other namings outside of 'the tradition'. Henceforth, the 'time of the 
other' may yet be the present, as the site of the conflict naming of that 
which is contested across difference. This plural event of the world's 
worlding would therefore become open to the minoritisation of language, 
and, in the English language, a 'post-colonial' literature and poetry could 
be acknowledged as vitally significant. Allowing a specific language to 
become infinite therefore amounts to allowing it to become different to 
itself, uncanny, subverted and heterogenously stretched. 
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I have drawn together as two instances of transcendence key figures in 
Heidegger's post-tum work which order the world by a sort of 
phenomenologico-ontological imposition. Heidegger himself makes the 
analogy in "The Origin", 
The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look 
and to men their outlook on themselves ... The same holds for 
the linguistic work.. it transforms the people's saying so that 
now every living word fights the battle, puts up for decision 
what is holy and unholy, what great and what small, what 
brave and what cowardly, what lofty and what flighty, what 
master and what slave. (Heidegger, 1993: 168-9) 
In both cases I have suggested different ways of looking at the same 
phenomena, ways which counter Heidegger's post-tum proclivity to think 
beyond subjectivism. This tendency leads, as I have maintained, a 
displacement of the subject, from Dasein and onto built space and 
language. The transcendence of Dasein therefore leads to the institution of 
immanence at a different level. In opposition to this manouver, I have 
argued that we can return to the work of the subject, that of the haptic 
resistance of the body beneath the architectural work in the temple figure, 
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and that of conflict naming in the case of the poetic work. This work, in 
being tbrough and tbrough a non-voluntaristic working with the exterior (of 
spacing, of language) is, to add to Agacinski's terms, a 'subjective 
worklessness'. Another name for this is transcendence within immanence. 
* 
That Heidegger after his Kehre could not think what I term transcendence 
within immanence is perhaps most evident in his reading of Rilke. To finish 
this chapter, I will look briefly at how Heidegger reads Rilke as falling 
back into a metaphysics of privileging the transcendent subject. I agree 
with Haar that this reading ignores the evident interplay between the 
subject and object in Rilke. By concurring with Haar, and developing the 
defence of a 'non-metaphysical' Rilke by naming it as transcendence 
within immanence, I prepare the way for the arguments to come in the 
following chapter. 
For a full and nuanced argumentation against Heidegger's reading I would 
recommend going to Haar's text. For brevity's sake here I will refer to just 
a few lines of Rilke: 
One space extends through all beings: the inner space of the 
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world. The birds fly through us... (Haar, 1984: 126) 
The basis of Heidegger's misreading for Haar is that wherever and 
whenever Rilke refers to 'the Open', the 'One space' as above, the 'Heart', 
cpure perception' and so on, Heidegger takes the poet to be subjecting a 
rhapsodisation of nature to an aggrandisating domination by the 
subject. "Rilke's poetry therefore becomes a sort of solipsistic pantheism, if 
that can be imagined. An appeal to modes of the natural is made, as far as 
Heidegger is concerned, only in order that Rilke can express his own 
displaced egologism. For Haar, the fault in this reading lies in the fact that 
it undervalues the exteriority at work in each of the terms. The subject 
opens onto and englobes a world which, by the very force of its ekstatic 
transcendence to the subject, disrupts an economy of pure interiority. As 
"One of the key argumentative passages against Rilke in Heidegger's corpus is to be found in his text 
"PARMENIDES", in the eighth section, 'The Significance of dis-closure. ' For instance, he writes, 
Man comports himself everwhere to objects, ie., to what stands over and against him. 
This implies man himself is the "subject, " the being that, positing itself on itself, 
disposes of its objects and in that way secures them for itself Rilke always thinks of 
man in the modem metaphysical sense. That current metaphysical conception of man is 
the presupposition for Rilke's poetic attempt to interpret the essence of man in the sense 
of modem biological metaphysics. Man is the living being that, by way of 
representation, fastens upon objects and thus looks upon what is objective, and, *in 
looking, orders objects, and in this ordering posits back upon himself the ordered as 
something mastered, as his possession. (1992; 156) We may contrast this passage with 
what Rilke himself says, at the end of his short prose-piece "Concerning Landscape". He 
writes, of the development of landscape art, "It tells us, that he [man] is placed amongst 
things like a thing, infinitely alone, and that all which is common to them both has 
withdrawn from things and men into the common depth, where the roots of all growth 
drink. " (1967: 5) 
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Haar writes, 
It seems that in the Rilkean heart the antinomy between 
exterior and interior is not unilaterally entrenched, as 
Heidegger supposed, by the folding back on absolute 
interiority; rather, it is confronted and resolved by a new 
possibility for the I and the world to exchange their roles. 
Rilke does not celebrate the absorption of the world into the 
subject but the relativisation, indeed the inversion, of 
interionty 
... Far from the I being what absorbs the world, the 
world itself is endowed with interiority. (Ibid: 125) 
Haar invites the reader to witness the interpenetration of 'subjective' and 
'objective' modes of being in the following lines from "The Spanish 
Trilogy", 
Why must a man stand there like a shepherd, 
so exposed to the excess of influence, 
so much a part of this space full of events 
So he arises at night and the cry 
outside of the bird is already in his existence 
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and he is emboldened because he has taken 
all the heavens into his face 
and the shadows of clouds 
traversing him as would thoughts that space 
would think for him, slowly. 
The outside, nature's exteriority, according to Haar's reading, no longer 
stands outside the subject as a 'pure extenority'. The force of this 'no 
longer' would be the mark of a move beyond the metaphysics of 
subjectivity. The extemal world becomes part of the subject's 'affectivity 
of being. ' Here in this phrase I am employing a double genitive: on the one 
hand exteriority manifests itself as an affect upon the subject's subjective 
being, on the other hand the interiority of the subject imposes itself upon 
'being' as an affectivity. As Haar writes, 'Rilke recognises in the "inside" 
the characteristics of the "outside". and in the "outside" the powers of an 
"inside". (Haar, 1984: 126) Far from Rilke attempting to access the supreme 
interiority of all poetic experience of nature, as Heidegger's reading 
suggests, the poet is seen as engaging with the possibility that prior to 
subjective mastery or the capture into objective being, an experience of the 
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world can be opened up whereby both 'subject' and 'object' poles can 
interchange with one another, at different moments inscribing each within 
the other. There is not simply a 'one-way movement' from ob ective being j 
into the subjective. Rather, Rilke probes a moment prior to the cleft, a 
moment which opens on to an inversion of one into the other. In other 
words, Rilke's 'Heart' expresses a chiasmic ontology, where Being is 
differentiated according to a fundamental ambiguity over what is inside and 
what outside. 
Moving beyond Haar's reading, I contend that the reversibility at work in 
Rilke's poetry occupies all the levels of being. Beyond challenging the 
inevitability of a metaphysical dualism (precisely against Heidegger's 
reading), Rilke challenges a fixed conception of a disjunctive relation 
between space and time. For instance, in his poem "To Music", the 
obviously temporal nature of music in fact articulates our experience of 
space itself The poem opens with 
Music: breathing of statues. Perhaps: 
silence of paintings. You language where all language 
ends. You time 
standing vertically on the motion of mortal hearts. (Rilke, 
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1982: 147) 
The temporal art of music announces itself in this elegaic poem as at the 
same time extra-temporal. Music articulates the space of experience and the 
experience of space. The deepest "within" of our experience is therefore 
always already ekstatic, and with the experience of music, the spatio- 
temporality of this ekstasis is emphasised. 
.. 0 you the transformation 
of feelings into what? -: into audible landscape. 
You stranger: music. You heart space in us, 
which, rising above us, forces its way out, - 
when the innennost point in us stands 
outside, as the most practiced distance, as the other 
side of the air: 
pure, 
boundless, 
no longer habitable. 
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I have shown, in this short end section, that Rilke, as the poet of 
reversibility, allows the fixed oppositions between subject and object, space 
and time, to fold into each other. But we may well ask: across what medium 
does this dual movement take place? What third kind interposes itself 
within ontology, in the manner of the Xopcc of the Timaeus? 29 
in this thesis, I will suggest that the site of this bridge between subjective 
and objective being is the body. As was shown through Whitehead in the 
previous chapter, the spatio-temporality of the subject works through an 
ontology that is thoroughly somatocentric. We experience the flight of the 
birds not just as an ocular spectacle, but through the body. But what can 
this mean? Haar writes of 'a fit of passion, of an ekstatic outburst, of 
44 sympathy, " of a fluttering of wings that quivers though and beyond us in a 
space that gathers and envelops us. '(Haar, 1984: 126) The body is no longer 
of subjective or objective being. How do we think this third level of being, 
how do we place the body? Should we think of the body as a place itself? 
Not space, not objectality, but the site prior to subjectivity and objectivity? 
"See Plato's "Timaeus" 49a. 
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But then, as "To Music" suggests, an ineradicable temporality, a 
temporisation. of the within, inserts itself at the heart of our embodied 
experience. How do we think this time-space of embodiment? 
Beyond the exegesis of the poetical that Haar provides, what is required is a 
thinking that matches it, a Denken to correspond with this Dichtung. For 
Rilke writes as a poet, and with this in mind it would be simply wrong to 
take issue with or concord with his thinking in purely philosophical terms. 
Rilke's language cannot itself be mastered by reducing it within the terms 
of a philosophical argument. Rilke's poetry ought not to be thought of as 
metaphysics by other means, for to reduce it thus would be to destroy its 
specificity within the German language. It is only by looking at the work of 
a thinker (whether wittingly or unwittingly) in sympathy with Rilke that we 
can think the basis of the body as the locus of reversibilities between 
subject and world. Only then can this inversion be thought 
phenomenologically. Once more, only then can the reversibllity of space 
into time and time into space achieve conceptual coherence. Can this path 
lead to a thinking that incorporates phenomenological difference within the 
present? Transcendence within immanence as a phenomenology of the 
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event, of the difference of the event? I turn towards the work of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. 'o 
"Although Merleau-Ponty never (to my knowledge) wrote about or even cited Rilke in his work, the two 
are first of all entwined through a shared obsession: the work of Cezanne. A text has yet to be written on 
the philosophical background to this obsession: the phenomenological ontology expressed through the 
mountains and everyday objects of the French painter's oeuvre. 
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CHAPTER 4: BETWEEN CLEAR SPACE AND THE NIGHT 
The solution of all problems of transcendence is to be sought M 
the thickness of the pre-objective present, in which we find our 
bodily being, our social being, and the pre-existence of the 
world, that is, the starting point of 'explanations', in so far as 
they are legitimate- and at the same time the basis of our 
freedom. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty "Phenomenology of Perception" p433 
No matter how sophisticated the work of ontology may become, the problem 
it must address will always remain simple. The tTadition bequeaths a central 
paradox that is easy to articulate, across different vocabularies. This chapter 
will look at key aspects of the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in order to 
argue that he provides a "solution" to the ontological problem. The solution c;; p-- 
is quoted, perhaps sous-rature, because with Merleau-Ponty's answer, things 
do not come to an end. The phenomenological treatment of ontological 
difference leads not to a full stop, a closure. Rather, it leads to an unfolding. 
The central paradox of ontology could be named thus: how do we rest 
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between clear space and the night? This poetic formulation will have to wait 
however. For the moment, let us call it: the paradox of immanence and 
transcendence. For the nth time, it will be introduced. Dualism produces two 
modalities of expression, two orders of being. Dualism announces that there 
is objective and subjective being. Each order or series supports itself as the 
fundamental, but in so doing displaces the fundamentality of the other. But 
the other order would always seem to retain the prestige of an 
equiprimordiality. One can introduce the paradox in the following way: the 
subject is the locus of knowledge. Yet knowledge purports to be knowledge 
of a transcendent order, of exterionty. Therefore, both the subject and object 
are deemed essential to what it is to know. And yet the subjective appears to 
be ontologically disjunct from the objective. As M. C. Dillon writes, 
The sphere of immanence is traditionally conceived as the 
sphere of interiority, the sphere of conscious life, the sphere of 
the given insofar as it is given. Transcendence is conceived as 
exteriority, the universe of things existing in themselves and 
independent of consciousness. Conceived in these traditional 
ways, immanence and transcendence are mutually exclusive, 
and the lines of demarcation between them 
impermeable. (Dillon, 198 8: 3 6) 
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In order to know, Dillon's 'lines of demarcation' must be crossed. The 
condition for a valid epistemology is an ontology of conjunction, across the 
apparent divide of subject and object. Something like an philosophical 
manifesto emerges from this point: all epistemological questions presuppose 
an ontological problematic. As Dillon says incisively, 'No epistemology can 
succeed in mediating what an antecedently adopted ontology has defined as 
mutually exclusive. '(Ibid. ) Transcendental philosophy since Kant has tried 
to conflate these two concerns; for instance Kant's attempt to fix the 
ontological distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon within 
the epistemological framework of a transcendental empiricism in "The 
Critique of Pure Reason". The response Merleau-Ponty gives is that 
questions concerning the conditions of possibility of knowledge must be 
suspended. Although his early period of writings are permeated with the 
'language of consciousness", as we shall see, this is much more the legacy 
of the constraints of the tradition than that which is affin-ned by the sway of 
his thought. The question of resolving the paradox of immanence and 
transcendence must be settled before questions of the form of 
transcendentality are broached upon. In other words, the conditions of 
possibility for transcendentality are ontological. The transcendental horizon 
I The phrase is Dillons. 
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of transcendentality is the question of the shape of the boundary between 
immanence and transcendence. But then this privileging of the ontological 
over the epistemological must transform the status of the latter. 
The idea implicit in the previous chapter was that Heidegger himself 
suspended transcendental questioning after 'the tum5, precisely because he 
came to see more clearly the confusions at work in Kant's conflation of 
ontology and epistemology. After "Being and Time", Heidegger attempts in 
his own way to resolve the paradox of immanence and transcendence. I 
argued that Heidegger's attempts ultimately privilege the transcendent. But 
this privilege itself can only work by way of dissimulating its real nature: 
that of a re-instituted immanence. Therefore, by displacing the work of the 
subject for the apparent worklessness of architecture, Heidegger actually 
ends up ascribing another form of work and another fonn of subjectivity 
onto building. This is the origin of his monumentalist thinking of 
architecture. The subject of architecture ends up becoming the architecture 
of a displaced subjectivity. In this way, Heidegger fails to provide a bridge 
between subject and object. 
2 The transformation of epistemology away from a latent or manifest hylomorphism first emerges in 
Merleau-Ponty's interest in the figure-ground relation of the Gestalt psychologists. However, one could 
argue that the privilege of an apriori form of experience over experience itself is inverted by the time of 
Kant's second edition, in particular through the introduction of the "Refutation of Idealism". As Krell 
renlinds us M his book "Archeticture" "Heidegger is right to wonder whether everything M Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason would have to change because of this new emphasis on outer sense. " (Krell, 1997: 50) 
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The previous chapter argued in addition that the same goes for Heidegger's 
post-turn account of language. By displacing man's mastery of language- the 
ideology of the nascent age of information, Heidegger ends up ascribing to 
language a mystical transcendence. But this can only be in actuality another 
form of subjectivity, another layer of immanence. The evidence for this 
comes in Heidegger's attempt to declare what poetry refers to. Instead of 
allowing a space for the work of the poet, albeit a work that tarries through 
mediation, Heidegger brings in a 'silent poetry' of language itself In other 
words, Heidegger's post-turn thinking of language brings us to the very 
brink of a linguistic immanence. 
Put in this light, I suggested that Heidegger's attempt to solve the paradox of 
ontology refuses to think the body. In discussing the work of architecture, 
the ambulant body of the spectator is not referred to. This is a very strange 
and significant omission, considering that architecture has no work beyond 
those whose bodies come into contact with it or within the sway of its 
visibility. In his account of language, on the other hand, Heidegger seems 
unable to think the work of the poet- a work that must always involve a 
mediation through the embodiment of difference. Moreover, Heidegger's 
emphasis on the event of language would seem to distance the relation 
between language and embodied being-in-the-world. 
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How then can the paradox of ontology be resolved? Up until this point, 
immanence and transcendence have been considered as oppositional poles 
that must be 'bridged'. The bridges offered by Heidegger, of the work of 
architecture and language, merely re-institute the paradox at another level. 
Instead of an oppositional relationship between the human subject and its 
outside, post-tum Heidegger leads us to an oppositional relationship between 
architecture, language and their outsides. The difference is that in the latter 
case, the outsides, are silenced. We do not hear from those subjected to 
architecture. And we do not hear from those subjected to language. We are 
left wanting another set of bridges to a reconstituted set of outsides. 
As I shall show, Merleau-Ponty radically tranforms, our approach to the 
paradox of ontology. He argues that immanence and transcendence are not 
oppositional modes of being that need to be bridged in order for us to know. 
The sub . ect and the object are, in fact, co-implicatory orders of being. For J 
Merleau-Ponty, the sphere of immanence does not require and yet oppose 
the transcendent. On the contrary, the sphere of immanence can only 
constitute itself on the basis of an inter-involvement with the transcendent, 
and vice versa. Far from requiring a 'bridge', in Merleau-Ponty's thought a 
precessive intertwining between subject and world demands that we 
articulate its nature. We do not need to search for or invent a bridge- say in 
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architecture, art or language, for there is no water to cross. 
It is clear that such a solution would radically transfonn how we think 
ontology. But on what basis can we begin to implement such a 
transformation? What is it that always already precedes the frantic search for 
a bridge, that makes the water disappear? 
* 
In the preface to his "Phenomenology of Perception", Merleau-Ponty states 
his indebtedness to and difference from the phenomenology of Husserl. The 
key statement is the following 
The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the 
impossibility of a complete reduction. (Merleau- 
Ponty, 1962: xiv) 
The phenomenological or transcendental reduction to the sphere of 
immanence must remain incomplete. Husserlian phenomenology suffers 
from the same flawed attempt at ontological reduction as the critical 
philosophy of Kant. it is impossible to reduce the transcendent world into 
the eidetic evidence of essential meaning without ontological remainder. 
IMmanence suggests transcendence and must be thought at least in part on 
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its terms. 
But how is transcendence suggested? What is the ontological remainder that 
reminds us of the impossibility of a reduction of the transcendent world into 
noematic essences? 
For Merleau-Ponty, immanence cannot reduce transcendence (and therefore 
act as its ground- another form of displacing ontology) because immanence 
is always already constituted through a relation to the transcendent. In his 
thought, the nature of this precessive constitution arises out of the embodied 
nature ofsubjectivity. The subject cannot eviscerate itself of all transcendent 
contents because those contents are elements constitutive of subjectivity. 
Before going into detail on how the embodied nature of subjectivity entails 
that transcendence and immanence presuppose each other in the 
"Phenomenology of Perception" and Merleau-Ponty's later works, I would 
like to draw a series of analogies between the philosophical significance of 
Merleau-Ponty's ontology and that of Plato's ontology in the "Timaeus". 
This will, I hope, provide initial clarification of what I take to be the import 
of Merleau-Ponty's work. I contend that in the history of western 
philosophy, only Plato and Merleau-Ponty have 'resolved' the ontological 
Paradox of transcendence and immanence. Fortunately, in the case of the 
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latter, important recent work has contributed to an appreciation of the 
profound significance of Merleau-Ponty's ontology. 3 In the case of Plato, 
perhaps only Jacques Derrida's reading of the text begins to allude to the 
4 
ontological significance at work . 
The key ontological shift at work in the "Timaeus" takes place with the 
introduction of the notion of the Receptacle of Becoming, which Plato also 
calls "Chora". Prior to its introduction, Plato's cosmology was constituted 
by the oppositional poles of the Ideal or intelligible and the material. In the 
beginning, the text therefore operates on the basis of a ontological 
disjunction between Being and Becoming. Chora, as becoming's receptacle, 
fits into neither the Ideal or the material. It is what Plato calls a triton 
generis, a 'third kind' of being. Chora allows the relation between Being and 
Becoming to take place. Chora therefore suggests itself as the most 
primordial ontological register, displacing the privilege previously accorded 
to Being. Plato is careful to maintain this displacement; for Chora is not to 
be subsequently reinscribed within the order of Being or Becoming. Chora 
therefore allows Being and Becoming to take place, without thereby being 
3 Here I am referring principally to Dillon's important first monograph on Merleau-Ponty, "Merleau- 
PontY's Ontology". 
4 See Jacques Derrida's essay "Khora" in "On the Name". Whilst being a highly important essay 
contributing to an understanding of the difference between the crude aberrations of Platonism and the 
subtlety of the original, Derrida however reduces Plato's text to an abyssal series of displacements. The 
Ontological significance of chora is not given sufficient treatment. 
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placed within either. Chora therefore operates as an originary palimpsest; a 
surface for being that does not get rewritten as Being. 
We do not begin, so to speak, with the Ideal, with the Platonic forms, with 
the geometric Ideal that orders platonism and its residues in Spinoza's 
method and beyond. Nor do we begin with the materiality of the things 
themselves. We do not find ourselves in the panic of displacement caused by 
not knowing which side of the river we must place ourselves. It is not a 
question of privileging the one or the other, or the One or the Many. The 
search for a bridge has forgotten that it begins by already assuming the value 
of oppositionality. The brief ontological interlude that is Plato's thinking of 
Chora suggests another founding value: that of a third space of becoming. 
The history of metaphysics has always been apt to forget this suggestion of a 
third space beyond oppositionality, even if a counter tradition can be 
assembled which attempts to remain in relation to it. 
5 This is understandable, 
given the brevity and enigmatic formulation accorded to Chora in Plato's 
text. If we read Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment as fulfilling the same 
ontological space as Chora, we can for the first time begin to see the power 
of Plato's suggestion. Moreover, we see Merleau-Ponty's work as the 
5 The compendium compiled by Shmuel Sambursky "The Concept of Place in late Neoplatonism7 is the 
most significant attempt to furnish such a counter-tradition. 
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response to an enigmatic suggestion not adequately addressed since its being 
written. 
When one re-reads the "Phenomenology of Perception" with the third kind 
of the Chora in mind, the way in which Merleau-Ponty thinks embodiment 
in such proximately similar terms seems uncanny. Perhaps beyond 
Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and the Gestalt 
Psychologists, Merleau-Ponty was most fundamentally, in that text, in 
dialogue with the "Timaeus". 
The first reference to a third space in the "Phenomenology of Perception" 
comes in the context of a discussion of -the figure-ground relation of the 
Gestalt psychologists. The figure-ground relation can be regarded as an 
analogon to the hermeneutic circle. Just as the latter is in essence an insight 
into the virtuous circularity at work between interpreting parts of a text in 
light of the con-text of either the text itself or the corpus of texts (an oeuvre), 
so the figure- ground relation expresses the inter-involvement and mutual 
implication of the parts and wholes of perception. An object within my 
visual field only makes sense in terms of the background or context within 
which it is situated. But, conversely, the background or context signifies 
only on the basis of the object- figures which configure it. Merleau-Ponty's 
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point is that the figure-ground relation of the Gestalt psychologists involves 
a tertiary ontology, 
As far as spatiality is concerned, and this alone interests us at 
the moment, one's own body is the third term, always tacitly 
understood, in the figUre-background structure, and every figure 
stands out against the double horizon of external and bodily 
space. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 101) 
The palimpsestical nature of the body manifests itself here; for the body-as- 
third-term is 'always tacitly understood. ' The body does not reveal itself, in 
ordinary perception, as either of the order of a figure or as con-text. The 
body acts as a horizon for the appearance of the figure-ground relation, but 
does not get reinscribed within either series. The body is the horizon of both, 
as chora, 'acts' as horizon to the Ideal and the Actual. The body is not object- 
ive. Merleau-Ponty writes that the patient observed is 'conscious of his 
bodily space as the matrix of his habitual action, but not as an objective 
ingress into a familiar setting; his body is at his disposal as a means of i 
surrounding, but not as the means of expression of a gratuitous and free 
spatial thought. "(Ibid: 104) In this case, the patient reveals how under 
cnon-nal' conditions of embodiment we are not aware of our body as a 
physical entity like other entities in the world. 
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It is crucial to understand that Merleau-Ponty makes a clear-cut distinction 
between the 'third space' of embodiment and a common-sense 
understanding of the body as a worldly entity. As always in the work under 
consi eration, Merleau. -Ponty's language varies from section to section and 
within sections, as the author struggles to break his thought out from the 
legacies of a hegemonic dualism that resides within the language of 
philosophy. In the section entitled "Space", he writes 
What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body 
as it in fact is, as a thing in objective space, but as a system of 
possible actions, a virtual body with its phenomenal 'place' 
defined by its task and situation. (Ibid: 25 0) 
Between the Ideal and the Actual, Merleau-Ponty expresses the third space 
as virtual. We look back to the "Timaeus" once again as the first articulation 
of the possible as a non-Ideal, non-Actual virtuality. Chora becomes the 
horizon of possibility for all subsequent oppositionalities. Oppositionalities 
that necessarily disavow their relation to the seat of Being and Becoming in 
order to valorise disjunction. It would be wrong however to consider Chora 
as a transcendental horizon. Chora is not the horizon of possibility for all 
knowledge. Rather, Chora occupies a space prior to all epistemic concems - 
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an ontological space. 
A little further on in the text, Merleau-Ponty marks the distinction anew. 
Embodiment is 'not that momentary body which is the instrument of my 
personal choices and which fastens upon this or that world, but the system of 
anonymous 'functions' which draw every particular focus into a general 
project. '(Ibid: 254). The virtual, third-space body is therefore not 'simply 
located' in space and time. Merleau-Ponty's incarnation of internal time- 
consciousness releases the body from an analytic capture within the present. 
The embodied subject projects itself from the space-time of the present, 
ecstatically across the stretch of time. 
The residual language of consciousness tempts Merleau-Ponty into 
reworking one of its key terms. He asks, 'Does not the experience of space 
provide a basis for its unity by means of an entirely different kind of 
synthesis? '(Ibid: 244-emphasis added). The suggestion of thinking 
6 synthesis' anew occurs at different locations throughout the work. 6 These 
references jostle for linguistic hegemony with an emergent and contestive 
vocabulary, outside of dualism. 
6 Note however that Merleau-Ponty argues against the use of the word 'synthesis' as a way of accessing the 
Primordial M other parts of the book. He argues that we cannot use the word 'since a synthesis presupposes, 
or at least, like the Kantian synthesis, posits discrete terms.. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 265) Eleven pages later 
in the English translation, at the end of the long footnote on Bergson, Merleau-Ponty prefers the word 
( synopsis'. 
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First, the body is thernatised as a kind of place, 'My body is the place [le 
lieu] or rather the very actuality of the phenomenon of expression.. '(Ibid: 235 
translation modified) A formulation that lies in tension with the body's 
virtualisation 15 pages further on. Then, Merleau-Ponty develops the 
textural metaphor, 'My body is the fabric [le texture commune] into which 
all objects are woven, and it is, at least In relation to the perceived world, the 
general instrument of my 'comprehension'. (Ibid) It is possible to highlight 
moments in the text where Merleau-Ponty begins to develop a language for 
the third term that leaves behind completely the Kantian/transcendental 
framework. For instance, he writes, 
We cannot understand, therefore, the experience of space either 
in terms of the consideration of contents or of that of some pure 
unifying activity; we are confronted with that third spatiality 
towards which we pointed a little while ago, which is neither 
that of things in space, nor that of spatializing space, and which, 
on this account, evades the Kantian analysis and is presupposed 
by it. We need an absolute within the sphere of the 
relative... (Ibid: 24 8) 
Those moments where Merleau-Ponty discusses his ontology of embodiment 
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in relation to the valorization of disjunction that must always privilege 
analysis in spite of attentions put upon synthesis are those points where the 
new vocabulary installs itself. At the furthest from dualistic language and the 
transcendental framework, Merleau-Ponty writes 
Now the body is essentially an expressive space ... But our body 
is not merely one expressive space among the rest, for that is 
simply the constituted body. It is the origin of the rest, 
expressive movement itself, that which causes them to begin to 
exist as things, under our hands and eyes. (Ibid: 146) 
In this light, it is possible to see more clearly why it has taken so long to 
begin to comprehend the ontological significance of chora. Chora 'operates' 
as that which places Being and Becoming. Chora therefore resembles a 
proto-place. And yet, Plato's ontological rigour demands that chora is not 
installed as another place. We are left with the enigma of a relation between 
an ontologically primordial proto-place and that which it places, a relation 
that has no name, that resists thematisatIon. Although Merleau-Ponty 
likewise introduces a third term into ontology, his notion of a 'synthesis' 
(which is not a synthesis) involves a difference. Put simply, Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of embodiment introduces movement, as synthesis, or as the motility 
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essential to the third space. The consequences of this innovation are 
essential. The time-space and space- time of the body inscribes Being and 
Becoming within history. Instead of an atemporal precessive cosmology 
(Chora), the receptacle of the body that moves through space and time, 
opening things up to themselves across its horizon, allows us to think tertiary 
ontology's relation to temporisation. Things reveal themselves only upon the 
'double horizon' of the context and the body. But this possibility of 
manifestation is not purely spatial. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of 
motility demonstrates the irreducibly inter-articulated, interwoven nature of 
space and time: 
By considering the body in movement, we can see better how it 
inhabits space (and,, moreover, time) because movement is not 
limited to submitting passively to space and time, it actively 
assumes them, it takes them up in their basic significance which 
is obscured in the commonplaces of established 
situations. (Ibid: 102) 
will show in a moment in more detail how the phenomenology of motility 
advances upon the "Timaeus"' suggestion of a 'third term' in ontology 
because of its relation to time. Just before that, I want to discuss a passage 
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from the "Phenomenology of Perception" on the body-as-third-space. This 
will allow me to develop a final correspondence between chora and 
Merleau-Ponty's ontology. This passage shows Merleau-Ponty at the edge of 
an absolute break from the transcendental framework of all previous 
phenomenology. The 'absolute break' comes when one questions the 
reference of this body-as-third-space. Does it just refer to individual human 
bodies? Or does 'the body' refer, like chora, to that which installs the poles 
of being and becoming in a more general sense? The early Merleau-Ponty 
retains transcendental-ism, in most cases even when his language strays 
away from the conventions of its articulation, by limiting the pre-personal 
third-space body to that of individual human bodies. In that case, the 
corporeal schema, the 'I-can' that incorporates the Kantian Tthink', thereby 
always retaining a latent transcendentalistic inflection. In this quote 
however, Merleau-Ponty for once begins to loosen the equivalence between 
the third-space of embodiment and that which manifests itself subsequently 
as this or that physical body. He writes, 
The body is our general medium for having a world. (Ibid: 146) 
Here the anonymity of 'the body' is extended beyond being merely 'pre- 
personal'. The body does not automatically refer here to the body of the 
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subject. And the notion of a 'general medium' suggests that an ontology of 
the middle term, no longer thought of as a bridge between opposites, but 
rather as a 'chiasm', has emerged. Nonetheless, the plural pronoun suggests 
a community, and the verb suggests a possession, both of which act to 
reinscribe the thought of the sentence within the terms of transcendentalism. 
To see what is meant here, I will contrast the previous quote with a similar 
passage in the late, unfinished work, "The Visible and the Invisible". Here, 
Merleau-Ponty writes, 
We must not think the flesh starting from substances, from 
body and spirit- for then it would be the union of 
contradictories- but we must think it, as we said, as an element, 
as the concrete emblem of a general manner of being. (Merleau- 
Ponty, 1968: 147) 
The substitution of the "flesh' (la chair) for the body, from the 
"Phenomenology of Perception" to "The Visible and the Invisible" marks 
the complete break in Merleau-Ponty's thought away from the language of 
consciousness, from the traces of dualistic ontology, and from the 
framework of Kant's Critical thought. In the latter stages of this chapter, I 
will delve further into the non-transcendental ontology of the late Merleau- 
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Ponty. For the moment, I will return to one last correspondence between 
chora and the third space of the body. 
As Derrida notes in his essay, the nomological substitutions of chora 
demonstrate that in fact it has no name. Each naming of chora, as 4receptacle 
of becoming', as 'the nurse', 'the midwife', as 'the sieve', as 'the virgin 
wax', and each of the form of its traces in the text- the ideal society whose 
children are not owned by their parents, the 'bastard logic' of the language 
of chora and so on, demonstrate that the chora cannot be fixed through a 
proper name. Chora is anonymous. This anonymity is entirely consistent 
with chora's uninscribable position prior to Being and Becoming, situating 
both but not situated by either. 
Although Merleau-Ponty cannot completely separate the third space of the 
body from a formulation in terms of its conditions of possibility, 
embodiment itself likewise remains anonymous. Here it is possible to mark a 
strong affinity across the centuries, an affinity bom by excavating a 
precessive 'bastard logic'. A logic that elides possession, and thereby lets 
each name for it slip away. 
My personal existence must be the resumption of a prepersonal 
tradition. There is, therefore, another subject beneath me, for 
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whom a world exists before I am here, and who marks out my 
place in it. This captive or natural spirit is my body, not that 
momentary body which is the instrument of my personal 
choices and which fastens upon this or that world, but the 
system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every particular 
focus into a general project ... (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 254) 
The physical body that comes after the virtual, 'synthesising' body is that 
which can lay claim to possession, both of itself and of entities in the world. 
The body of experience on the other hand does not possess itself. One does 
not 'have' a body, in the most primordial layer of experience. Rather, one 
'inabits' the body (Ibid: 13 9) 
In a remarkable dense poetic text entitled "Genesis", it is possible to read 
Michel Serres as making the same comparison between chora and the body 
that I have been making. For Serres, the body is that which underlies and 
inscribes within itself (without being thereby inscripted) all subsequent 
orgotten signification. The body therefore becomes the fulcrum of af 
ftmdamental ontology, giving place to signification. As such, thinking the 
body becomes a way of deconstructing a privilege recently given to the sign. 
Serres is also sharply aware that the 'body' being referred to, as a third kind 
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of being, is not at all to be equated with the physical body. This body 
operates as a spatio-temporal schematism, the condition of possibility for 
worldly existence. As spatio-temporal, the body in a sense is always a 
dancing body: 
All come to dance in order to read without speaking, to 
understand without language. They are all, nowadays, so 
exhausted, so saturated, so hagridden with discourse, language, 
writing. In the end fugitive meaning passes through there, 
tacitum. 
The dancer's body is the Platonic Chora, the virgin wax on 
which one writes, pure location or pure place or naked 
space. (Serres, 1995: 40) 
One can read Serres here as saying that every-body is a dancing body. That 
is, it is just through the spatio-temporal agency of the motile being that 
'writing' takes place. One can only write or express on the basis of a body 
which transforms meaning itself And as the dancing body is constantly 
keeping meaning within play, this meaning becomes an expression only of 
the present, and as such, fugitive. I shall return to the dancing body shortly. 
Before I move on to examining how Merleau-Ponty develops this 'third- 
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space' of the body, I will summanse the points of correspondence and 
difference between his notion of embodiment in "Phenomenology of 
Perception" and the chora of "Timaeus": 
1) Chora and Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment both displace dualistic 
ontology with the introduction of a 'third term'. 
2) The 'third term' is not however functioning as a 'bridge' between 
ontologically disjunct orders of Being. Rather, the third term is the 
primordial conjoint origin of those orders. Merleau-Ponty will later call 
this conjoint origin the 'chiasm', the 'intertwining' (entrelacs). 
3) The body introduces movement across space and time into the 
ontological conjunction. As such, the third term inscribes time. Chora 
remains enigmatic because it does not. The body is the locus for a spatio- 
temporal schematism (the goal of thinking opened up after reading 
Heidegger's "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" in the second 
chapter, in light of the first chapter's critical reading of "Being and 
Time" section 70). In Serres' words, the body is the dancing body. 
4) The body, at least in the "Phenomenology of Perception" remains quasi- 
transcendental. It remains a form of subjectivism, even though it 
functions as the 'pre-personal'. Chora is not. The flesh of the Merleau- 
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Ponty's later work is in this sense closer to the a-subjectivity of chora. 
5) Chora and the body are anonymous. Serres says, 'Whoever thinks is 
naked and whoever dances is nobody. '(Ibid: 45) 
* 
By taking Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment as preceding the spheres 
of subjective and objective being, the paradox of transcendence and 
immanence is resolved by challenging a primordial ontological disjunction. 
The body answers to a transcendence within immanence. Transcendence is 
chiasmically intertwined with immanence, not opposed to it. This 
intertwining always originates in the body of exPerience. I shall now 
examine in more detail the notion of embodiment at work in the 
"Phenomenology of Perception", in order to show how the body performs 
this chiasm between subjectivity and world. 
Instead of going into detailed exegesis of the text, I will reinforce and 
exaggerate an implicit schema within the text itself This will allow the 
reader to have a clear overarching framework in which to position the 'how' 
of the body as third term. I contend that in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
of embodiment, the lived experience of the 'normal' body contrasts with two 
modes that lie at its extremes. These two modes are that of abstraction on 
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the one hand, and alienation on the other. It is possible to see the lived 
experience of the 'normal' body as occupying the middle position along a 
continuum between abstraction and alienation. This relation may be 
diagrammed as follows: 
CLEAR SPACE ----------- LIVED EXPERIENCE ----------- NIGHT 
(Abstraction) (Normal embodiment) (Alienation) 
Although the spaces of the body are always more complex than this diagram 
suggests, I will continue with its development in order to show how the 
nature of space changes when it is grounded in the normal lived experience 
of the body. 71 will begin by examining the nature of clear space and its 
relation to the non-n, then I will look at the figure of the night. Finally, I shall 
broach upon what takes place between clear space and the night. 
Clear space in the "Phenomenology of Perception" is the space of classical 
geometry. It is the space of the 'simple object' (of Chapter two). Objects are 
posited in space, and are measured according to their breadth and height. 
Their third dimension, depth, is merely an equivalent dimension. That is to 
7 In the final section of this chapter I will begin to deconstruct the normativIty, that runs throughout the text. 
Iii terms of the complexity gestured towards by Merleau-Ponty, let us note that he writes, 'The description 
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say, depth can be considered as either breadth or height turned through 90 
8 degrees. Moreover, the three axes of measurement have no intrinsic 
onentational or phenomenological value; they do not designate an 'up', 
ýacrossl or 'distance'. Objects in clear space therefore have no relation to the 
body as ground, to the earth or the sky. They have no relation to themselves 
across time except in terms of the logic of identity. Objects in clear space 
receive their paradigmatic form when represented as objects from the 
vantage-less perspective of the axonometric grid. The object is projected 
axonometrically, such that the most distant fagade appears as no more 
distant than that which is closest. The object has no background or context 
from which it appears. It resembles an in-itself, a self-contained 
transparency of being. Clear space is 'clear' precisely because there is no 
real 'depth', no real position or perspective upon things. There are just 
objects, in a neutral space, all equally available for representation. Merleau- 
Ponty describes clear space as 'that impartial space in which all objects are 
equally important and enjoy the same right to existence.. '(Merleau- 
Ponty, 1962: 287). 
Merleau-Ponty argues that philosophy, when concerned with the problem of 
of human space could be developed indefmitely. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 287) 8 On page 255 Merleau-Ponty reminds us of Berkeley's famous definition of depth as 'breadth seen from 
the side. ' 
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the 'perception of space', has restricted itself solely to examining how we 
come to experience the space of objects. It has not, that is, sought to question 
the primacy of this level of experience. No-one would doubt, least of all 
Merleau-Ponty, that we do often experience our bodies and the entities that 
suffound it as objects that approximate to the geometric idealities of clear 
space. Moreover, no-one would want to refute the legitimacy of the axioms 
of classical geometry, for the least reason of their efficacy. However, 
Merleau-Ponty is concerned to show that up until this point, the 
philosophical enquiry into the perception of space has not been grounded in 
the body of experience. To counter this argument, he argues that classical 
geometry must be grounded in the proto-geometry and rationality of 
embodiment. 
The traditional problem of the perception of space and 
perception generally must be reintegrate into a vaster 
problem. To ask how one can, in an explicit act, determine 
spatial relationships and objects with their 'properties', is to ask 
a second order question, to give as primary an act which 
appears only against the background of an already familiar 
world, to admit that one has not yet become conscious of the 
experience of the world. In the natural attitude, I do not have 
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perceptions, I do not posit this object as beside that one, along 
with their objective relationships, I have a flow of experiences 
which imply and explain each other both simultaneously and 
successively. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 280-28 1) 
If clear space refers to bodies as equivalent to discrete objects, a reffication. 
of the exterior such that it threatens to reinstitute itself as fundamental reality 
(as with Whitehead's 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'), Merleau-Ponty's 
'night' constitutes a reification of interiority. The subject can no longer 
rationalise the distance between itself and the world. The subject loses its 
sense of self and becomes possessed by that which lies in front. Merleau- 
Ponty's description of night is one of the most lyrical of the entire work and 
is worth quoting at length, 
This is what happens in the night. Night is not an ob ect before j 
me; it enwraps me and infiltrates through all my senses, stifling 
my recollections and almost destroying my personal identity. I 
am no longer withdrawn into my perceptual look-out from 
which I watch the outlines of objects moving by at a distance. 
Night has no outlines; it is itself in contact with me and its unity 
is the mystical unity of the mana. Even shouts or a distant light 
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people it only vaguely, and then it comes to life in its entirety; it 
is pure depth without foreground or background, without 
surfaces and without any distance separating it from me. All 
space for the reflecting mind is sustained by thinking which 
relates its parts to each other, but in this case the thinking starts 
from nowhere. On the contrary, it is from the heart of nocturnal 
space that I become united with it. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 283) 
In this passage Merleau-Ponty holds that a collapse of boundaries between 
self and world results from an interionsation. However, the solipsism of the 
night is not 'purely subjective'. Interiorisation is not an act of the subject. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty shows that this phrase does not make any sense, 
unless it is figured in terms of an absolute immersion in the world, to the 
limits of a subjective evisceration. In the night, the world immerses itself in 
the subject more than the subject immerses itself in the world. The subject 
announces the night in the passive voice. And at this point we encounter the 
uncanny liminal asymptote of a rigorously solipsistic logic: that an absolute 
interiority cannot be distinguished from an absolute exteriority. That 
Heidegger did not follow this logic to its limits is his greatest error in his 
reading of Rilke mentioned in the previous chapter. 
See Chapter two. 
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will summarise clear space and the night in poetic tenns: - 
Clear Space: alienation of being. Copernicus at the limit. No centre of being, 
no more gravity. No vestige of home. No centre. De-centered from being de- 
centered. No space for the body -for somapsyche - the soul of the body 
squeezed out, strung out. Infinite, cold space. The nihil of the 
Axonometric 
The Night: closing down of limits - an infinity intrudes absolutely. Even the 
stars oppress. No distance, no space to breathe. No arc of respiratory joy. 
Inspiration and expiration cancel each other out as the boundary between the 
outside and the inside collapses in a metaphysical autism. 
Between clear space and the night lies the rational experience of space; a 
space not so distant from things in the world as to imbue them with an 
exteriorising neutrality- making them into objects. But then again a space 
that avoids collapsing the gap between the embodied subject and its midst, 
plunging the subject into the confusion of the night. This 'rational space' is 
the perceptual delimitation of an optimum vantage point. It is that point 
whereby the skyscraper neither teeters above us with a reversed vertigo, nor 
loses its awesome proportions through distance. It is the interval that allows 
for an exchange between the near and far, such that figure and ground can 
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make sense in terms of each other. In contrast, clear space involves an 
abstract objectality, a derivation upon a primordial experience of space. 
The night, on the other hand, is not another derivation. The above quote 
provides a clue in this respect. The reference to a 6pure depth' above shows 
that what Merleau-Ponty calls the night is the origin of our embodied 
experience. Merleau-Ponty continually stresses that any clarity of spatial 
experience is itself dependent upon a generalised spatiality of depth that 
threatens to absolve the subject of all individuality. He writes that 'Clear 
space.. is not only surrounded, but also thoroughly penneated by another 
spatiality thrown into relief by morbid deviations from the 
normal. '(Ibid: 287) Night, as the space of schizophrenia and other forms of 
insanity, is at the same time the general medium from out of which emerges 
the sense of things held apart from the subject. Merleau-Ponty therefore 
provides a theory of insanity which is thoroughly spatial-10 
What is this maddening 'pure depth' (la profondeur pure') that is at the 
origin of all experience of space? If we remind ourselves of the equivalence 
between the three axes of geometric clear space and how this compares with 
10 'What protects the sane man against delirium or hallucination, is not his critical powers, but the structure 
Of his space: objects remain before him, keeping their distance-What brings about both hallucinations and 
myths is a shrinkage in the space directly experienced, a rooting of things in our body, the overwhelming 
Proximity of the object, the oneness of man and the world, which is, not indeed abolished, but repressed by 
everyday perception or by objective thought, and which philosophical consciousness 
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'lived space', it is possible to begin answering this question. The difference 
between clear space and the space of embodied experience is one of depth. 
Merleau-Ponty outlines the demands of the enquiry. 
.. we have to rediscover beneath depth as a relation between 
things or even between planes, which is objectified depth 
detached from experience and transfon-ned into breadth, a 
primordial depth, which confers upon the other its significance, 
and which is the thickness of a medium devoid of any 
thing. (Ibid: 266) 
Again, we are forced to ask: what is this primordial depth? The kernel of an 
answer was already developed in the second chapter's examination of 
Whitehead's notion of simple location and the thesis of complex location- 
the 'event of perception', which he developed in response. I contend that 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of depth refers to the spatio-temporal complexity at 
work in each act of perception. When we perceive an obj ect, we only 
derivatively perceive the object on its own, in abstraction. Typically, the 
object can only be understood in terms of the double horizon of its context 
and the embodied position of the perceiver. This double horizon is always 
already temporal- therefore the object presented to us refers to itself and its 
rediscovers. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 29 1) 
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relation to context, and also to other contexts and objects, across time. " 
Each act of perception of an object involves the presentation of a fagade of 
its being, a partial manifestation. But, by co-implication, the object is 
presented in plenitudinality. Unlike Husserl's account however., the co- 
implication of depth in Merleau-Ponty involves other objects, as the loci of 
other possible positions of perception. 12 Merleau-Ponty holds that 'When I 
look at the lamp on my table, I attribute to it not only the qualities visible 
from where I am, but also those which the chimney, the walls, the table can 
'see'.. '(Ibid: 68). Depth therefore is the implication of plenitudinality of the 
object, a fullness of being which is latent within the partiality of its 
manifestation. 
This being simultaneously present in experiences which are 
nevertheless mutually exclusive, this implication of one in the 
other, this contraction into one perceptual act of a whole 
possible process, constitutes the originality of depth. It is the 
dimension in which things or elements of things envelop each 
other, whereas breadth and height are the dimensions in which 
11 The object presents itself as an image open to multiplicity- as Proust declares In the quotation on page 
134. The presentation of an image, always already complex, can be the opening to a defire of the writer. 
Merleau-Ponty enters into a similar sort of delirium in discussing red in "The Intertwining" chapter of "The 
Visible and the Invisible". See p 132. 12 See Husserl's "Cartesian Meditations", especially the 3rd and 4th meditations. 
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they are juxtaposed. (Ibid: 265) 
Our ptimordial experience of 'objects' is one of co-implication, of inter- 
involvement and an interweaving of beings. With a phenomenology of 
depth, the surface of beings revealed through the narrow limitations of 
perspective, a potentia unbearable lightness of being, is filled through the 
monadological device of the other. The two-dimensionality of being merely 
a point in the visual field is enriched by spaces for the other - loci that 
surmount the occlusions of situatedness. The other is always elsewhere in 
space, guar-anteeing that this surface has its concomittant depth. It does not 
matter that the other is only a chimney, a wall, or a table, that is possible 
perspective enough. 
The delirium at the heart of pure depth is that of the loss of self. The 
intertwining between things in space threatens the subject's ability to 
achieve distance from the world. To change metaphor, the monadological 
surface of mirrors threatens to confuse the gap between the self and its 
infinite reflections elsewhere in the universe. The monadological mirror 
sends a shiver of indistinguishability through the core of the subject's space. 
Depth is, to repeat, 'the thickness of a medium devoid of any 
thing. '(Ibid: 266). Pure depth, the intertwining of being, emerges in the night. 
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The night introduces insanity as the origin of our embodied experience. 
Merleau-Ponty makes it a condition of embodied being-in-the-world that its 
possibility occurs only on the basis of the risk of the subject-world gap 
collapsing. At the limit of our embodied existence, depth opens experience 
to the delirium of an Undifferentiation. Our embodied subjectiVity occurs on 
the ground of a pre-personal anonymity of being. Another name for this is 
depth, a depth that always originates through an undifferentiation of being. 
This intertwining of depth will later be named as 'flesh' [la chair] in "The 
Visible and the Invisible". The earlier work shows that the pure primordial 
depth, being of nocturnal origin, is always already a space of insanity. The 
embodied subject-world relation emerges out of the thickness of this 
undifferentiated medium. The flesh too will therefore perdure as the space of 
insanity, or the insanity of space. 
The desire for certainty in philosophy has found two divergent but parallel 
articulations- that of empiricism and intellectualism. The former valorises 
the object of experience, and in so doing opens itself to the skepticism of an 
incapacity to provide the grounds for a connection between this object and 
the transcendent thing. The latter esteems the subject of experience, but by 
reducing experience to the sphere of immanence, obtains certainty at the 
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price of there being no transcendent measure of truth and falsity. 13 By 
thematising the night as the core of our emergent experience, Merleau-Ponty 
is implicitly resisting another philosophical formulation of certainty. Our 
experience of the world, an experience that always implies maintaining a 
distance vulnerable to collapse or over-extension, cannot thereby be certain. 
Merleau-Ponty writes that 'If myths, dreams and illusion are to be possible, 
the apparent and the real must remain ambiguous in the subject as in the 
object. '(Ibid: 294) How then do we establish a relation to the opacity of 
transcendent things, and to the uncertainty of all our experience, without 
giving in to a generalised skepticism? Merleau-Ponty's answer in 
"Phenomenology of Perception", an answer which is developed into the 
subheading for an entire section by the time of "The Visible and the 
Invisible", is that we have perceptual faith. 14 It is only through perceptual 
faith that the interval between clear space and the night is maintained. 
Knowledge of the world, as has by now been established, is guaranteed only 
by the ontological inter-involvement of transcendence and immanence. 
However, Merleau-Ponty's situation of the origin of the rational experience 
in space on the basis of a distancing from the night of indefinitely ranufymg 
13 In making this comparison between intellectualism and empiricism I am grateful to M. C. Dillon for the 
lucid first two chapters of his book "Merleau-Ponty's Ontology". 14 
Perceiving is pinning one's faith, at a stroke, in a whole future of experiences, and doing so in a present 
which never strictly guarantees the future; it is placing one's belief in a world. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 297) 
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co-implication, the distancing of perceptual faith, raises a question: how is 
rationality maintained? Or, put another way, whence perceptual faith? 
shall not venture answers to these difficult questions here. However, what 
can be said is that the linear security of the diagram above must be 
complexified. The night is the core of the emergence of depth. From this 
'primordial' depth emerges a depth at work in rational experience: a depth 
between clear space and the night. And again, at the outer extreme, depth 
empties itself of all existential content, becomes neutral, in clear space. 
Having established the fragility of the lived experience of space for the 
crational' subject, we can now develop some of the main themes of 
embodiment Merleau-Ponty introduces in the "Phenomenology of 
Perception". 
The body is, for Merleau-Ponty, a precessively orientated being. The body 
therefore is that diagram of capacities to act towards and in the world in 
certain ways. 15 These capacities are wrought through a combination of the 
corporeal practices at work in the body's grounding culture- its habitus, and 
the physiological limits of the body itself. Whenever an embodied subject 
15 Fenlinist commentators on Merleau-Ponty such as Iris Marion Young have criticised the fancionalism. of 
his notion of the 'I can', comparing it to an embodied female J cannot' (see her essay "Throwing Like a 
Girl"). These criticisms, while valid and opening up his thought to difference, do not however challenge his 
work itself as a resource for thinking. See also, for a critique of Merleau-Ponty's functionalism, Alphonso 
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intends to act, it does so subsequently only on the basis of a postural or 
corporeal schema 16 It acts in this or that action on the basis of a 
predispositionary matrix of ways of occupying and dealing with the world. 
The world, on the other hand, is not merely the pointless grid of clear space. 
The ontological remainder of a transcendental reduction is that of a space 
that is always already directed. Beyond the incorporated intentionality of the 
subject, the world offers itself through the directives of what we might call a 
6worldly intentionality'. 17 The precessive space of the world suggest ways of 
embodied negotiation of it. As Merleau-Ponty writes, 
Generally speaking, our perception would not comprise either 
outlines, figures, backgrounds or objects, and would 
consequently not be perception of anything, or indeed exist at 
all, if the subject of perception were not this gaze which takes a 
grip upon things only in so far as they have a general 
direction.. since every conceivable being is related either 
directly or indirectly to the perceived world, and since the 
perceived world is grasped only in terms of direction, we 
Lingis, paper "Phantom Equator". 16 In the Phenomenology, see especially pp 137-142. 17 It is by emphasising the directives of space itself that we can approach the work of the sculptor Anish 
Kapoor. His 'objects' suggest forms of comportment towards them (rather than vice versa). Kapoor can be 
seen to be revamping a sculptural motif first developed by James Turrel in the 1970's. 
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cannot dissociate being from orientated being.. (Ibid: 25 3) 
The 'primordial encounter with being'(p252) therefore is the site of 
exchange, the interplay of a double intentionality, that of the subject and 
world. The body directs itself towards and within the world on the basis of 
the patternings of habit. The world in its turn suggests directions of 
orientation for that body. 
However, within the account thus far set up, it is not possible to account for 
the genesis of either embodiment or world. This is the task now before us. 
The primordial encounter with being is the site of origin. The most 
significant insight of the whole of the "Phenomenology of Perception" is 
found on page 254 of the translation, where the interchange and exchange 
between body and world takes the notion of origin in a new direction for 
thinking. I shall now examine this insight in detail. 
On a naive level, the body acquires the pattemings of a postural schema 
through the embodied cultural practices of its grounding places, its habitus. 
The place of the ground is therefore taken to be a uni-directional. linear 
causality. The origin of a particular set of cultural practices happened once 
and once only. In this way the origins of a culture take on the semblance of 
occurring in an immemorial time, and of being the authentic foundations of 
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the beginning. These embodied practices get taken up by the child and 
repeýated. 
This model of repetition is rejected by Merleau-Ponty, and the rejection is 
given its most emphatic statement on this page. We will continue with the 
quote given a few pages ago, where, it will be recalled, Merleau-Ponty 
distinguished the momentary body from the anonymous body-as-function 
gathering every particular focus into a general project. 
Nor does this blind adherence to the world, this prejudice in 
favour of being, occur only at the beginning of my life. It 
endows every subsequent perception of space with its meaning, 
and it is resumed at every instant. Space and perception 
generally represent, at the core of the subject, the fact of his 
birth, the perpetual contribution of his bodily being, a 
communication with the world more ancient than 
thought. (Ibid: 254) 
In the French, the last sentence from this extract reads, 'une communication 
avec le monde plus vielle que la pensee. ' The "vielle" here is ambiguous; it 
could be read in the sense of "ancient" or "old", at the same time however, it 
could be read in the sense of "previous to" or "prior to". Through this 
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ambiguity in the French language, Merleau-Ponty is able to convey how the 
given is saturated with the past, such that at each moment of the encounter 
with the given (which itself is of course historically constituted at and 
through each moment), all of the past is at stake, from the immemorial 
mythic foundations to the most recent transformations. 
The double intentionality of the subject's exchange with the world, of a 
transcendence within immanence, therefore constructs the origin within the 
terms of the present. For Merleau-Ponty, the origin does not reside within an 
untouchable immemoriality, rather it is taken up anew in each 
communication between the body and world. The origin of culture therefore 
is transformed from a simple repetition to a repetition of difference. The 
origin of culture is founded upon the difference of the embodied subject in 
the present. 'Culture', the place or site of grounding for a set of specific 
practices for bodily being, is constructed around the transformative 
difference of the present. In Merleau-Ponty's thinking therefore, the 
questions of who is the subject, and who the object, who is the agent and 
what is being acted upon get completely enmeshed within each other. The 
embodied subject is at the same time the locus for the transmission and 
transformation of culture. At one and the same time, it is possible therefore 
to see the agent as an individual and as the way in which a cultural horizon 
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articulates itself in the terms of the present. The "Phenomenology of 
Perception" is replete with an inchoate reversibility. The embodied subject 
therefore acts within the terms of a cultural horizon, and yet is acted upon by 
that horizon. 
RFr-. k; tuming to Serres' figure of the dancer may be helpful at this moment. He 
writes, 
The more I dance, the more I am naked, absent, a calculation 
and a number. Dance is to the body proper what exercise of 
thought is to the subject known as 1. The more I dance, the less 
I am me. If I dance something, I am that something or I signify 
it. When I dance, I am only the blank body of the sign. The sign 
is a transparency that tends towards its designation. The dancer, 
like the thinker, is an arrow pointing elsewhere. He shows 
something else, he makes it exist, he makes an absent world 
descend into presence. He must thus himself be absent. The 
body of the dancer is the body of the possible, blank, naked, 
nonexistent. (Serres, 1995: 39-40) 
Serres is clear that subjectivity is questioned once the ontological priority of 
the choric dancing body is brought into play. An individualist or 
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psychologistic reading of a dancing body (and by this, we can assume once 
again that any body is a dancing body) forecloses the communication with a 
world that is essential to all embodied movement. Through motility, the 
individualism of a 'subject' alone, suspended from history, disappears. 
Henceforth, the more I dance, the less I am 1. The dancing subject embodies 
a world that is given and to be transformed, through movement, through the 
dance. Dancing the body discloses history and being as transformable 
potentialities, within the motile arcs of the present. And this transformability 
always thereby points 'elsewhere' - to a future whose course is about to be 
reworked, in the present. The reworking of the future, for Serres as for 
Merleau-Ponty, is settled in the present, as a descent from the virtual to the 
actual. And this reworking takes place both within and beyond the ambit of 
the subject, as a transcendence within immanence of the anonymous agent. 
The dancing body is a spect-actor, a body that is both witness to 
tTansformation and its agent. 
18 
To continue with this Serresian trope, with each step, the dancer alters not 
only their relation to the tradition of dance to which they belong, but they 
also transform that tradition itself Again, I am employing 'dance' in the 
widest sense possible, as demarcating patternings determining the intentional 
18 By using the word 'spect-actor' I am referring to the important work of the radical Brazilian 'playwright', 
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arcs of motile being. But the nature of the double-intentionality has profound 
ontological implications for the subject itself The origin of embodied 
subjectivity is founded within the difference of the present. The ontological 
core of embodied subjectivity, the being of its identity, is constructed around 
difference. The body' motility, its movement through time and space, a 
pattem of gestures and postures of being, only takes place on the ground of 
habitus. But this ground only offers itself through being reworked in the 
present. In this way, Merleau-Ponty offers us the most profound ontology of 
the relation between history and embodiment, 
In every focusing movement my body unites present, past and 
future, it secretes time, or rather it becomes that location in 
nature where, for the first time, events, instead of pushing each 
other into the realm of being, project round the present a double 
horizon of past and future and acquire a historical 
orientation-My body takes possession of time; it brings into 
existence a past and a future for a present; it is not a thing, but 
creates time instead of submitting to it.. (Ibid: 240)19 
The subject's primordial encounter with the world is mutually 
Augusto Boal. See his book, "Games for actors and non-actors. " 19 For a parallel account in terms of embodied memory, see Merleau-Ponty's lecture "The problem of sleep, 
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transformative. The ground of embodiment, the practices of a culture, is a 
ground itself based upon the difference of repetition. This repetition is the 
transformation enacted through the bodies which incorporate that ground in 
the space-time of the present. Cultures and the beings that embody it do not 
alter themselves across time through a difference that is in some sense 
external. Rather, the shifts and movements of culture are enacted through the 
most intimate ontological exchange. This exchange, Merleau-Ponty is clear, 
is pre-representational. Neither corporeal ambition nor the directives of the 
world transform each other most primordially within consciousness. The 
foundations of our identity as embodied beings is structured by a pre- 
personal repetition enacted only through difference. Transformation and the 
opening up of history and tradition takes place in obscurity, an activity of the 
dusk. And the gravity of this exchange is also clearly marked: history and 
the future are not dead concerns beyond the reach of the embodied subject, 
they are on the contrary the very means by which that sub ect takes up the j 
world. 
In this sense, we arrive at a significant insight into the nature of freedom. 
Freedom becomes, under this reading of Merleau-Ponty, the possibility to 
transform the cultural horizons given to one. Freedom is freedom to act 
the unconscious and memory" in "Tbe Paris Lectures" 
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within the terms of the historical patternings and habitus, in such a way that 
this action can now express itself according to the difference of the present. 
Freedom is therefore not a simple voluntarism. Nor must we dismiss 
freedom for the sake of an extreme historicism (such as Foucault's for 
example) . 
20Freedom. is essentially about agency, and the most fundamental 
form of agency is that of the body expressing its world (of corporeal traces 
and conditionings) in the present. The difference of the present ensures that 
the body must act to transform its givens, or else suffer the fate of no longer 
being an agent, of being less of a historical being. History therefore stops 
becoming an external fate that descends upon all whose destiny it is to have 
been bom into its time. The historical is most primordially the expression of 
the body's truth in the present of its being; all other fonns of 'history' are 
derivative upon this. As we shall see in the next chapter, the conditions 
which allow for freedom are not however always dependent upon the 
C spectactor' thernself. The corporeal schema of agency, of a possibility of 
communicating with a world prior to thought, can itself be blocked, through 
the other. 
201 am referring to Foucault's notion that history works through the body by imprinting itself upon it- as if 
the body was incapable of agency and resistance to a hegemonic inscription. For instance, in "Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History", he writes, 'Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the 
arficulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process 
Of history's destruction of the body. ' (Foucault, 1984: 83) 
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But before we can begin to discuss this, we must understand how freedom is 
put at risk by fragility of the space of rational existence in general. As was 
shown above, the sanity and rationality of a spacing between the subject and 
world is permeated by the possibility of the night, a possibility that may 
fulfill itself as either pathological or as a momentary hallucination. The 
obscurity of communication between subject and world is but a few shades 
away from an all-encompassing night. If we gather this possibility in light of 
this communication, we must conclude that the emergence of an embodied 
identity occurs on the cusp of insanity. Our embodied subjectivity 
transfonns the world through a faith that battles with the possibility of a 
collapse into con-fusion. 
This flueatening lack of distance has implications for the relation between 
the body and time. The fusion between subject and world that is the mark of 
a noctumal ontology puts us at risk of losing our status as historical beings. 
In the night, we lose our relation to the movements of our body whereby 
what is past and what is future gets renegotiated. An extrapolation of 
Merleau-Ponty's thinking of the night and what I have called the 'dusk' of 
an ancient communication is therefore that those lost in dreams or the 
pathologies of a medium without thickness no longer occupy the space-time 
Of the transformative present. Here we may picture the sidestepping of 
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history by the drunk, in confused conversation with himself, pointing at 
phantom interlocutors. His confused steps are out of time with the steps of 
history, and he goes by unnoticed in the shadows of time. Again, as the 
following chapter will show, it is through the other that a denial of historical 
agency (and this last phrase by now should appear as tautologous) is often 
wrought, through the violence of the gaze. 
* 
I will now turn to the later work "The Visible and the Invisible" in order to 
argue that the relations outlined above between the body, subjectivity, space, 
time and history are not radically altered by the time of the late work. The 
difference this work introduces is rather that of a de-centering of the subject, 
to the extent that the quasi-transcendentality of the earlier work is absolutely 
foreclosed. In terms of the radical notion of origin developed above 
however, the later work does not offer a different approach. In both cases, a 
phenomenology of the present is offered which is at the same time an 
ontology of difference within repetition. 
The key notion introduced into "The Visible and the Invisible" is the 
concept of reversibility. The other innovations in vocabulary- the 'chiasm', 
'intertwining', 'flesh', all are developments of this founding term. 
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'Introduced' has to be taken with the caveat that its operation was implicitly 
present within the "Phenomenology of Perception". It is an essential aspect 
of embodiment in that first work that the embodied subject is able to 
perceive only because their embodiment is both immanent and transcendent. 
Our perception opens out onto the world only because our bodily being is 
the gTound of both our status as subjects and our visibility as 'objects 11 in the 
world. As the phenomenologist writes, 'I apprehend my body as subject- 
object, as capable of 'seeing' and 'suffering" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 95) With 
this in mind, the notion of reversibility is simple to introduce. Instead of 
founding ontology with a disjunctive relation between the subject and the 
object, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodied being grounds 
ontology in an intertwining of both. What is 'subjective' is always already of 
the object, and vice versa. The concept of reversibility enables us to follow 
more clearly the explicit work of this pre-dualistic ontology. 
In the later work, the transcendence within immanence of embodiment, the 
crux of its reversibility, is modelled on the perception of touch. The hand 
that touches the other hand, or that touches another ob ect, can only do so if j 
it can at the same time be touched. The only possibility of avoiding this 
outcome is if the touching hand is insensate, if the nerve endings which 
enable the sensation of touch have been disabled in some way. But then, 
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touching with a set of numb fingers is hardly touching at all! Under normal 
circumstances, my touching the other at the same time involves my being 
touched. The status of the 'at the same time' however is crucial. Merleau- 
Ponty argues that there is never simultaneity with reversibility; the touching 
of one hand by the other is not at the same time reversible. There is always a 
gap, an ecart, between touching/being touched and its reverse. 
In the case of other modes of perception, the reversibility thesis works by 
extension. For example, I am able to see objects in the world only given the 
fact that my eyes are located in my body, and that vision requires a motile 
body that only sees through a sort of 'embodied dialogue' with the seen. 
Furthermore, the seen is at the most merely a surface, a partial percept, if the 
act of perception is limited to the analytics of a subject-percept relation. The 
"Phenomenology of Perception" showed, through the resources of Gestalt 
Psychology, that perception requires the horizon of a ground upon which the 
percept is situated, in order that the percept be comprehended. In that earlier 
work, Merleau-Ponty argued that in addition to this, the perceptual field 
gives the percept 'depth' on the basis of the surrounding objects occupying 
roles as other possible positions for perception. The co-implication of a 
background and a terrain of other possible views, across time as well as 
space, furnish the surface of the percept with a plenitude and a relation to its 
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environs it would not otherwise have. In terms of the later work, the visual 
field of perception therefore works only on the basis of this field being 
potentially occupyable by the embodied subject, reversing roles with 
surrounding objects. 
The notion of reversibility in "The Visible and the Invisible" occupies many 
levels of conceptuality. For example, beyond being the ontological 
prerequisite for perception, it enables us to understand the complex nature of 
percepts. The object perceived is not first of all this colour and this size and 
this shape and this form of movement, as if objects acquire the gravity of 
ontological status by addition of qualities. Rather, the object's colour and so 
on are dependent upon all its other qualities. Only on the basis of its texture 
is this coat this shade of red . 
2' Reversibility therefore enables us to 
understand the implicit ontology of the 'style of being' that appears in the 
earlier work . 
22 A pre-representational synaesthesia works through the object, 
an internal horizon of co-dependent qualia that is the ground of its unity. The 
advancement the later text makes if any is in underlining the background of 
repetition within immanence at work in the object's style of being. Just as 
the embodied subject takes up its matrix of comportments only by 
21 In the delirium of his discussion of red things mentioned above, Merleau-Ponty writes 'And its red 
literally is not the same as it appears in one constellation or the other.. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1968,132) 22 See the "Phenomenology of Perception", p327. 
258 
Chapter 4: Between Clear Space and the Night 
transforming the habitus of their ground, so too the object's gathering or 
embodying of sensory qualia, only occurs through transformation of the 
4given' of those qualia. Hence Merleau-Ponty deschbes each incarnation of 
red as 'a punctuation in the field of red things'. Previously, on the same 
page, he retums to the textural metaphor employed in the earlier book. He 
writes 
. Ahis red 
is what it is only by connecting up from its place with 
other reds about it, with which it forms a constellation, or with 
other colours it dominates or that repel it. In short, it is a certain 
node in the woof of the simultaneous and the successive. It is a 
, 
concretion of visibility, it is not an atom. (Merleau- 
Ponty, 1968: 132) 
The "Phenomenology of Perception" contains all the motifs of the later 
work, if only implicitly, in the case of certain concepts. The radical 
introduction of a 'third kind' in ontology is the cause of all of the tension of 
the earlier work, which is half written in the wake of the transcendental 
language of perception and consciousness, and half written in a language 
beyond dualism. The disturbance of this triadic ontology is resolved more 
fully in the later work, which succeeds in abandoning most of the traditional 
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vocabulary of ontology in introducing its own. 
The primordial pre-personality and anonymity of the embodied subject in 
the "Phenomenology of Perception" leads to the origination of identity in the 
miasma of the night. Identity is always already threatened on the basis of 
that which founds it. In the earlier work, this threat is undermined or reduced 
to an extent by the competency of the 'rational' subject- the subject who can 
maintain a distance from the night. It is a matter of uncertainty whether one 
can name the implicit ontology of this work as a reversion to monism. This 
is because rationality and sanity occur by standing apart from their ground. 
Although not posited in an acosmic space, the embodied subject attains 
rationality through a distancing whose ontological status is unclear. 
In "The Visible and the Invisible" however, this unclarity is resolved. 
rl - Reversibility is not maintained through a reversion to a subjectivity that 
resists a collapse into the monism of the night only through an embodied 
competency of being. The quasi-transcendental 'I can' drops out in the final 
unfinished work, leaving no ontological ambiguity. The Implications of 
cutting out the transcendental 'I can' are clear: no ontological separation can 
be fixed between what is 'subject' and what is 'object'. The thesis of 
reversibility maintains, as an explicit treatment of what was already implicit 
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in the earlier work, that the object thoroughly interpenetrates the subject and 
the subject thoroughly interpenetrates the object. 
There are two stages in unfolding the ontological implications of the 
reversibility thesis beyond this: 
Merleau-Ponty writes, '.. between my body looked at and my body 
looking, my body touched and my body touching, there is overlapping or 
encroachment, so that we must say that the things pass into us as well as 
we into the things. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 123) From the point of view of 
my body, I can no longer determine what is my own in terms of the 
separation of subject and world. Authenticity, ownness, jemeinigkeit, are 
all annulled by reversibility. Merleau-Ponty therefore has taken the 
phenomenology of ekstasis to its logical conclusion: my embodied 
projection towards the world is the primordial layer of worldhood 
available to me. This projection does not overlay a previously existing 
world., rather this projection is the very means by which we inhabit the 
world, and the very means by which we can say that the world inhabits 
us. By this stage, Merleau-Ponty has become the thinker to match and 
support the poet of reversibility discussed at the end of the previous 
chapter: Rilke. The interpenetration of the 'outside', of the perception of 
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nature, with an alleged interiority leads to the poetic installation of the 
ambiguity of reversibility. All reference to the 'personal' in Rilke, the 
'heart', the 'Open', the 'pure perception' and so on, are not, as 
Heidegger believed, a recapitulation within a grand metaphysical 
subjectivity. Rather, the Rilkean interior always leads itself to the outside 
according to a poetically and conceptually rigorous transcendence within 
immanence. As with our fingers tracing the 'surface' of the mobius strip, 
the Rilkean inside leads inexorably towards its outside. 
2) But this limitation to the personal itself is no longer tied to an implicit 
resistance to monism grounded within quasi-transcendentality. The 
transcendental privilege of the T is no longer maintained. The 
primordiality of depth, renamed as 'flesh' or 'wild being' displaces any 
residual privilege ascribed to the subject. Instead however of a reversion 
to a Kantian double-aspect theory or to a psycho-physical parallelism, 
Merleau-Ponty's reversibility thesis plays an ontologically more 
primordial role. Again, as was stressed at the outset of the chapter, an 
ontological clefting is derivative upon an onginary conjunction. The 
embodied subject's relation to the world is reversible to the extent that 
the two poles of the relation are ontologically equiprimordial. In 
Heideggenan parlance, the twofoldedness of immanence and 
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transcendence is at the same time a onefoldedness. Flesh is, 
ontologically, an 'absolute within the sphere of the relative. ' But, given 
the reversibility of (1) above, the separation or spacing between subject 
and world is an intertwining gap. It guarantees therefore that the 
possessive is no longer absolutely fixable. We uncover a deeper level of 
anonymity to that of the "Phenomenology of Perception"; a nomological. 
ambiguity over what is addressed as 'subject' and what is named as 
'world. ' Henceforth, the equiprimordiality between subject and world 
holds only for a subject and world that themselves are reversible. 
In a key passage of chapter 4, "The Intertwining", Merleau-Ponty condenses 
the twofold explication of the ontology of reversibility into one dense 
passage, which is worth quoting in full, 
If the body is one sole body in its two phases, it incorporates 
into itself the whole of the sensible and with the same 
movement incorporates itself into a "Sensible in itself" We 
have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the body in the 
world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and 
the body in the seer as in a box. Where are we to put the linut 
between the body and the world, since the world is flesh?.. The 
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world seen is not "iW' my body, and my body is not "in" the 
visible world ultimately: as flesh applied to a flesh, the world 
neither surrounds it nor is surrounded by it. A participation in 
and kinship with the visible, the vision neither envelops it nor is 
enveloped by it definitively. The superficial pellicle of the 
visible is only for my vision and for my body. But the depth 
beneath this surface contains my body and hence contains my 
vision. My body as a visible thing is contained within the full 
spectacle. But my seeing body subtends this visible body, and 
all the visible with it. There is reciprocal insertion and 
intertwining of one in the other. Or rather-there are two circles, 
or two vortexes, or two spheres, concentric when I live naively, 
and as soon as I question myself, the one slightly decentered 
with respect to the other.. (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 13 8) 
There is scarcely any mention of the 'night' in "The Visible and the 
Invisible". By decentering the subject's quasi -transcendental spacing apart 
from primordial depth, the anxiety of a recrudescence of an englobing 
monism evaporates. The rationality of the embodied subject is no longer 
accorded the tenuous position of an epi-phenomenal suspension over the 
abyss of the anonymous thickness of being. Rather, the distance of a rational 
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embodied subjectivity is maintained by the gap of reversibility: the subject 
envelops its world as the world enfolds the subject within it. The 
reversibility of this envelopment is, unlike double-aspect theory or psycho- 
physical parallelism, non-coincident. The transcendental function of an 
embodied intentionality is no longer the sole guarantor against the night; any 
such intentionality is interpretable as englobing a world and as englobed by 
that world- but not at one and same time. The gap of non-coincidence allows 
for 'subject' and 'world' to sediment themselves from out of the flux of 
emergence. Only thus does the subject attain 'rationality'. 
The reversibility thesis therefore explicitly opposes an individualistic thesis 
of the transformation of the world. The individual is at most the conduit of 
the world's transformation. Merleau-Ponty's last work does not undermine a 
first-personal perspective upon action, embodiment and its grounding within 
._ 
AoLIOA of culture, 7TVirou36 LIAe -- rtw-r5ib*tLibj-'C--ý-ckces-66Ls-%jýr force the 
tendency towards a covert ontological separation through a quasi- 
transcendentalism to be stopped in its tracks. The 'biggest picture' of an 
expressive development and transformation of the world folding back upon 
itself through the conduit of individuals is the non-coincident correlate of all 
first-personal accounts of experience. As M. C. Dillon holds, 
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.. we must learn to think of the relation of body to world as 
relation of flesh to flesh after the model of one hand touching 
the other- but we must think this folding of the flesh back on 
itself as decentered, as takmg place at a level prior to the 
emergence of conscious, I-centered, personal reflection. At the 
level of perceptual faith, where I do not see, but "one perceives 
in me", it is misleading to think of a body-subject in relation to 
a world-object; it is more accurate to think of an anonymous 
perceptual unfolding, dehiscence, ecart. (Dillon, 1988: 164) 
In both the "Phenomenology of Perception" and "The Visible and the 
Invisible", Merleau-Ponty positions the transformation of history within the 
present of embodied subjectivity. The 'communication more, ancient than 
thought'(p254) produces an origin of embodiment that is reconstructed at 
each of its instances. Prior to the individuality of personal embodied 
existence, our bodies partake of a general manner of being which reworks, 
the ground of that being, and thereby its past and its future. The world 
unfolds through the transformafions and reversibilities of the flesh. The 
name of this unfolding is history. The site of this unfolding is the present of 
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transformation. In order to achieve linguistic as well as conceptual rigour, all 
reference to 'structure' must always be grounded therefore in the difference 
of a repetition. The embodied transformation of the present leads to novel 
formulations of the structure of being, but this structure always supervenes 
upon an anterior drama of difference. In this way, some commentators have 
begun to think of Merleau-Ponty's work as offering a way out of a 
23 
prevailing phobia against the present . 
* 
In the final section of this chapter, I want to introduce a further level of 
reversibility that can be seen at work in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. 
This reversibility is always only ever implicit in his overtly non-political 
works. It is a reversibility between a poetics of the embodied present and a 
politics of that present. Although I have called Rilke the poet of reversibility, 
it is vitally important to see that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology itself has 
serious ramifications for developing a political ontology. 
23 1 refer to M. C. Dillon's penetrating phenomenological critique of deconstruction in his preface to the 
compendium entitled "Merleau-Ponty Vivant". Dillon argues that Derrida holds phenomenology's 
treatment of the present to be reducible to Husserl's main contentions on the matter- that is that the present 
is the arena for the subject's self-coincidence. By introducing Merleau-Ponty's notion of the present as 
always-already fissuring from itself, as a non-coincident unfolding that works through the body, Dillon 
argues that existential phenomenology offers a way through the impasse of a-referentiality he takes to be 
intrinsic to the 'linguistic immanence' of differance. 
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in order to begin this work, I will focus on the "Phenomenology of 
Perception". It would be equally possible to begin to explore a political 
ontology of the later work, however I will suspend that task for a future 
project. In both texts, this political ontology, although implicit, remains so 
for a reason. This reason is the legacy of a Leibnizian tendency in 
phenomenology that neither Merleau-Ponty nor his most recent readers have 
begun to challenge. In my reading, I find the grounds for a challenge within 
his work itself2-'t 
The LeibniziansiM of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is found in most 
explicit form in a passage that has already been alluded to. I will now quote 
it in full in order to begin its deconstruction, 
Thus every object is the mirror of all others. When I look at the 
lamp on my table, I attribute to it not only the qualities visible 
from where I am, but also those which the chimney, the walls, 
the table can 'see'; but the back of my lamp is nothing but the 
face which it 'shows' to the chimney. I can therefore see an 
object in so far as objects form a system or a world, and in so 
far as each one treats the others round it as spectators of its 
hidden aspects and as guarantee of the permanence of those 
criticising Merleau-Ponty from the perspective of a suspicion towards universalisms, I am 
iing myself with the feminist critiques of his thought. Apart from Iris Marion Young's important 
I essay "Throwing like a Girl", see also Elizabeth Grosz's "Volatile Bodies" chapter 4, where the 
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aspects. Any seeing of an object by me is instantaneously 
reiterated among all those objects in the world which are 
apprehended as co-existent, because each of them is all that the 
others 'see' of it. Our previous formula must therefore be 
modified; the house itself is not the house seen from nowhere, 
but the house seen from everywhere. The completed object is 
translucent, being shot through from all sides by an infinite 
number of present scrutinies which intersect in its depths 
leaving nothing hidden. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: p68-69) 
As the subject perceives the thing, the limitations of perspective entail that 
only one spatio-temporal facet of the thing reveals itself. The possible 
locations beyond the subject represented by the furniture of the room act 
therefore as guarantors of the thing's depth. At the limit, the accumulation of 
depth would render the thing absolutely transparent, a totality. This view 
from everywhere is of course, given the limitations of embodiment, an 
impossibility. But as a hypothetical extrapolation, the monadological 
manouver of the above passage allows Merleau-Ponty to distinguish 
between what he calls the 'world' and the 'universe'. The universe is the 
thought experiment of every object seen from all possible perspectives. The 
universe would therefore involve a 'completed and explicit 
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totality'(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 7 1). The universe would be the world re- 
viewed as an absolutely clear space. Again we return to the line diagram set 
out above in order to revise it. Clear space is depth at the limit. The collapse 
of the night is therefore very close to that which was previously considered 
as its opposite. Absolute interiority folds out upon absolute exteriority, as in 
the previous chapter the transcendence of transcendence turns out to be the 
dissimulated strategem. of a displaced immanence. The difference between 
clear space and the night is that with the former, the interrelationality is 
explicit. Instead of a solipsism, the subject is shrunk to a point in the field of 
totality. Standard accounts of perception must repeat this reductive 
alienation by assuming perception occurs on the basis, of a 'point' in the 
visual field. Instead of the insanity of the night, clear space, as a mode of 
subjectivity, leads to absolute alienation. The Copernican Revolution is 
indeed put to its limit, for with clear space there is no space for God or for 
the soul. The soul looks out upon a universe that denies it its own space for 
being. 
As finite beings, the thought of the universe must necessarily remain an 
impossible hypothesis. The world on the other hand refers to the possibility 
of other locations for perception that are not given or are not what Merleau- 
Ponty calls a 'presumptive synthesis'. (Ibid: 70) The world is, in Merleau- 
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Ponty's words, that 'open and indefinite multiplicity of relationships which 
are of reciprocal implication. '(Ibid: 7 1) 
Given the limitations of embodiment, the above portrait of the other 
horizons for perceiving the object situates it somewhere between a world 
and a universe, or between a world and a 'system'. The extrapolation of co- 
existence and co-implication could result in a space that is both absolute and 
clear, if we read the passage in isolation. We could assume that co- 
implication itself implies a coincident and absolute unfolding. To do so 
would however be to ignore the indefinitions of embodiment. Moreover, the 
other locations for perception, the chimney, the lamp and so on, are not 
themselves simple locations. Perhaps the deception of the above passage lies 
in its assumption of other spaces as simple locations, as if an embodied 
being could be re-placed by a lamp without reduction. But this deception 
would only be the deception of objectivity, by which it is taken to be 
primary reality Mstead of the asymptote of a totality. 
Prior to the clear space of objective being, the embodied perception of the 
thing places it in competition with other features of the visual field. By 
concentrating attention on this object, one necessarily must background 
other objects. The perceptual field works by occlusion. To be presented by 
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one object is to put other objects out of view, on the lee- side of the percept. 
Merleau-Ponty writes, 'To see is to enter a universe of beings which display 
themselves, and they would not do this if they could not be hidden behind 
each other or behind me. '(Ibid: 68) The embodied nature of perception 
entails therefore that the object before me inhabits a world, and by this term 
is meant both a field of open and extendable relations and a set of limitations 
to the perspective on offer. 
Just as between clear space and the night, this gap between the universe and 
the world has ontological significance. Beyond the question of how 
phenomenology sets up the relation between the finite and the infinite, the 
significance lies in the direction of how difference is thought. In the 
preamble to Part One of the "Phenomenology of Perception" entitled 
"Experience and objective thought", the section from which the above 
citation was taken, there is a fundamental ambiguity as to where Merleau- 
Ponty draws the line. On the one hand, he wants to begin introducing the 
phenomenological value of depth, whereby one can contrast an atomistic, 
isotropic account of space with the lived experience of an embodied 
perspective on the world. This leads Merleau-Ponty in the direction of 
Leibniz's monadology. On the other hand, the fact of embodiment at the 
same time restricts the possibility of an infinitisation of perspectives, 
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towards the 'indefinite', and henceforth openness of a 'world'. 
The stakes for this tie-off between the infinite extension of views and the 
limitations of an embodied perspective are therefore not 'purely' 
ontological. The most important question to be addressed in this section is 
not what relation the body has with possible other locations and thereby with 
infinity. Rather, the most pressing reading of the section is political. 
Between the infinity of perspectives explicit with the notion of a universe 
(an ideality which is revealed as such by the unresolvable tension between 
the universe's infinity and the requirement for the universe at the same time 
to be a totality) and the limitations of embodiment in the world lies the 
question of difference. On the one hand, the Leibnizian passage above 
suggests the smoothness of a logical passage of co-implication from the 
finitude of embodied perception to the universe. On the other hand, at other 
moments in the section, Merleau-Ponty attempts to show how this 
infinitisation is always resisted by the specificities of incarnate being. The 
closest he gets towards thinking difference occurs on the page following the 
above quote, 
But, once more, my human gaze never posits more than one 
facet of the object, even though by means of horizons it is 
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directed towards all the others. It can never come up against 
previous appearances or those presented to other people 
otherwise than through the intermediary of time and language. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 69) 
Here we have the problem: how do we think the other in Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology? In terms of depth and its implications, the other is merely 
the facilitator of extrapolation, the representatiVe of worldliness. The other 
therefore functions as the token of community, and of the Same. The other is 
therefore the stranger who yet belongs, who belongs to the polis of the One. 
There is only one world, however indefinite. In terms of difference however, 
the other must be something in sharp contrast. The other as other does not 
belong to the same community. The other would not therefore recognise the 
object in terms of a different one of its 'facets'. The other advances as the 
threat of not recognising the object as such. In this case, the other resists the 
community that wants to extend itself. The other is the strange avatar of the 
incompossible. Is this other thought in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology? 
The danger of a phenomenology that wants to place objective thought in 
relation to an embodied situatedness that precedes it is that it gets caught up 
in the chimeras of infmity that the former appears to require. Merleau- 
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Ponty's section under discussion is full of tensions between the finite and the 
infinite. It is my contention that these tensions must always be read in terms 
of a political ontology, for what is always at work in thinking the infinite is 
of course a transcendence of finitude. But all attempts to think 
transcendence, I hold, are always already attempts at thinking community in 
relation to difference. Merleau-Ponty is implicitly aware of this in his 
reference to 'other people' in the last quoted sentence. The question of a 
phenomenological political ontology is apparent in this reworking of the 
simple locationism. of the lamp and the chimney from one page to the next. 
How are we to negotiate between an other who encourages us into a world 
that promises more and more depth within our experience, an other who 
promises to redeem us from the insanity of the surface, from the unbearable 
lightness of being, and an other who transcends the boundaries of that 
experience? Is there merely a for-itself in community, who encounters the 
other as alien, as an object, like a lamp or a chimney? Or does the other 
occupy a more ambiguous role, such that its status is neither one of 
community or difference, but both, in varying degrees? In order to advance 
further towards a phenomenological thinking of embodied difference, the 
next chapter will examine Franz Fanon's reading of Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenology, in an effort to think how race is just such an ambiguity that 
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can be clarified by a political ontology. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DIFFERENCE OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
I do not want to exalt the past at the expense of my present and 
of my future 
Frantz Fanon "Black Skin, White Masks" p227 
The concluding paragraphs of the last chapter began to suggest that Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenology is not prior to politics. By concentrating on a few 
pages in the "Phenomenology of Perception" I argued that Merleau-Ponty 
remains ambiguous concerning the phenomenological and therefore 
ontological status of 'the other'. At one point at the beginning of Part One, 
as was shown, the other is reduced to a quasi-simple locationality. The other 
is the lamp over there, the chimney in front of me; in fact the other is 
essentially any other position from which I might deepen the facet of the 
percept currently available to me. The logical conclusion of this process of 
'profundification' is the translucency of the object 'seen from everywhere'. 
The object thereby takes its place in the totality of the 'universe'. Merleau- 
Ponty is however always mindful of the finite limitations embodiment places 
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upon this phenomenological monadology. The subject inhabits space, and 
only on the basis of this inhabitation can it perceive. This inhabitation entails 
that the co-implication of the other produces a depth that is indefinite, not 
infinite. The embodied subject can only be aware of a finite number of other 
possible locations for perception across space and tiMe. The difference 
between an infinite co-implication and an indefinite one is the difference 
between logic and perception. As a perceiving subject, my inhabitation 
within the world entails occlusions in the perceptual field. The perceptual 
field is populated by other bodies which block and obscure a panoptic 
mastery. A translucent objectivity is the asymptote, at the limit of the 
world's horizon. 
So where does this leave the place of the other in the world? The only other 
reference to the other in this section comes where Merleau-Ponty is 
describing the limits of depth. He refers, as was stated in the previous 
chapter, to the facets of the object given to the other, 'through the 
intermediary of time and language. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 69). The question 
therefore would be, "what is the force of inflection of the 'Intermediary"? " 
Does the intermediary involve difference? Do the time and language of the 
other belong to the world, contributing, through mediation, to its depth? Or 
does the other resist contribution? Furthermore, given the resistance of the 
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other, are we not lead back into something like Benjamin's 'conflict 
naming', as discussed in chapter 3? 
In order to procede further, it is necessary to focus on the relation between 
the other and the world in the "Phenomenology of Perception". To do this, I 
will briefly examine in more detail Merleau-Ponty's notion of world. 
The notion of the universe, for Merleau-Ponty, is an ideality, an 
hypothesisation of a totality of translucent beings, each nurroring all the rest 
through a hypothetical locationality. In contrast, the notion of world refers to 
the limit context of bodily being in the world. The world is the ultimate 
gound of all corporeal intentionality. Embodied actions are always already 
situated on a contextual horizon, a significational matrix without which 
those actions would be senseless. As such, its boundaries are indefinite or 
horizonal. The world horizon is the 
horizon of all horizons, the style of all possible styles, which 
, guarantees 
for my experiences a given, not a willed, unity 
underlying all the disruptions in which we have discovered the 
definition of the body. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 330) 
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For Merleau-Ponty, this ultimate horizon is not merely a spatial limit to 
existence. The world- horizon is at the same time grounded in temporality. 
Each incarnate act of motile behaviour signifies on the basis of a 
contextuality that is always unfolding. As Dillon writes, 'The world horizon 
as the context of all contexts is a temporal horizon, and its historical 
unfolding influences all themes, perceptual or linguistic, emerging within 
it. '(Dillon, 1988: 78) Therefore, 'the world' refers to the limit of all horizons 
to any embodied action, according to the possibilities of the present. So, 
given a particular action of a particular subject, the action's significance 
occurs on the basis of at least a two-fold layer of contextuality. First, there is 
the immediate context of the action, the football pitch, the law chambers, the 
rules of the game being played. But this figure-ground relation itself only 
'makes sense' in relation to the horizon of the temporal present within which 
this enactment is being played out. Beyond the immediate horizon, which 
itself is often open to multiple readings (for instance in football is it the 
physical feature of the pitch, the skills and characters of the players, or the 
current styles of playing the game? ) there are many sheaves of contextual 
richness before the 'world' is reached. But then, as the context of all 
contexts it is illegitimate to think of the world as a horizon that can be 
4reached'. As Dillon explains, 
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As the "horizon of all horizons, " it [the world] is ultimate and 
all-inclusive because it does not pennit thematization. It is 
characteristic of other horizons that they can be thernatized, 
placed within the context of a more encompassing horizon. But, 
since every thematization. is contextualisation within a more 
encompassing horizon, it follows that there is always a horizon 
that eludes thematization. It may be that a horizon that 
functioned as the world horizon at some stage in history 
subsequently, becomes thematized, bounded conceptually, and 
objectified. Thus, for example, one can speak more or less 
determinately about the eighteenth-century world or the world 
of Christian civilisation, and one might even claim to be able to 
speak this way about the twentieth century. (lbid, 7 8-79) 
A monadology which is suggested through the logic of depth in one moment 
of Merleau-Ponty's thought is therefore resisted, by way of its connection to 
the notion of 'world'. The resistance the world offers is that of the 
unthematisable and unrepresentable. The world is the boundary or limit for 
all existence5 'boundary' being taken in the positive sense of that which 
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allows for existence. 'However, the temporality of the world is not both 
determinative and yet somewhat mysterious, as one possible extrapolation of 
this passage might claim. The world-honzon must, to whatever degree, 
according to the findings of chapter 4, be in 'communication' With the 
embodied subject. The temporality of the world horizon is gTounded in part 
by the motivations and motilations of the subject, transforming the historical 
given in the presene. It is impossible however to posit any simple causality 
from one to the other. The relation between the figure of the embodied agent 
and the ground of the historical world of the 'now' is an indeterminate 
relation. Both are acting upon and transforming the other. Neither world nor 
embodied agent are either entirely passive or entirely active in relation to 
each other. An important consequence of this is that the locus of historical 
transformation, the present of the embodied moment, cannot be transparently 
articulated. The present presents itself as a rupture within any constructed 
linearity which works to establish it as lying in a non-transformative 
continuum with the past (and thereby entailing a predictable future). The 
ICasey writes in "Getting Back to Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-Worl&', 
... Boundary" (horos) or "limit" (peras) is not the nugatory notion of mere cutting off; nor is it the 
geometric concept of perimeter .. Boundary or 
limit, construed cosmologically, is a quite positive 
presence. '(Casey, 1993: 15) 
2 Of course, the world-horizon is also grounded in the changes in materiality and virtuality afforded by 
technology. 
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present therefore is the site of openness, the horizon for multi-directional 
change. The temporal sense of the horizonality of the present referred to by 
Dillon therefore emerges: the horizon of the present itself cannot be 
thematized. The historical given and the project of the future are open to the 
differentiation of the present. As open, the horizon of the present cannot be 
re-presented. Or rather, each representation of the present is worked through 
difference, the difference of the new 'present' and the ruptures it enacts 
through new sheaves of embodied signification. The boundaries of the 
present body-world relation remain ultimate in the sense that they cannot be 
rendered explicit to representation. As Dillon says above, representation of a 
'world-horizon' can only take place retrospectively. But beyond this, one 
can say that this retrospection only works through the intermediary 
difference of time and place, and itself can be retrospected anew and 
differently in the future. 
The world-horizon of any possible action is therefore all-encompassing of 
that action. In Merleau-Ponty's words, 'the world is not a sum of things 
which might always be called into question, but the inexhaustible reservoir 
from which things are drawn. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 342) For both Mer LeMu - 
Ponty and Dillon, although always already temporal, and as such is what we 
might call a 'horizon of becoming', there is only one world. The world is the 
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gandest of Merleau-Ponty's terms, his approximation for the Absolute, an 
approximation always maintained because of its temporality. As such, the 
distinction between world and universe is reduced, at least for Dillon, 
There is one world, one universe, because 'world' and 
cuniverse' name the horizon of all horizons. (Dillon, 1988: 79) 
The present is therefore both the locus for the transfonnation of the 
traditions and sets of cultural horizons to which the embodied subject 
belongs, as well as the all-encompassing horizon for all possible action. 
Again we move here from the immediate context of the present to its 
unrepresentable ultimate context. In the latter sense, the present of the world 
provides a theorisation of that notion of popular currency: the "Zeitgeist". 
The present is both the immediate context for embodied 'agency' and its 
ultimate context. In Dillon's words, the inimediate context is 'nested' within 
the world. But the conditions of possibility at work here are not uni- 
directional. The world alone does not provide the axioms of agency for the 
subject. Temporality and historicality are generated out of the reversibilities 
between ultimate and immediate context. That is, the ultimate context of the 
grand 'now' of history is the finite horizon for all comprehension of agency, 
yet at the same time, this finite horizon is openly determined through the 
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significational ramifications of transformations of the immediate context. 
And transformations of the immediate context are enacted by way of 
communications with the embodied subject. Therefore, the subject's 
dialogue with the world of immediate context can lead to new precedents of 
behaviour and disrupt the meaning-grid of the world. The anachronistic 
figure of the 'hero' would be one form of this 'bottom-up' disruption. By 
way of example, we can say that football 'signifies' according to the present 
historical context. To embellish this, a cultural commentator could start by 
pointing to the increasing commercialisation of the game, in the West at 
least. However, the historical position of this particular branch of the leisure 
industry in the present is articulated by the immediate context of particular 
teams, particular players and so on. It is possible that a particular player 
could transform the way in which the game is played. The position of 
football in the historical 'now' of the West is therefore a function of the 
interplay between its immediate and ultimate contexts. 
So, to return to the question of the situation of the other: where does the 
other 'fit' into the world construed by Merleau-Ponty as the all- 
encompassing, 'universal' inexhaustible reservoir of all beings? It would 
seem that the answer is obvious: the other must belong to the world. As the 
context of all contexts, the indefinite, open and productive boundary for all 
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existence, the over-arching nature of the world horizon entails that the 
mediation of time and language referred to above must therefore occupy a 
space within the world. Confirmation of this position being Merleau-Ponty's 
comes in the late chapter of the "Phenomenology of Perception" entitled 
'Other Selves and the Human World'. 
Merleau-Ponty's aim in this chapter is principally to resolve the paradox of 
interpersonal relations generated by Sartre's extrapolation of cartesian 
ontology in "Being and Nothingness". That is, Merleau-Ponty wants to 
argue that the subject does not encounter the other as first of all an object, 
thereby avoiding the polarities of being constructed, through this encounter, 
as either subject or object. Merleau-Ponty's alternative account begins with 
the ontological ambiguity of the embodied subject. It is not necessary to go 
into details here, for enough was said in the previous chapter about the 
primordial third space of the body being both subject and object for it to be 
clear that the transparency of the subject's gaze in Sartre is at its inception 
undennined by Merleau-Ponty's idea of the reversibility of the subject's 
corporeality. The impossibility of the subject constituting the other as 
another subject through first of all encountering the other as object is 
rejected, precisely because an object-ality, or rather a corporeality, is already 
grounding the subject itself. Interpersonal relations therefore are not 
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construed by Merleau-Ponty on the basis of two centres of consciousness 
perilously bridged via the 'objectivations' of two bodies. Rather, 
interpersonal relations emerge through the intercorporeity of bodies open to 
the flesh of the world. Interpersonal relations are not given as 'subject to 
subject' through the intermediary of the body. The body's openness to the 
world, its pre-personal communication with it, is what enables an openness 
to the other. Merleau-Ponty can therefore wnte, 
.. we must learn to find the communication between one 
consciousness and another in one and the same world. In 
reality, the other is not shut up Inside my perspective of the 
world, because this perspective itself has no definite limits, 
because it slips spontaneously into the other's, and because 
both are brought together in the one single world in which we 
all participate as anonymous subjects of perception. (Merleau- 
Ponty, 1962: 353) 
For Merleau-Ponty, the world is always already given to the embodied 
subject. The subject's freedom lies in inhabiting the present of this given 
through the agency of the body. Freedom is the freedom of a historical 
being, situated within the openness of the present. This present is, as has just 
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been shown, an enfolding unfolding of layers of contextuality, from the 
immediate to the ultimate. Freedom is therefore the freedom for an 
embodied subject to refuse the mere repetition of embodied pattemings, 
according to an incorporating linearity. The subj ect encounters the other 
across time and language, and yet always within the world. The embodiment 
of difference therefore does not solicit the monism of the world's horizon of 
becoming. 
The politics of difference made available through Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology would thereby seem extremely limited. Any embodied 
difference works within the community of the world, that context of all 
contexts. The time and difference of the other is always reduced, at the last 
instant, into the same of the world. The 'intermediary' of time and language 
would therefore always be vulnerable to collapse, given the ultimacy of the 
worldly 'now', from difference to forms of equivalency. All leavetakings of 
phenomenology are therefore justifiable on political grounds alone: it would 
seem that questions of community and difference cannot be asked on the 
basis of an already assumed community. 
Were this the conclusion of my research thus far, phenomenology would 
have been exposed as the ultimate form of conservatism, despite any 
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transformativity drawn out from the 'communication more ancient than 
thought. ' Phenomenology would allow for the presentation of embodied 
difference only on the basis of a reduction to the ultimacy of the One world. 
This however is not the conclusion of the thesis. I shall now attempt to 
transform the way in which Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology can be read. 
This reading has already begun: the communication more ancient than 
thought developed in the previous chapter already lies in tension with a 
universal world-horizon. The tension arises because the differential 
repetition of the present of the corporeal schema does not need to assume an 
ultimate context. Indeed it would seem more plausible to assume that 
contexts of cultural patternings do not fold outwards ad ultimatum. Rather, 
flie incamating ground of a cultural given is such precisely on the basis of its 
irreducible specificity. The world is on the cusp of breaking up, of no longer 
being harmonised through its function of contextualising contexts to the 
limit. 
I shall argue that the 'inexhaustible reservoir' of the world is not given, 
certainly not as a universal. Such a reduction is the reduction of politics to 
nationalism, to the polity of the One. The universal can only be given as the 
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ideal. 3 If phenomenology can think this, then phenomenology can think a 
phenomenology of difference that is at the same time a phenomenology of 
worldly difference. A politics of embodied difference that thinks the 
universal as that which is deferred precisely on account of difference. A 
politics of the Kantian/Derridean 'yet-to-come': the ideal of a universal 
community that many have taken phenomenology to have assumed as 
already given. In order to move further in the direction of this project, I shall 
tum to one of Merleau-Ponty most productive critics, Frantz Fanon. 
* 
Frantz Fanon's most significant philosophical influence is often taken to be 
the existential phenomenology of Sartre. Whilst Sartre's shadow is 
undoubtedly cast across many of the pages of Fanon's "Black Skin, White 
Masks". it is important to register that Fanon was also engaged in a dialogue 
with Merleau-Ponty. 41 Will argue that Merleau-Ponty's inclusive notion of 
3 David Michael Levin reminds us that Merleau-Ponty did think, in one place at least, of the flesh as ideal. 
In the "Themes from the Lectures" Merleau-Ponty describes reversibility as 'the correlate of an ideal 
community of embodied subjects, of an intercorporeality. '(Merleau-Ponty, 1970: 82). However, in Levin's 
paper (Wisions of Narcissism'), the form of this ideality is not clarified. Levin later writes 'Although of 
course only In a rudimentary and preliminary way that needs to be appropriately cultivated, 
intercorporeality already schematizes the embodiment of a self deeply rooted in an ethics of caring and 
open to the kind of communication necessary for the building of a society truly organized by principles of 
Justice. 'in Dillon, 1991: 77.1 would argue that it is precisely the vagueness of the 'rudimentary and 
preliminary' nature of the ideal that needs to be both clarified and challenged. 
4 In his book, "Fanon and the Crisis of European Man", Lewis R. Gordon acknowledges the influence of 
Merleau-Ponty on Fanon, without developing the nature of the dialogue in depth. See p14. 
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world is both the point of criticism for Fanon and the source of the 
construction of his ideal of 'disalienation". Only by looking at the implicit 
dialogue between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty that Fanon constructs will we be 
able to comprehend Fanon's politics of difference. As Fanon's method in 
"Black Skin, White Masks" is phenomenological, an excursus into the well 
known essay of chapter 5, "The Fact of Blackness", and an examination of 
the final chapter, "By Way of Conclusion", will, in the light of the political 
critique of Merleau-Ponty's ontology already undertaken, lead to a radical 
phenomenology of difference. It will also lead to a novel construction of 
political ideals, grourided in a phenomenology of the body. 
It is not difficult to show how "The Fact of Blackness" involves a dialogue 
with Merleau-Ponty. What is essential beyond this however is to bring to 
light the force of the critique at work, a force that is matched by the vigour 
of the ideals that emerge within the frame of the analysis. That is to say, 
Fanon's critique of Merleau-Ponty is undertaken only for the sake of 
exposing a redemptive politics which is latent in the latter. Fanon allows for 
a reading of Merleau-Ponty that cuts out the conservativism of the function 
of the 'world' and emphasises the transformativity of embodied 
communication. In this way, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is developed 
into the arena of difference. This is the task I am attempting here. 
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In "The Fact of Blackness, " Fanon's opening argument is that a 
phenomenology of blackness cannot be understood in the context of the 
'black man among his own. '(Fanon, 1986: 110). It is only in the encounter 
with whiteness that an analysis of the experience of skin difference, of being 
the black other, can be undertaken. In the Antillean setting of Martinique, 
the coercion and internalisation. of racial inferiority cannot be understood at 
the level of experience. Before entering the 'white world', Fanon was 
6 satisfied with an intellectual understanding of these 
differences. '(F anon, 19 8 6: Ibid) Everything changes in the cross-racial 
encounter however. Fanon writes, 
In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in 
the development of his bodily schema. (Fanon, 1986: lbid) 
Fanon proceeds to explicate Merleau-Ponty's notion of corporeal schema in 
the following paragraph. He ends the paragraph with the summative 
statement, 
A slow composition of my seýf as a body in the middle of a 
spatial and temporal world- such seems to be the schema. It 
does not impose itself on me; it is, rather, a definitive 
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structuring of the self and of the world- definitive because it 
creates a real dialectic between my body and the world. 
(Fanon, 1986: 111) 
Fanon therefore agrees with Merleau-Ponty's insight that the self and the 
world are constructed through the work of the body. As we have seen, he has 
also made the initial suggestion that the black construction of self is 
irihibited in the West. Concomittant with this initial suggestion therefore is 
the idea that the world itself is inhibited, or at least encountered as a 
difficulty. Fanon then articulates the character of this inhibition, 
Below the corporeal schema I had sketched a historico-racial 
schema. (Fanon, 1986: lbid) 
The move announced here against the primacy of the world in Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenology is dramatic. Fanon is suggesting, in one sentence,, 
that the corporeal schema, the locus of the co-eval emergence of self and 
world, is undercut or undermined in the case of the black subject in the 
West. Fanon therefore challenges the universal 'one-world' thesis that I have 
shown is the outcome of Merleau-Ponty's monadological tendencies. Farion 
is suggesting that not all subjects belong. The non-belonging of the black 
subject is the work of the 'historico-racial schema', the de-composition of 
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self and world. Fanon therefore introduces an account of the mediation of 
difference which shakes the security of belonging to the world that Merleau- 
Ponty held to be unquestionable. As Nick Crossley writes, without any 
further expansion, 
Merleau-Ponty is clear that one's experience of one's body is 
mediated but he does not identify the social devices whereby 
differences are introduced. Race and more particularly skin 
colour provide a useful example here. They demonstrate that 
bodies are categorised differently and invested with different 
meanings, with the consequence, in many cases (M the context 
of European societies), that persons are treated differently- 
which, in the context of a world of interdependencies, amounts 
to a differential in agency capacity. 
Hence the illocutionary force of the 'Fact' of blackness. The Merleau- 
Pontyan ambiguity over the status of the body, as either subject or object, is 
reduced to the painful clarity of being designated solely as the latter, for the 
black subject. Blackness is an unambiguous fact of being which is 
encountered as an external reality, and the reality of its embeddedness within 
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certain significational structures cannot be disavowed. 
The fact of blacluiess therefore raises the issue of visibility, in a sense 
beyond those stipulated by Merleau-Ponty in either "Eye and Mind" or "The 
Visible and the Invisible". Beyond the ambiguity of the phenomenological 
reflexivity of always 'being seen' in each act of seeing, the fleshy birth of 
subject and object in each act of perception, the fact of blackness 
overdetermines the 'being seen" - Given the fact of blackness, the black 
subject's being seen in seeing cannot perform according to the ambiguity of 
reversibility. Rather, each act of perception confronts the possibility of being 
marked out as 'other'. as a stranger to the world, or rather somehow beyond 
the world. In this sense, it becomes clear that the ambiguity and reversibility 
of the world requires a form of invisibility which Merleau-Ponty did not take 
account of The visibility of skin difference becomes an irreversible 
facticity. ' 
Fanon sets up the historico-racial schema by way of a simple narrative 
5 Nick Crossley, "The Politics of Subjectivity", p39 
6 At this point it is meet to mention the important disinction. between race and ethnicity. Although it is not 
my concem in this chapter or in the thesis to address the complexities at work in this distinction, I will offer 
the following brief comments. One way in which the distinction can be introduced is in terms of visibility 
and invisibility. Race difference tends to involve inalienable forms of visible markers of difference, 
whereas ethnic difference tends to involve invisibility. I say 'tend to' because it would be easy to think of 
specific examples where there is more ambiguity. In general one can say that each form of embodied 
visibility (in terms of being seen and 'marked out') involves at the same time modes of invisibility, and 
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which recurs in fragments throughout the rest of the essay. It is the 
experience of a white child saying to his mother on a train, "Look, a Negro! " 
This is the moment of alienation for the black subject. Fanon's fragmented 
I 
style in this piece invites a reconstruction of the historico-racial schema in a 
more systematic manner. The two aspects of this undercutting schema I want 
to highlight are its effects on freedom and the way in which another form of 
objectivity is constructed which contrasts with the objectivity of science that 
Merleau-Ponty discusses. 
Firstly then, the opening pages of the essay mark the difference between the 
freedom of the subject receiving and transforming the gift of cultural 
patternings discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis and the 
unfreedom of the alienated black subject. To begin, in Fanon's experience, 
the encounter with the white other who subjects the black male subject to his 
gaze is taken lightly. "Look, a Negro! " It was true. It amused me" (Fanon, 
1986: 1bid) This amusement is annulled as the child continues badgering his 
mother, this time adding to the expression of the gaze a component of fear. 
The fear of the child is read as the outcome of all that Fanon's skin 
represents. The child is no longer merely pointing to the skin difference as a 
vice versa. This point will be developed in future work. 
296 
Chapter 5: The Difference ofPhenomenology 
form of naive rejoicing in the novel - the surprise of seeing (perhaps for the 
first time close up) a black human being. The child, this figure allegedly 
prior to coding, has in actual fact already imbibed various presuppositions 
beyond the simple physicality of skin difference. That is, the black skin is 
already operating as a kind of metonym for the child, representing a specific 
construction of otherness. The child gazes upon the Fanon's black male 
presence as a representation of the primitive. 
could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were 
legends, stones, history, and above all historicity, which I had 
learned about from Jaspers. Then, assailed at various points, the 
corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial 
epidermal schema. (Fanon, 1986: 112) 
The violation of the train episode is therefore given a more dramatic context 
because of the gaze being expressed by a child. The power of the gaze 
resides in its exemplification of the permeations of racist attitudes in the 
West to even the 'innocent'. Fanon's brilliance lies in the way in which he 
subjects his own experience to phenomenological analysis. The collapse of 
the corporeal schema is the moment whereby alienation becomes embodied. 
I existed triply: I occupied space. I moved toward the other 
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and the evanesent other, hostile but not opaque, transparent, not 
there, disappeared. Nausea ... (Fanon, 1986: lbid) 
Here Fanon reproduces Sartre's threefold model of the subject in relation to 
others. The subject is first of all an outlook upon the world, the locus of 
perception. In encountering the other, the subject is forced however to accept 
secondly a view of itself from the outside, as a location or entity in the 
world, as an 'other'. This tension between a subjective and an objective 
account of the subject's embodiment must be resolved, for as it stands the 
two views are opposed. As is well known, for Sartre this resolution, the 
dream of a for itself in-itself is a futile one. 7 Double consciousness always 
involves non-coincidence - and this remains faithful to the logic of the 
excluded middle. The tension between being experienced as an object in 
relation to one's own interior experience can only lead to the unresolved 
modality of nausea. In a moment, this state of sickness will be named as 
'abjection'. Fanon is therefore naming the collapse of the corporeal schema 
by the epidermalisation of the subject in Sartrean terms. Beyond Sartre 
however, Fanon is critiqueing Merleau-Ponty's thesis of freedom taken as 
7 In "Being and Nothingness", Sartre writes, 'Everything happens therefore as if the in-itself and the for- 
itself were presented in a state of disintegration in relation to an ideal synthesis. Not that the integration has 
ever taken place but on the contrary precisely because it is always indicated and always 
impossible. '(Sartre, 195 8: 623) 
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the freedom of the historical agent. The nausea Fanon felt on the train is 
therefore only the first stage of the experience of alienation and unfreedom. 
This unfteedom develops in terms of the weight of a past constructed by the 
other in caricatural fashion. 
I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for 
my ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination, I 
discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was 
battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual 
deficiency, fetichism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above all 
else, above all: "Sho' good eatin'. "(Fanon, 1986: lbid) 
Beyond the experience of nausea, of the paralysis of bodily bemg, the gaze 
of the child effects an unfreedom. Instead of the body being located in the 
present of a 'communication more ancient than thought', of being the site of 
a possible transformation of the cultural givens of bodily patternings, the 
black 'subject' experiences his own skin as the metonym for a parodic 
primitivism. Black skin is indissolubly connected to a history constructed by 
a white imaginary. The black subject finds himself no longer in the present 
of possible transformation, but thrown back into a past that was never his 
own. Fanon writes, "The Negro, however sincere, is the slave of the 
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past. "(Fanon, 1986: 225) Fanon therefore is showing that he is in strong 
agreement with Merleau-Ponty's insight that freedom is the freedom to 
change the world, and to change the meaning of one's history. But the way 
in which this agreement is expressed is in the form of a critique from the 
point of view of those excluded from freedom. Merleau-Ponty only ever 
explored the outside of history in the sense of those outside of the bodily 
norm, in the "Phenomenology of Perceptiorf ' the figure in point being 
Schneider. Schneider's disabilities permit Merleau-Ponty to construct an 
account of a bodily norm .8 But Merleau-Ponty does not ever think the 
difference of bodies in terms of the differences of race, class and gender. As 
Fanon's analysis of his own experience shows, the politics of exclusion 
embodied in the child's gaze impose another fon-n of disability: the dis- 
abling of the corporeal schema. This disabling is at the same time an 
alienation of the subject from the embodiment of freedom in the present. 
Later in the essay, this unfreedom is expressed succinctly in two words, 
"Too late. " (Fanon, 1968: 121) From this mournfull, shibboleth everything 
that pertains to Fanon's analysis unfolds. The black subject enters the arena 
8 As Krell says, the production of an embodied normativity from out of an exploration of abnormality is not 
performed by Merleau-Ponty for the sake of reifýýing or privileging the normal. He writes, 'Merleau-Ponty 
advances along the via negativa of a pathology of the human body. He does so, not to deduce the normal 
frorn the abnormal, but to show that the geometric space of modem science, metaphysics and mathematics 
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of interpersonal encounters in the West with his or her history already 
constructed and given. The already given history, the parodic primitivism 
most powerfully represented by cannibalism, is the form of the denial of 
giving the black subject historical agency. Once on the scene of the present, 
the black subject encounters his historical agency as already decided. Any 
possible uniqueness or singularity to the subject is undermined by the 
imposition of a representational framework. The black subject represents 
black subjectivity. 'Everything is anticipated, thought out, demonstrated, 
made the most of. My trembling hands take hold of nothing; the vein has 
been mined out. Too late! '(Ibid) Fanon cannot even grasp something 
anymore- the schemas that permit the hands and arms to draw things close to 
the body according to the culturations of habit are attenuated into 
insignificance. The fact of blackness (in the West) annuls the Heideggerian 
distinction between vorhanden and zu-handen by annuling the agency of the 
hands completely. Without the agency of the body occupying the free space 
of the present, the subject lies absolutely exposed to the gaze of the other. 
The black subject at this point loses his sense of interiority. At the brink of 
the decomposition of self and world, all Fanon's hands can do is tremble. 
is fundamentally pathological' (Krell, 1997: 140- 1) 
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At this point we arrive at the second aspect of the undermining of the 
corporeal schema by the racial schema: objectification. As was shown 
briefly m the previous chapter, the 'object' in Merleau-Ponty refers to the 
, asymptote of translucency of the percept. The object is that hypothesis of the 
limited perspective of my perception being deepened by an infinity of other 
perspectives. The object is, in Merleau-Ponty's example, the house 'viewed 
from everywhere'. In contrast, the object in Fanon's sense is that of the 
subject viewed from elsewhere. Not just any neutral elsewhere however. The 
gaze of the other denies the perspective of the subject and the capacity of the 
subject to perform embodied transformations of a specific cultural trajectory. 
The limit point of this denial of freedom comes when the subject acquiesces 
to the onslaught of the alienating gaze and internalises it. At two points in 
his essay Fanon describes this moment with acute force, 
On that day, completely dislocated, unable to be abroad with 
the other, the white man, who unmercifully imprisoned me, I 
took myself far off from my own presence, far indeed, and 
made myself an object. (Fanon, 1986: 112) 
I sit down at the fire and I become aware of my uniform. 
(Fanon, 1986: 114) 
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In sum, the white other fixes the black subject as different because of their 
skin colour. The fixity of this difference resides in it operating as an 
inextricable and unquestionable metonynm for a parodic construction of 
black history. Objectification therefore is the objectification of history, not 
science, for Fanon. The subsequent internalisation of the other's fixing point 
of view results in a self-inflicted inferiorisation. As Fanon writes, 'I have 
ceaselessly striven to show the Negro man that in a sense he makes himself 
abnormal.. "(Fanon, 1986: 225) The black subject repeats the other's gaze, and 
in a panopticon-like manner, the other no longer needs to be there. 
In this state of exteriorised being, the subject has become abject. 9 Not quite 
object, and yet no longer secure within an assuring framework of interiority, 
the subject is decentered by a paralysing double-consciousness. Not 
completely reducible to the names the other would ascribe, but then no 
9 Kristeva's term, most fully explored in her book "Powers of Horror", has been subsequently read by 
others beyond the confines of its original psychoanalytic context. For instance, Iris Marion Young in 
"Justice, Politics and Community" explores the concept from the point of view of the embodiment of 
difference outside of the 'universalisms' of modem reason. In chapter 6 of Cataldi's book "Emotion, Depth 
and Flesh", the author takes up Young's reading and carefully distinguishes between the abject subject and 
the object in terms of the threatening proximity of the former to a stable sense of selfhood, 
Today the Other is not so different from me as to be an object; discursive consciousness 
asserts that Blacks, women, homosexuals, and disabled people are like me. But-they are 
affectively marked as different-The face-to-face presence of these others-threatens, 
aspects of my basic security system, my basic sense of identity, and I must turn away 
with disgust and revulsion. (Cataldi: 143) 
It must be noted that the stated equivalences between different modalities of the abject here does not 
account for differences in visibility, for instance the 'fact' of blackness. I will discuss this in more detail in 
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longer able to legitimate the names the subject would give himself, 
abjectification expels the subject from the community of citizens and 
rational beings. 
But there is still a further moment of alienation, according to Fanon's text. 
Beyond the objectification alienating the black subject from the freedom of 
an embodied historical being, it excludes the externally constructed black 
historical narratiVe from being part of worldly history itself. That is, instead 
of being seen as historical beings in the world, with their own specific 
cultural inflection of worldliness, at the limit subsumable within the context 
of all contexts of the 'world', the caricature of black history is kept separate 
from this universal world. 
I shouted a greeting to the world and the world slashed away 
my joy. I was told to stay within bounds, to go back where I 
belonged. (Fanon, 1986: 114-5) 
This extract powerfully reminds the reader of the essential relation between 
voice and community. To be part of a community is to have a voice. 
Belonging has a vocal imperative that the voice is heard and recognised and 
accepted. in any place where the voice is either not heard, not recognised or 
my reading of Baldwin's "Another Country" below. 
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not accepted, an implicit disavowal of community is at work. In the field of 
race difference, this disavowal can become one of the most subterranean 
forms of constant racial abuse. Fanon strives to combat the incessant 
subtlety of this dynamic in the above quote by personifying the amorphous 
pressure of 'the world. ' 
Let us take stock of Fanon's critique of Merleau-Ponty. The racial-epidermal 
schema denies the universal freedom Merleau-Ponty ascribes to all 'normal' 
bodied beings. In this sense the 'ontology' of the same collapses under the 
pressure of difference. This denial of the universal acts as one form of a 
wave of difference according to race, class and gender that combine to resist 
the notion of the context of all contexts,, the 'world' to which all embodied 
subjects belong. The world to which Fanon shouted a greeting is refused by 
the (white) other in the refrain of "The Fact of Blackness"). A 
phenomenology which recognises the embodiment of difference therefore 
must confront the difference of worlds which differently positioned subjects 
experience. Fanon argues implicitly that phenomenology cannot legitimate 
its purported discovery of universal commonalities between embodied 
subjects such that every subject belongs ultimately to the same world- 
horizon of the 'now'. Not all embodied subjects are capable of becoming 
historical beings, due to this capacity being refused by the objectifying and 
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abjectifying positioning of the other. Not everyone can experience their own 
embodiment of history. Therefore, some are denied the potentiality to 
transform the history of the world (or the history of their world). The 
intemalisation of inferiorities based on the embodiment of difference works 
to deny a first-personal take on the 'now' of this present historical moment. 
Fanon himself is forced to live according to the weight of a fake past instead 
of a present open to possible change. Through internalisation, the now of the 
black subject is lived through the caricatured constructions of the white 
other. The excluded subject is alienated from their body, their history, and 
that history's relation to the 'history of the world'. Far from beginning with 
an always already given sense of commonality within a world-horizon, the 
nauseous objectified sub ect begins with an exclusion, a denial of a relation j 
to the universal, and a denial of his belonging to the present. 
With this in mind, we can understand more fully Fanon's initial antipathy 
towards 'ontology'. He writes 
Ontology-once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the 
wayside- does not permit us to understand the being of the 
black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must 
be black in relation to the white man. (Fanon, 1986: 1 10) 
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For Fanon, the collapsing of ontology into difference enacts the collapsing 
of ontology itself. Fanon repeats the Levinasian move here of construing 
ontology as the field of the same. He is in effect arguing that ontology, by 
way of a phenomenological methodology, refers to a 'world' whose 
community of being discounts phenomenological visibilities such as the fact 
of blackness. To be black is to be seen as black, an irreversible facticity 
which Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology cannot articulate within its own 
terms. However, although an explanation for Fanon's rejection of ontology 
has been established, I would argue that the act of rejection is too strong. In 
thinking the embodied character of difference, an ontology of difference 
must be developed in order to demarcate the form of the boundaries between 
immanence and transcendence, between sameness and difference. The 
Fanonian critique of Merleau-Ponty is an attempt to highlight the omissions 
of embodied difference in the latter. But to reassert difference in 
phenomenology, as Fanon. does, cannot be undertaken without recourse to 
the terms of ontology. This is explicitly recognised in the conclusion to 
"Black Skin, VAite Masks". where Fanon writes, 'I am a part of Being to the 
degree that I go beyond it. ' (Fanon, 1986: 229) Far from ontology 
demarcating the community of being that excludes difference, ontology 
itself is rethought as differential. Ontology therefore marks the limits of the 
307 
/11 L 
Chapter 5: The Difference ofPhenomenology 
same, and allows for a spacing between it and the other, such that a univocal 
6world' is deferred and reconstituted as the ideal. Ontology is always an 
ontology of difference. If ontology was delegitimated by difference, 
difference itself would be rendered impossible to thinking. 
* 
In order to embellish the implications for phenomenology of a world that is 
not universally given across the embodiment of differences, I will now 
examine some key passages from James Baldwin's novel "Another 
Countryý'). 10 Written in Istanbul and set in New York in the late fiffies, this 
novel can be read as an extended critique of the universalist normativity 
between the body and space that a text such as the "Phenomenology of 
Perception" represents. However, as with Fanon's "Fact of Blackness", the 
poetics of the text lead us back to phenomenology, through the sparks of 
difference. In this sense, Baldwin's novel, like the text of Fanon's, can be 
read in the light of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology in order to open it to 
difference. Although dense and turbulent with many other themes, for 
instance a portrayal of homosexual love thematised as non-deviant, and an 
10 1 am aware that the bulk of the work of this chapter faces the potential criticism that in order to construct 
a phenomenology of race difference I have narrowed my reading down to just two thinkers, viz Fanon and 
]Baldwin. This narrowing was necessary in order to speak with sufficient depth within the limits of a 
308 
ryl- 
Chapter 5: The Difference ofPhenomenology 
account of pretension in the face Of artistic failure, the novel is most 
disturbing and powerful in highlighting the blindspots of embodied 
difference. 
By 'blindspots of embodied difference' I refer to the way in which the 
bodily schema is coded with difference to the extent that vision itself can no 
longer be seen as opening on to the neutrality of a 'perceptual field'. Using 
Fanon, I have argued that the embodiment of difference suspends the 
possibility of a universal world being available to all subjects. BaldwM's 
novel shows that this leads, in the case of densely coded zones like 
'downtown' New York and 'uptown' Harlem, to the same spaces themselves 
being read differently. In Baldwin's New York, issues of visibility and 
invisibility are raised to the forefront of what it is to perceive the world, 
across difference. It is the 'privilege' of the white subjects in the novel to see 
the places they occupy as neutTal. zones. In contrast, those whose bodily 
capacities are challenged, principally in the novel the two central black 
characters, brother and sister Rufus and Ida, do not have this prerogatiVe. As 
such, Baldwin is able to uncover a racism beneath its most obvious forms; a 
racism in perception. 
chapter length text. In future work I hope to expand upon the scope of thinkers involved in this direction. 
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In order to develop this reading, I will examine a passage detailing Rufus' 
consciousness of the white other's blindspots, and then Ida's. Both examples 
tum on that most covertly coded of urban spaces, the park. In the first 
example, Rufus is walking with his new girlfriend, the 'white trash' Leona, 
and his best friend the Italian-American Vivaldo. They are in the apparently 
free space of Washington Square, the park at the centre 
_of 
Greenwich 
Village. Vivaldo has just been stopped by a drunken woman, leaving Rufus 
alone with his partner, 
Without Vivaldo, there was a difference in the eyes which 
watched them. Villagers, both bound and ftee, looked them 
over as though where they stood were an auction block or a 
stud farm. The pale spring sun seemed very hot on the back of 
his neck and on his forehead. Leona gleamed before him and 
seemed to be oblivious of everything and everyone but him. 
And if there had been any doubt concerning their relationship, 
her eyes were enough to dispel it. Then he thought, If she could 
take it so calmly, if she noticed nothing, what was the matter 
with him? Maybe he was making it all up, maybe nobody gave 
a damn. Then he raised his eyes and met the eyes of an Italian 
adolescent. The boy was splashed by the sun falling through the 
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trees. The boy looked at him with hatred; his glance flickered 
over Leona as though she were a whore; he dropped his eyes 
slowly and swaggered on- having registered his protest, his 
backside seemed to snarl, having made his point. 
Taggot, ' Rufus muttered. 
Then Leona surprised him. 'You talking about that boy? He's 
just bored and lonely, don't know no better. You could 
probably make friends with him real easy if you 
tned. '(Baldwin, 1990: 38-9) 
Although the couple are both challenged by the general ambience of 
suspicion in the square and the particular confrontation with the youth, only 
Rufus reads this suspicion as a challenge to his being. This is not to say that 
Leona is not aware of the statement they make. 'He's probably bored and 
lonely' gives the game away, a reference to an act which Leona does not 
bring into the open. The most Leona can do is effect a silent relation to the 
challenge, without speaking it. Prior to this encounter, the difference in 
readings of the space of the park is stairtling. On the one hand, Leona is 
4 oblivious, to the atmosphere, whereas Rufus is painfully self-conscious. 
Leona gleams in the pale sunlight, as if the sun's rays carry the force of the 
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eyes looking at them. In other words, the sun's rays on Leona are a metaphor 
for her basking in the attention of the park dwellers. The surface of Leona's 
skin is glorified and illuminated by a concealed transmission of ocular power 
(in a manner that corresponds to the self-illumination of Heidegger's temple 
in the third chapter). On the other hand, Rufus cannot reflect the sun's rays 
or the gaze of the others, he can only feel their eyes sink into his being. 
Rufus' skin is non-reflective - the sun bums his neck. And only Rufus is 
aware of this difference, to the point of insanity. The insanity emerges at the 
point where Rufus is brought to challenge his whole reading of the situation. 
If the park is not full of suspicious eyes, then Rufus is aware that he must 
obviously be projecting his own paranoia onto the others. This possibility 
becomes present in Rufus' mind, as the possibility that his own mind is 
distorting the situation in which he finds himself As such, Rufus is led into 
considering that he is mad, that he can no longer access reality beyond the 
delusions of his being. Being brought face to face with Leona's blindspots, 
the silence of the places where the sun does not shine, Rufus is led to 
question his whole orientation within the world. " Leona, in contrast, is not 
11 Here we broach upon a development of the spatial phenomenology of insanity mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Tbe unresolvable double-consciousness of an exteriorisation that threatens to reduce the doubling 
to a 'pure' (and of course impossible) exteriority is an attack on the rationality of the subject. The outside 
impends as that which threatens the very viability of an 'inner groundedness of being'. 
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provoked to question her sanity. For her, the gaze of the others in the park is 
an occasion for display, an inversion of suspicion into admiration which 
tums on the self flattery of vanity. The subsequent particularisation of the 
suspicion in the figure of the adolescent therefore does not trouble her as a 
question put to their being together. Rather, she reads the youth" s behaviour 
as a local problem, put down to his boredom. 
This first excerpt from "Another Country" demonstrates Farion's point that 
racial coding leads from a difference in embodiment to a difference in 
worlds. Baldwin shows the consequence of this when those 'worlds' happen 
to be superimposed upon the same space. The white world of Leona plays 
the part of Merleau-Ponty's 'corporeal schema', a privilege and a freedom to 
occupy space as unproblernatic and uncontested. The strength of the 
privilege is manifested in Leona's power,, even as mere 'white trash' to resist 
the gaze of the others, to not internalise it into her being. For Leona, all 
space is orientated with the possibilities for a postural schema, unlike a 
scientifically 'objective' space devoid of such latent or manifest value. 
However, these possibilities are assumed to be universally available to other 
subjects. The place of the other for Leona is therefore the possibility of 
another position for perception, and nothing more. On the other hand, the 
world as it opens up for Rufus is an incarnation of Fanon's 'racial-histoncal- 
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epidermal' schema. The positioning of the 'bohemian' others in Washington 
Square fixes him into a decomposition of self which leads him to the brink 
of the paralysis of insanity. The world is not, and has never been, universally 
available to him, at least the white world south of Harlem. But then this 
distinction between uptown Harlem and downtown Manhattan for black 
subjects is enough to shatter the notion of a worldly 'nest' for all. Local 
aspects of the world cannot add up indefinitely towards the linUt of the 
worldly 'now'. The embodiment of difference resists such extrapolation. 
Rufus therefore lives between the 'freedom' of Harlem and the prison of 
Manhattan; however, the presence of the police and whites venturing north 
mean that even Harlem cannot be considered a zone affordant with 
undisturbed possibilities for him. 
In the novel, Cass, the white wife of the failed novelist Richard exemplifies 
the reverse of Rufus' experience. As she makes the trip north to Harlem to 
Rufus' funeral, she experiences herself with reduced bodily competence, a 
decomposition of subjectivity which is the result of being positioned as other 
in a predominantly black space, 
One small, lone, white woman hurrying along 125th Street on a 
Saturday morning was apparently a very common sight, for no 
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one looked at her at all. She did not see any stores with ladies' 
hats in the window. But she was hurrying too fast and looking 
too hard. If she did not pull herself together, she might very 
well spend the day wandering up and down this 
street. (Baldwin, 1990: 120) 
The interesting difference between Cass and Rufus in terms of their being 
positioned by the racial other is temporal. Cass experiences a breakdown in 
the bodily competence of her corporeal schema on a trip to Harlem. She 
finds the simple task of going to buy a hat disturbingly difficult. Her 
imagined sense of being exteriorised as 'other' takes her out of a bodily 
competence she would blindly take for granted in the streets to the south. 
Although perhaps rattled, her return to the white safety of downtown New 
York encloses her again in the security of the illusion that the world is there 
for eveyone. For Cass, the blindspots against difference are accommodated 
for by the normative power of the white space of downtown. Rufus on the 
other hand is some part on the way towards a Fanonian crumbling of his 
corporeal schema. The possibility of being positioned as an object denied 
freedom is an ever-present threat. The constancy of this threat is often 
represented by the anonymous figure of white authority, the police, that 
populate the novel, always suspicious of the black subject. 'The policeman 
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passed him, giving him [Rufus] a look. ' This appears on the first page of the 
novel. Rufus' decision to embroil himself in the white world below 100th 
stTeet ends in his suicide. 
12 
Ida's race-consciousness entails that she is always already aware of the ever- 
present threat of positioning of the white other. She lives most of the novel 
in Harlem, working downtown. Unlike her brother Rufus, she resists the 
decomposing and crumbling effects of the racial-epidermal schema by 
exploiting it to her advantage. She uses the power of being read as an 
C exotic' source of sexual intrigue to her gain in controlling her relation with 
the wheeler-dealer Ellis. She allows herself to be read in Fanon's parodic 
fashion as a way of manipulating the other's gaze. Ida therefore testifies to a 
reversibility in the power of the gaze, a competency which has yet to be 
explored in theory up to date. 
The following dialogue between Ida and Cass takes place as they are 
joumeying uptown to Harlem, passing by Central Park. 
12 Although Rufus cannot help being aware of the epidermal schema, Baldwin portrays him as being In 
denial about it. This contrasts with the critical attitude his sister Ida has. Baldwin writes, 'he knew Ida 
would instantly hate Leona. She had always expected a great deal from Rufus, and she was very race- 
cOnscious. She would say, You'd never even have looked at that girl, Rufus, if she's been black. But you'll 
pick up any white trash just because she's white. What's the matter- you ashamed of being black? Then, for 
the first time in his life, he wondered about that- or, rather, the question bumped against his mind for an 
instant and then speedily, apologetically, withdrew. ' (Baldwin, 1990: 3 7) 
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They were in the park. Ida leaned forward and lit a cigarette 
with trembling hands, then gestured out the window. 'I bet you 
think we're in a goddmn park. You don't know we're in one of 
the world's great jungles. You don't know that behind all them 
damn dainty trees and shit, people are screwing and fixing and 
dying. Dying, baby, right now while we move through this 
darkness in this man's taxicab. And you don't know it, even 
when you're told; you don't know it, even when you see it. '[.. ] 
And she, too, looked out at the park, trying to see what Ida say; 
but, of course, she saw only the trees and the lights and the 
grass and the twisting road and the shape of the buildings 
beyond the park. (Baldwin, 1990: 34 1) 
In this short exchange, Ida shows that Cass's blindspot's are embodied, an 
essential aspect of her corporeal schema. Cass does not suffer merely from a 
lack of knowledge. It is not as if she can, in true liberal fashion, learn to 
know the problem and thereby transcend it. Knowledge here will never be 
enough to surmount the asymmetries between the two women. The blindspot 
refers to an aporia more profound than merelY an epistemic limitation. The 
blindspot is part of her being-in-the-world. The depth of her blindspots on 
the coding of space are powerfully evinced in the above passage. Ida tells 
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Cass that she won't notice the jungle that is Central Park even when she sees 
Cass is obviously listening to Ida at this point. And yet, even in the 
knowledge that she may have a blindspot to the difference of perspectives 
upon the same space, she still cannot eradicate the aporias of her embodied, 
positioned and privileged perspective on the world. Cass' positioning as a 
white subject entails that she cannot see the world except in universal terms. 
A space such as Central Park therefore offers itself as available to everyone. 
As such, the social codings of the space drop out, and Cass is left staring at 
the trees and the grass. 
The contestation of urban spaces witnessed in "Another Country" therefore 
shows how this contestation is asymmetric across the racial divide. For white 
subjects such as Cass and Leona (representing the middle class liberal and 
the Southern white trash respectively), the fabric of the urban as contested is 
repressed by their positioned embodiment as subjects of skin pnvilege. For 
the two central black protagonists, Rufus and Ida, (representing the 
uncritical and the critical modes of race awareness respectively), their 
Positioned embodiment leads them to an awareness of the contestation of 
every space. As was shown in the case of Rufus in Washington Square, the 
Pivot between the reading of space as universally available and reading it in 
terms of opprobrium and exclusion is itself the space of insanity. Either the 
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lived experience of space is one which is universally available to all, and 
therefore it is possible to say that 'we live in the same world', or it must be 
accepted that there are imbalances and privileges in having a white 
subjective positioning over and against other forms of positioning. The main 
form of this privilege lies in being able to claim that the world does not 
exclude the other. This leads to the privilege of reading public spaces such 
as Central Park and Washington Square as uncontested spaces. This 
privilege therefore results in privileges afforded to the body's sense of 
freedom in space. In many cases, this positioning can be seen to reach its 
zenith of privilege in the white male subject. In "Another Country"". Cass' 
journey uptown to Rufus' funeral is fraught with fear as she senses her 
bodily difference. This contrasts with Vivaldo's freedom of movement in 
both uptown and downtown New York. The difference between Cass and 
Vivaldo could be expressed in terms of the extra layers of privilege 
Vivaldo's masculinity gives him. The white male does not encounter the 
Contestations the white female faces, for quite obviously, the contestation of 
space works not only on racial lines, but also in terms of gender. The white 
male therefore is supported by a two-fold privilege in his access to social 
space: firstly in terms of not encountering exclusion based on race, and 
secondly in tenns of not facing contestation based on gender. 
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After reading "Another Country", it becomes ever more clear that there is no 
middle position between the thesis of a universal world and that of worldly 
difference, or rather those forced to occupy this middle position can be 
driven to expenence e: unbearable nausea that Fanon felt. Whereas those 
who do not encounter opposition and contestation in their movement 
through social space exist outside of nausea, and can therefore be blind to its 
possibility. The condition of black western subjectivity then becomes a 
sickness unto death. 
Baldwin's novel therefore can be read as urgMg those interested in 
developing Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to rethink it in the light of 
differences of race, class, and gender. The spatial codings of difference 
between uptown and downtown New York in the late fifties should not be 
read as a 'classy throwback' to the dramas of the jazz age and black and 
white American movies. For those films should not and cannot be read as 
purely historical documents. As Fanon writes, on the last page of "The Fact 
of Blackness", 
I cannot go to a film without seeing myself I wait for me. In 
the interval, just before the film starts, I wait for me. The people 
in the theater are watching me, examining me, waiting for me. 
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A Negro groom is going to appear. My heart makes my head 
swim. (Fanon, 1986: 140) 
* 
When difference is grounded in the body, not merely in concepts and 
discourses about the body, the universal world to which we all allegedly 
belong is put in crisis. The social spaces of our existence become contested 
spaces. The nature of the contestation involves assymmetry. The reading of 
Fanon and Baldwin above has established that this assymmetry works 
through visibility and invisibility. In terms of race, the visible occupies two 
levels. Firstly, the 'fact' of blackness refers to the unambiguous difference of 
skin colour, a difference which, as was argued above, interrupts a 
phenomenological reversibility. Secondly, the visible in terms of a 
phenomenology of race highlights what lies beyond the blindspots of white 
embodied perception. The two examples given in my reading of Baldwin's 
text, of Rufus in Greenwich Village and Ida in Central Park, both show 
differences in 'visibility' in both these senses. Moreover, the contestation of 
space between white and black subjects in Baldwin's novel involves a 
relation between invisibility and the architecture of urban form. The 
4 uptown' area of Harlem, which in actual fact is mostly low-rise buildings, 
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has a sort of panoptic privilege over the skyscraper landscape of downtown 
Manhattan. In much the same way as Michel de Certeau's descent from the 
World Trade Center quoted in chapter 3, Baldwin's Manhattanites occupy 
spaces invisible to each other. This contrasts with the one character rooted in 
Harlem, Ida, who can see into the invisibility of downtown sociality. Ida 
therefore represents the site and sight of embodied counter privilege. The 
visibility of black skin therefore leads to an affi'mation of its corollary, the 
insight and vision of being embodied differently. Beyond white embodied 
blindspots of perception, beyond the skin privilege that covers over the 
contestive nature of social space and makes it invisible, the black subject 
uncovers a potentiality of insight. 
It would be possible to extrapolate here a conflict naming of space from my 
generalisation of Andrew Benjamin's notion of 'conflict naming' in the third 
chapter. In the long footnote to Derek Walcott's poem "Names", precisely 
such a move was made. To remMd the reader 5 in this poem, the naming of 
spaces and places by the coloniser are challenged and re-worked or re- 
named by those formerly colonised. At this point poetry becomes overtly 
political: questions of language and naming explicitly refer to issues of 
community and enforced community. Universality is revealed, through 
conflict naming, to be the ruse and strategy by which the forces of victory 
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conceal themselves as such. In this case, it is possible to draw a parallel 
between Cass' blindspot in Central Park and the operations of the names of 
power. Cass can only see the obvious, she has a 'natural attitude' which 
reifies the obvious in her perceptual field. She cannot see how the 
undisturbed neutrality of her perception is constructed on the basis of 
privilege. In the same way, the names of power installs and continues a 
certain framework of references and privilege (in the Walcott poem, a 
European privilege), without revealing itself as a form of power as such. If 
in the field of difference one can maintain the legitimacy of Heidegger's 
statement that 'language is the house of being', one can only do so under the 
rubric of plurality; there are many different houses of being. This, as has 
been shown, is the motive behind Fanon's rejection of ontology. For Fanon, 
ontology cannot 'accommodate' the difference of conflict, the difference of 
the black subject. But as we have also argued, the difference of the black 
subject can in actual fact only be secured by returning to ontology, as 
ontological difference. As the third and fourth chapters have argued, only 
through an ontology of difference can transcendence be thought within 
immanence. A phenomenological ontology of embodiment leads, through 
Fanon and Baldwin, to the notion of social space as contested. There can 
therefore be no 'pure' space of immanence, of a community that assembles 
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itself prior to the question; any such claim could only be made on the basis 
of the blindspots of embodied privilege. 
Conflicts of space, place and names are therefore opened up by a 
phenomenology of difference grounded in the 'third space' of the body. The 
body, be it white, black, mixed race, female or male, old or young, 
occidental or oriental, makes available certain ways of seeing and being in 
the world. In this way, an ontology of difference becomes necessary, to 
which I believe Fanon would concur (given his remarks in the conclusion). 
Given that social space is always contested, the immanence of immersion 
within a world always opens out onto the transcendence of other ways of 
seeing and being. The specific positioning of the subject to an extent 
determines whether this opening is a matter of coercion or repression 
however. The awareness of a difference beyond one's bodily groundedness 
in a world depends therefore to an extent on a critical consciousness. Critical 
consciousness opens the subject therefore to two forms of transcendence. 
Firstly, one"s communication with the world through the pre-personal body, 
as has been argued, amounces a tTanscendence of what has been given. The 
present, as the site of corporeal reworking, is not necessarily part of a line of 
time and tradition, rather it is the site of a potential rupture of that time and 
that tradition. But beyond this intra-conflictuality of the name (again 
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apparently the most significant form for Benjamin in his notion of conflict 
naming), an opening onto the traditions and ways of seeing of the other is 
also emergent. The second form of transcendence the body is opened to is 
the transcendence of the other, grounded differently in their body. This 
transcendence is not the altenty of Infinity, rather it is the alterity of conflict. 
Through an inevitable reciprocation, the recognition of the embodied 
difference of the other leads to one also marking one's own body out as 
different. Recognition of the markers that ground one's body in difference, a 
recognition grounded in a critical consciousness, therefore leads to the arena 
of conflict. 13 No-one can be exempt from the direction of such a programme, 
for to claim exemption would be to capitulate to the strategies of power that 
wish to overrule and undermine a critical consciousness of difference. But 
then such a capitulation itself can only lead to conflict in the face of the 
other, against one's will or inclination. 
But is that the end of the story, for one who reads difference into and against 
Merleau-Ponty such as Frantz Fanon? Are we merely led to the arena of 
13 Fanon cites Merleau-Ponty in the conclusion to "Black Skin, White Masks" 'Jor a being who has 
acquired consciousness of himself and of his body, who has attained to the dialectic of subject and object, 
the body is no longer a cause of the structure of consciousness, it has become an object of 
consciousness. '(Fanon, 1986: 225) In this sense, the other allows the subject to become aware of his or her 
own difference. As such, Merleau-Ponty allows community to be thought in ternis of intrinsic embodied 
differences, what I am calling the 'arena of conflict'. 
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conflict, of the name, of place, and of the body, that is if we were not already 
forced to encounter it? Does a critical awareness of the implications of 
embodied difference lead to a fragnientation of the socius, and a splitting of 
history into a thousand minor histories? Does difference therefore preclude 
the ideal of justice and community for all? Is the only 'justice' available 
through critical consciousness a promotion of the awareness that if your 
bodily being in the world is different from mine, then we are by 
reciprocation different from each other? But what sort of justice would that 
entail? 
The response from Fanon must be clear: a critical awareness, of the body no 
longer merely as the structure but as the object of consciousness, performs 
no splitting, and certainly no fragmentation. All it does is discover, against 
the grain of a beguiling rhetoric of universalism, that all is not equal. 
Embodied difference is the startingpoint for a critical awareness, and should 
not be confused, as the basis of a pessimistic critique, as its goal. In Fanon"s 
case, the critical awareness on race he preaches 
14iS for wholly redemptive, or 
dare I say it, spiritual purposes. 
14 Here 'preaching' is not meant as pejorative or as connoting proselytization. I am referring to the 
vociferous and pithy style of Fanon's voice, particularly In the final chapter "By Way of Conclusion". 
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In the 'Fact of Blackness', Fanon expresses his political desire as follows, 
All I wanted was to be a man among other men. I wanted to 
come lithe and young into a world that was ours and to help to 
build it together. (Fanon, 1986: 112-3) 
Fanon's desire is to belong in the manner a phenomenologist such as 
Merleau-Ponty decrees is already possible to all 'normal' humans. Fanon's 
critique of the universalism in Merleau-Ponty is therefore a suspension or 
deferrment of it. The world to which he shouted his greeting slashed away 
his joy. Merleau-Ponty's insights are yet of the blind. The world is not given, 
it must be fought for. The world therefore signifies a freedom that resembles 
the Kantian regulative ideal, or the Derridean 'a devenir'. The thought of 
embodying difference necessitates the deferral of a universal world. The 
world therefore is transformed from being the always already given ground 
of being, the 'inexhaustible reservoir from which things are drawn'. Instead, 
the world becomes the token of justice and freedom. The world is a fatural 
destiny for those who dream of transcending the fixing of the other's gaze. 
The body is both subject and object, as Merleau-Ponty says. Freedom lies 
therefore when the objectification of the body is not the work of the other, 
but the 'object' of consciousness for the subject. 
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For Fanon, this redemption from the gaze is articulated in terms of a 
transformative historicality, outlined forcefully in the final chapter. Fanon 
begins with Merleau-Ponty's notion of the body becoming an object of 
consciousness for the subject, inscribed within the present. Freedom for 
Fanon is first of all freedom from the weight of the past, 
The problem considered here is one of time. Those Negroes and 
white men will be disalienated who refuse to let themselves be 
sealed away in the materialized Tower of the Past. 
(Fanon, 1986: 226) 
The present is therefore the site of possible transfonnation, the horizon for 
the possibility of justice and community. A specific construction of the past 
has therefore to be dismissed. 'I will not make myself the man of any past. I 
do not want to exalt the past at the expense of my present and of my 
future. '(Fanon, 1986: 226) The only past that is legitimate for the purposes of 
freedom is a universal past. 'I am a man, and what I have to recapture is the 
whole past of the world. '(Fanon, 1986: 226) However, this project of 
recapture is secondary to secunng a freedom for the black subject through 
the present. Here I will merely list some quotes, for even a mere list of 
Fanon's conclusion makes available the force of his polemic: 
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I am not a prisoner of history. I should not seek there for the 
meanmg of my destiny. (229) 
In the world through which I travel, I am endlessly creating 
myself (229) 
I am not the slave of the Slavery that dehumanized my 
ancestors. (230) 
I 
am my own foundation. (23 1) 
Here then, Fanon argues that the present is the site of a potential rupture of 
the historical, the unbearable weight of Being. Fanon's redemption from the 
past involves not responding or reacting to it. Freedom for Fanon involves 
the active force of transfonnation of the 'now', rather than a reactive 
valorization of recrudesence. It is not possible to avoid the parallel with the 
account of histoncal transformation found in the "Phenomenology of 
Perception"- with the notion of a pre-personal communication between the 
body and its habitus. Fanon's 'endless recreation of himself , his existence 
as his own foundation, are the equivalent of Merleau-Ponty's 'resumption at 
every moment' of the perpetual contribution of his bodily being. '(Merleau- 
Ponty, 1962: 254) In both philosophers, freedom is a function of the present, 
as the site of a possible transformation of the given. In such a manner, the 
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linearity of the past is broken, and the future is opened to difference, the 
difference of a transcendence of the same. 
There is however an important, if subtle difference between the two. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the possibility of transformation in the present is given with 
the ease of a 'perpetual contribution. ' It would seem that the present is the 
site of rupture of the given's linearity, and that this rupture is guaranteed 
merely by the motility of the agent. That is, it is not clear whether rupture is 
automatic or potential in Merleau-Ponty. The problem with a decision on 
this issue is that one would want to recognise two patternings which lie in 
tension with each other. On the one hand, one would want, as Merleau-Ponty 
surely does, to articulate the insight that bodily repetition involves 
differentiation and transformation as the norm. A repetition that circles 
within the Same would be the exception, which in cultural production is 
usually enforced through work and discipline. 15 On the other hand, to the 
extent that one marks this tendency, the risk of automatising and naturalising 
transfonnativity arises. I would argue that Merleau-Ponty articulates the 
fortner and encounters the risk of the latter, without attending to formulating 
'5The discipline of 'classical' music is a good example. Only by codification in terms of score can 
approximation to a repetition without difference be achieved. The fact that music scores themselves cannot 
accommodate all nuances of musical expression is M part that which allows for new interpretations of 
classical works. This contrasts with the 'metaphysics' of jazz, or other improvised musics, where difference 
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a relation between motility, transformation, and work. There is a sort of 
flattery of difference at work in Merleau-Ponty's idea of a 'communication 
more ancient than thought'. In contrast, Fanon's freedom from the past 
involves a great deal more effort and resolve. For Fanon, transformation of 
the present requires a 'critical consciousness'. Without that, the weight of 
the past disavows and disables the possibility of transforming the present. In 
this sense, Merleau-Ponty's insight into the body's relation to freedom 
therefore again is blind to the weight difference can make to the past. For 
Fanon's text ends with the most solemn of vows to a vigilancy of the 
corporeal, 
My fmal prayer: 
0 my body, make of me always a man who questions! 
(Fanon, 1986: 232) 
* 
In this chapter I have argued that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the 
body privileges a construction of the 'other' as within the world. The 
world's circumscription of difference in effect reduces all difference to the 
within repetition is the nonn. 
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same honzon of being. Merleau-Ponty is cautious enough to suggest that the 
other sees the object through the 'intermediary of time and language'. Using 
Fanon, I have argued however that this mediation cannot resist a collapse 
back into the Same. Although Merleau-Ponty's monadological tendencies 
are always restricted by the facticity of embodiment (unlike Husserl 5S)16, the 
other is nonetheless inscribed within the temporality and historicality of the 
worldly 'now'. No-one escapes the Zeit-geist, Merleau-Ponty's spirit of 
time. I have used Fanon and Baldwin to show how embodied difference 
denies the possibility of an already given community and commonality 
between human subjects. Any assertion of an always already given Same is 
blind to the difference between the world named by power and the worlds 
which contest it. But then Fanon and Baldwin's insights are not ways of 
darnning Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to an ontology of the Same. 
Rather, my readings of both have been undertaken to tease out the ontology 
of difference that lies implicit within Merleau-Ponty"s text. The 
'communication more ancient than thought' of the "Phenomenology of 
Perception" in particular provides the most powerful and resourceful way of 
thinking embodied identity grounded in the difference of the present. Only 
on the basis of the richness of Merleau-Pontyýs work can Fanon's critique 
16 See for instance Husserl's "Cartesian Meditations", sections 55 and 56. 
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result in a productive phenomenology of difference which repositions 
community as the Ideal, and not the given. 
Fanon and Baldwin in their different ways attest to a spatialisation. and 
placialisation of Benjamin's notion of 'conflict naming'. As such, difference 
is seen to be grounded in an ontological problematic, rather than being 
reduced to mere epistemology. Difference involves blindspots in being 
engendered by the limitations of embodiment. The invisibilities of privileged 
forms of embodiment in the socius are matched by the insights of the 
'unprivileged', insights which I called 'counter-privileges'. In this way, the 
social spaces of urban zones become seen as contested spaces, whose forms 
of contestation are assymmetrical, from the blindspots of privilege, to the 
insights of the differentiated. But this contestation is only uncovered to its 
very depth through a phenomenological ontology of embodiment. This 
methodology reveals that there are no 'pure' spaces, spaces of immanence. 
The transcendence within immanence discussed in the previous two chapters 
therefore in this chapter is articulated in terms of contested space. 
However, as the last pages of this chapter have sought to point out, a critical 
awareness of embodied differences between the subject and the horizons of 
its being does not seek to denounce justice and community for the sake of 
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irreducibility. Rather, the phenomenologists' dream of uncovering a pre- 
thetic community is shown to be the vigilant goal of those who seek to 
question their bodies in the present. 0 
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CONCLUSION 
In the last five chapters I have been attempting to resurrect a 
phenomenological. ontology of the body, through difference. I have 
sought, that is, to show that the body allows thinking to escape from the 
trap of dualism. By thhildng the body as different, philosophy no longer 
needs to privilege either an objective or a subjective mode of thinking. 
I have argued that the early attempts by Kant and Heidegger provide the 
resources for other philosophers to develop the method by which the 
body can be allocated a central role in ontology. It is through a 
phenomenology which questions the privilege ascribed to the universal 
(questioning, that is, the transcendental apriori) that the embodied subject 
is revealed as the motile agency that articulates the world in its historical 
unfolding. In the language of the third chapter, this agency is 'workless'; 
that is, the subject does not dominate its world (its spaces, language, 
buildings and so on), nor is it dominated by them. It is rather through a 
'middle-voiced' interplay that the world and the embodied subject 
express each other, as history. 
335 
Conclusion 
In this way, the embodied subject is seen to act on the basis of a cultural 
and historical horizon of difference. This horizon is not immemorial or 
prescriptive of a certain form of authenticity. Such constructions of the 
horizon are derivative upon a more primordial corporeality - that of the 
culture and the history being transformed by agents of the present. The 
present is therefore the site of transmission and transformation of the 
conditionings and patternings of a cultural given. The cultural given or 
habitus is re-worked according to the different demands of the present. 
Through my readings of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, I have argued 
that this 'communication more ancient than thought' that takes place 
between the body and its world is inherently political. The politics of 
difference begins with the embodied subject, situated within a cultural 
horizon. This cultural horizon is the simulacrum of the Kantian 
transcendental horizon. Like the Critical model it operates as a given, as 
the condition of possibility for accessing and living within a world. 
Unlike the transcendental apriori however, this horizon is not universal 
and does not forever recede. Rather, the horizon is gathered up within 
each embodied action, and the possibilities of transformation of a 
particular world are opened up. In this sense, freedom, as I began to 
argue in the fourth chapter, becomes the freedom to be a historical being. 
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It is not granted that historical agency within the present of a cultural 
horizon facing its future can always express itself within the terms of that 
present. There will always be conservative and reactive forces which 
construct the cultural and historical given as 'pure' and 'originary'. 
Ideologies of an 'uncorrupted before' promote the desire to repeat the 
past without difference,, to transmit but not to transform. 
In relation to this, perhaps the most significant ambiguity in Merleau- 
Ponty is that he does not spell out the difference between active and 
reactive modes of motility. It is as if Merleau-Ponty romanticises the 
body's capacity to incorporate difference by addressing the needs of the 
present. For Merleau-Ponty, transformation of the cultural given itself 
operates as a giVen. But the absence of a distinction here ends up as a 
form of phenomenological flattery. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty is left 
unable to address all the forms of conditioning which the institutions of 
modemity and post-modernity have imposed upon the body. ' 
Moreover, the freedom of a 'corporeal schema', of celebrating the simple 
motile agency of bodily being, can be constricted and paralysed by the 
1 It is this lacuna in Merleau-Ponty's thinking that Nick Crossley addresses by inserting the work of 
Michel Foucault in his book, "The Politics of SubjectiVity". 
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other. Through the work of Frantz Fanon and James Baldwin in the final 
chapter, I began to articulate a serious challenge to the idea that Merleau- 
Ponty's flesh ontology brings us justice in the form of an always already 
given intercorporreity. In order to acknowledge the difficulties of 
difference, I read into Fanon an idealisation of the flesh ontology. That 
is, I contended that for Fanon, the union through difference of the flesh 
ontology cannot be considered as given. The fact that as embodied 
subjects we are all chiasmically entwined to our own worlds of difference 
entails that the flesh, as the Ideal of the universal, must be struggled and 
fought for. To consider the flesh as somehow vaguely already given is 
therefore a dangerous move. Within the terms of this move it would be 
correct to describe phenomenology as a conservatism. 
It has been my principal aim in this thesis to argue that phenomenology 
does not necessarily fall back into such a conservatism. On the contrary, 
it is only through a phenomenological methodology that difference can 
be thought, ontologically and therefore philosophically. Phenomenology, 
read through its development from Heidegger through to Merleau-Ponty, 
at last allows philosophy out of the current impasses of poststructuralist 
obsessions with the sign. The body, as spacing and temporising its world, 
dances with difference in the moment. Again I return to the words of 
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Michel Serres, 
All come to dance in order to read without speaking, to 
understand without language. They are all, nowadays, so 
exhausted, so saturated, so hagridden with discourse, 
language, writing. In the end fugitive meaning passes 
through there, tacitum. (Serres, 1995: 40) 
It is time to return to 'the body', through a phenomenological ontology. 
The body marks out its being-in-the-world. Both Heldegger and Merleau- 
Ponty fall into the trap of considering this engagement with the world to 
be within the terms of a reconstituted monism of being. Both tended to 
assume that there is only one world, and that 'world history' is World 
History. It is possible to read Heidegger's entire oeuvre as a shift from 
grounding such a World History in the subj ect to its displacement in 
language and, finally, a mysterious Event of being. Only in the Merleau- 
Ponty however is it possible to discern tensions beneath the surface of the 
text - tensions of difference. Against the prevailing reading of Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenology as opening up to thought the lived expenence of 
the motile body and yet closing itself off to the thought of difference, I 
have discerned a political ontology that works 'against the grain. ' 
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If philosophy does not engage with difference in the world, then it will 
become less and less relevant to the multiple voices that demand 
expression in theory today. Philosophy Will become an anachronism, the 
worst form of being 'untimely. ' No-one will continue to believe in and 
cherish the universalisms and the proffered certainties of language, truth 
and logic. Nor will they accept a grand historicism that disables and 
paralyses the possibilities of grounding human agency in a world open to 
transformation. And finally, nor will people continue to be seduced by 
the simulacra of difference, operating in a textuality which absorbs all 
transcendence within its own tenns. Philosophy must speak difference, or 
it will be drowned out by voices of the contemporary. 
For instance, by not engaging with issues around race, philosophy falls 
increasingly into the trap of being necessarily racist. For being blind to 
the difference of race is the least overt (but most powerful) form of 
racism at work in society. The fact of race and racism in the West alerts 
us, at a theoretical level, to the fundamental difference embodiment can 
make to identity. As Fanon so painfully exposes, in "The Fact of 
Blackness", racism, beginning with apparently the most innocent of 
gestures (from the child on the train) has the capacity to destroy the 
capacity to be in the world. 
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And so, as I acknowledged early on, I have to be alert and vigilant to my 
own positioning as a white male westerner. I write and exist in the world 
with a given set of privileges (and disadvantages), which allow for a 
specific set of insights and blindspots to be made available to me. It is 
only on the basis of my bodily being in the world that my 'knowledge' 
takes on the form it does. Again, from a philosophical point of view, all 
epistemic claims are grounded within a corporeal horizon of difference. 
Epistemology cannot be privileged over a phenomenological ontology 
without falling into the trap of not being able to ground difference. I 
choose my subject, but I cannot choose my audience. In this case, I 
cannot speak for difference, but I can attempt to allow difference to be 
spoken. 
The body. Difference. Phenomenology. As these themes get taken up and 
developed in the thinking to come, I end with the vulnerable struggle of 
the dancer as a figure for the efforts required to place embodied 
difference at the centre of philosophy today. 
The dancer is the sole hero, he remains when the others have 
gone, when music withdraws from the space. He is the sole 
hero, for he is helpless. His body is helpless, his gestures 
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and the sign that he attempts are not aided. Dance is without 
recourse. It is alone, and it is first. (Serres, 1995: 46) 
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